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Abstract
The signing of the US-China bilateral trade agreement in November 1999 paved the way for
the People's Republic of China (hereafter China) to ascend to World Trade Organisation as a
member. China's bid to become part of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) renewed
foreign investor interest after a decade of growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) in China.
An analysis of FDI to China confirms that foreign firms take an evolutionary approach to
enter the Chinese market place. Since the opening of the economy to foreign investors in
1978, foreign enterprises shifted their utilisation of entry modes from contractual joint
ventures (CJV), to equity joint ventures (EJV) and since 1994 many entered China without
the help of a local partners through wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOE's). Problems
and frustration with joint venture partners gave rise to the growth in WFOE's. However EJV's
are still superior in profitability and market share to the WFOE. Foreign investors need
guidance in selecting the most appropriate entry mode. However, entry mode frameworks
and models offered in literature are contradictory and fragmented.
Entry mode alternatives in China can be represented on a continuum of control. CJV's and
minority EJV's represent the lowest level of control or ownership while the WFOE, the
highest level of control. This study proposes that the entry mode decision can evaluated in
terms of the level of ownership that a foreign investor should adopt in a foreign invested
enterprise (FIE).
Turning to the theoretical foundations of entry mode choice, the transaction cost-, eclectic-.
resource based -, strategic behaviour -, institutional- and evolutionary theories are integrated
into a framework from which entry mode can be considered. From its theoretical foundations
entry mode determinants are reviewed and propositions made regarding the impact of each
determinant on the ownership level in a FIE.
A review of and application of the framework to the Chinese business environment resulted
in the market entry mode decision framework for foreign investors in China (MEMOFFIC).
The MEMDFFIC suggest a phased external-, internal-, partner and project analysis when
considering entry mode choice. China's high market potential, experience in attracting FDI
as well as high level of opportunism and weak intellectual property protection are proposed
to motivate foreign investors to adopt high ownership levels when entering into China.
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Opsomming
Die ondertekening van 'n bilaterale handelsooreenkoms deur die VSA en China in November
1999 het die weg gebaan vir die Volksrepubliek van China (hierna "China" genoem) om
lidmaatskap van die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie (WHO) te verkry. China se pogings tot
deelname aan die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie het die belangstelling van buitelandse
beleggers laat opvlam na 'n dekade van groei in direkte buitelandse belegging in China.
'n Ontleding van direkte buitelandse belegging in China bevestig dat buitelandse firmas 'n
evolusionêre benadering volg om tot die Chinese mark toe te tree. Sedert die oopstelling van
die ekonomie vir buitelandse beleggers in 1978 het buitelandse ondernemings hul
toetreemeganismes verskuif van kontraktuele gesamentlike ondernemings na ekwiteit
gesamentlike ondernemings, en sedert 1994 het talle van hulle China binnegegaan sonder
die hulp van plaaslike vennote deur middel van ondernemings ten volle in buitelandse besit.
Dit was probleme en frustrasies met vennote in gesamentlike ondernemings wat tot die
uitbreiding van laasgenoemde tipe ondernemings gelei het. Tog is billike gesamentlike
ondernemings nog steeds winsgewender as ondernemings ten volle in buitelandse besit en
geniet ook 'n groter markaandeel. Buitelandse beleggers het 'n behoefte aan praktiese
leiding in die keuse van die geskikste toetreemeganisme, aangesien toetreeraamwerke en
-modelle wat in die literatuur voorgehou word, mekaar dikwels weerspreek en ook
gefragmenteer is.
Daar is wel toetreevlakalternatiewe in China op 'n kontinuum· van beheer. Kontraktuele
gesamentlike ondernemings en kleiner ekwiteit gesamentlike ondernemings verteenwoordig
die laagste vlak van beheer of eienaarskap, terwyl daar by die ondernemings ten volle in
buitelandse besit die hoogste vlak van beheer bestaan. In hierdie studie word voorgestel dat
die toetrevlakbesluit geëvalueer kan word ingevolge die vlak van eienaarskap wat 'n
buitelandse belegger behoort te aanvaar in 'n buitelandse beleggingsonderneming.
Wat betref die teoretiese grondslag van keuse van toetreevlak, word die transaksiekoste-,
eklektiese, bron-, strategiesegedrag-, institusionele en evolusionêre teorieë geïntegreer in 'n
raamwerk vanwaar toetreevlak oorweeg kan word. Vanuit die teoretiese grondslag word
toetreevlakdeterminante geëvalueer en voorstelle gemaak oor die impak van elkeen op die
eienaarskapvlak in 'n buitelandse onderneming.
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'n Oorsig en toepassing van die raamwerk op die Chinese sake-omgewing het gelei tot die
marktoetreevlak-besluitnemingsraamwerk vir buitelandse belegg.ers in China. Volgens die
raamwerk word voorgestel 'n gefaseerde eksterne, interne, vennoot- en projekanalise
wanneer die manier van toetrede oorweeg word. China se hoë markpotensiaal, ervaring van
die !nk van direkte buitelandse belegging asook hoë vlak van opportunisme en swak
beskerming van intellektuele eiendom moet gesien word as aansporing vir buitelandse
beleggers om by toetrede tot China hoë vlakke van eienaarskap te aanvaar.
v
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The signing of the US-China bilateral trade agreement in November 1999 paved the way for
the People Republic of China (hereafter China) to ascend to World Trade Organisation as a
member. The signing of the agreement can be seen as one of the most significant market
opening agreements ever. US companies will gain access to previously restricted industries
like financial services and telecommunications, while significant reduction in taxes and duties
are expected. In return the US, as the most powerful member of the WTO will back China's
bid, and will grant China permanent normal trade relationship status (Beams (2000).
Interest in China steadily increased over the past 20 years as the world watched how the
Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and more specifically, the China
Communist Party (CCP), realised that it had no other option than to open China to the
outside world.
The Government was increasingly faced with vast problems in many areas: bankrupt and
unproductive state enterprises, a depleted banking system due to handouts to state
enterprises and increasing unemployment with millions of people that are living under the
bread line (Smyth: 1998, Jiagui: 1998, Burns, J.P. 1999)
1.2 Description of Research Problem
Since the start of the reforms under the Regime of Deng Xiaopeng in 1978, China has
sustained an average economic growth of over 10 % annually. With the continued reforms of
Zheng Ziamen and Zhu Rongi China has managed to attract the most foreign direct
investment of all the developing countries, 38% of the total FDI to developing countries.
More than 200 of the world's top 500 multi-national corporations have established operations
in China (Henley & Kirkpatrick: 1999).
Foreign investors encouraged by the recent reforms, and eager to establish a foothold in
potentially the worlds biggest market, will continue to invest unprecedented amounts in the
Chinese economy. Figure 1 illustrates the rapid growth in foreign investment in China since
1990.
1
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Figure 1: Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1990 - 1999
---------------------------------------------------------
FOI in China, 1990 -1998 (US$ Million)
50,000
45,000
40,000
35,000
5, 0 0 0
30,000
25,000
20,000
15, 000
10, 0 0 0
o
Source: US-China Business Council (1999), MOFTEC (1999)
1.2.1 Market Entry Modes for Foreign Investors in China
With the sharp rise of foreign direct investment in China, foreign investors became
increasingly perplexed as to which mode of entry to utilise while entering China. Pan & Chi
(1999) stress the impact of entry mode choice on foreign entrants' performance in the China
market. Both profitability and market share influenced by entry mode choice.
In the early year's foreign investors was restricted to the use of contractual joint ventures
(CJV), while as the legal framework evolved equity joint ventures and wholly owned foreign
enterprises also became possibilities. Figure 2 illustrates the utilisation of foreign market
entry modes in China since 1985.
2
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Figure 2: Market Entry Modes Utilised in the PRC, 1985 - 1996.
Market Entry Modes Utilised in the PRe, 1985 -
1996 (US$ Million)
60000 ..,--~_.,....
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___ CJV 3496 1624 2138 13255 20347 17791
....- .-- .--- -_.+-------~----+----I-------+-------+-----_ .._-
..........W FOE 45 480 3667 15696 21472 33601__ . ~_ .. ---------''-- __;__ _l.
Source: US-China Business Council (1999), MOFTEC (1999)
High levels of host country risk, uncertainty and lack of host country experience, coupled with
government restrictions resulted in foreign entrants utilising the CJV for the majority of the
investment projects. However, limitations with nature of CJV's, as well as government
incentives, in a shift from CJV to EJV since 1988.
Regardless of the legal structure, many investors became increasingly frustrated by the
limitations and problems imposed by the EJV, and the Chinese partner (Png: 1993, Madhok:
1995; De Bruijn & Jia: 1997; Van & Zeng: 1999; Wong & Maher: 1999, Appel et. al. (1999).
Increased host country experience provided the incentive for investors to increasingly desire
higher ownership levels in EJV or to take full control of their operations through a WFOE. A
number of practitioners and researchers have called for entering China by means of WFOE's
(Tirbert: 1994, Rothstein: 1996; Wood: 1997; Economist Intelligence Unit: 1997;
Vanhonacker: 1998). By 1995 the growth trend of WFOE'S indicated that it would become
the most popular alternative for companies who seek more control of their operations.
Current empirical research contradicts WFOE-advocates suggesting that EJV's performed
better in both market share and profitability in China (Pan & Chi: 1999; Pan & Li: 1999). In
1999 EJV's were utilised only marginally higher than WFOE's (15.83 vs 15.55 US$ billion)
(Gelb: 2000). In addition to EJV and WFOE's, Joint Stock Limited Companies (JSLC)
emerged by 1996 as an alternative to invest via the stock markets in listed public companies
enterprises. (Capener: 1998, Zaloom & Hongchuan: 1999)
3
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1.2.2 The Market Entry Mode Decision
Each of the entry modes discussed represents different levels of ownership, risks, resource
commitment and returns (Czinkot & Ronkainen: 1998, Kotabe & Helsen: 1998; Chee &
Harris: 1998 and Mead: 1998). In other words the entry mode decision be reduced to the
level of ownership level to be adopted in the foreign invested enterprise.
Much has been written with regards to the entry mode decision (Argwal et al.: 1992; Erramilli
& Rao: 1993; Erramilli & D'Souza: 1993; Brouthers: 1993; Woodcock et al.: 1994; Tallman &
Shenkar: 1994; Brouthers: 1995; Pan: 1996; Erramilli: 1996; Bell: 1996; Tse & Pan: 1997;
Tsang: 1997; Madhok: 1997; Sharma: 1998; Van Den Bulcke et al.: 1999; Sun: 1999; Pan, Li
& Tse: 1999; Pan & Chi: 1999, Padmanabhan & Cho: 1999; Delios & Beamish: 1999; Ding:
2000). However, no integrated framework exists that can guide the foreign investor in China
with its market entry mode decision. The contradiction found in the research indicates that
there is no simple right or wrong entry mode. All the relevant factors have to be consolidated
in an integrated model that can guide investors given its specific investment situation.
1.3 Objectives of the Study
In view of the stated problem the primary aim of the study is:
• To develop an integrated market entry mode decision framework for foreign investors in
China.
Secondary aims of the study includes:
• To critically review current market entry modes available for the foreign investor in China.
• To critically review and formulate propositions regarding determinants of entry mode
choice.
• To integrate and consolidate determinants of entry mode choice in a general entry mode
framework.
• To assess the Chinese business environment regarding the status of country-specific
entry mode determinants.
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1.4 Scope of the Study
The study was conducted within the following confines:
Although a host of market entry mode alternatives are available to foreign investors, only
entry modes falling in the category of foreign direct investment in China have been
considered for review.
Foreign investors need to consider a broader array of questions when entering into a foreign
market such as timing-, location- and diversification decisions, this study is limited to the
entry mode decision. In addition, the entry mode decisions are reduced to which level of
ownership or control a foreign investor should adopt when entering into China.
Although the majority of empirical research views entry mode choice from a western
perspective, studies from non-western perspectives on entry mode choice were included in
the review of literature.
The main focus of research performed on entry mode choice is specific to the manufacturing
industry, while only a few studies applies it to the service sectors. The literature review
includes both views, while the focus on the manufacturing perspectives are be dominant.
1.5 Method of Research
The study is limited to a literature review and extensive analyses of foreign direct investment
data. Figure 3 indicates the research process that was adopted. Two pillars of literature
were reviewed in order to achieve the aim of the study. First a basic literature overview of
China's investment environment was performed. In the context of the general investment
environment the entry mode options available for foreign direct investors in China were
critically analysed.
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Figure 3: Method and Structure of the Study
An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
(Chapter 6)
Market Entry Mode
Alternatives for Foreign
Direct Investment in
China Cha ter 3
Determinants of
Ownership Level in a
FIE (Chapter 5)
Theoretical Foundation's
of Entry Mode Choice
(Chapter 4)
Overview of the
Investment Environment
in China (Chapter 2)
Once the context for entry mode choice in China has been set, the study turned to the
general entry mode literature. Since most of the empirical performed are based on one or
the other theory, an extensive review was done of the foundational theories of entry mode
choice. From its theoretical departing points general entry mode choice determinants were
identified and surveyed.
Propositions are offered for each determinant of entry mode choice, and are integrated into a
general entry mode decision framework. Each proposition represents the conclusion or
suggested impact of the relevant entry mode determinant on the ownership level of a FIE.
Finally the China-specific entry mode determinants were identified and integrated into the
general entry mode framework. The impact of China specific entry mode determinants on
ownership level in foreign invested enterprises were assessed and propositions offered.
1.6 Summary
China's bid to enter the WTO has renewed foreign investors' interest. Foreign investment in
China in recent years has seen explosive growth. Frustration with the CJV and EJV has
increased the need for a framework to guide the foreign investor in deciding on an entry
mode or the level of ownership that it should adopt while entering in China. However,
existing entry mode literature is contradictory and fragmented in its approach to offer
guidance to foreign investors. This study aimed to integrate entry mode determinants into a
integrated framework for entry mode choice in China.
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2 China's Investment Environment
2.1 Introduction
The first building block towards the unfolding of a market entry mode decision framework for
China will be the review its investment environment (see Figure 4). China's economy and
business environment over the past 21 years were characterised by a phased or gradual
opening to the outside world. Each phase opened new opportunities for investors, and
impacted especially the mode in which foreign entrants do business in China. Notable are
the current reforms of China's state owned enterprises and trends in foreign direct
investment to China.
Figure 4: Market Entry Mode Decision Building Block One
-An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
(Chapter 6)
Market Entry Mode
Alternatives for Foreign
Direct Investment in
China Cha ter 3
Determinants of
Ownership Level in a
FIE (Chapter 5)
Theoretical Foundation's
of Entry Mode Choice
(Chapter 4)
Overview of the
Investment Environment
in China (Chapter 2)
Chapter 2 will therefore aim to review the history of market reforms in China, provide a
background to the reforms in state owned enterprises (SOE's), as well as to analyse foreign
direct investment to China. This review will provide a basis from which market entry mode
can be reviewed.
2.2 Market Reforms in the People's Republic of China since 1949
Contrary to the perception that the government of the People's Republic of China (hereafter
China) has embraced a market economy with a full democratic system, Burns (1999)
suggests that quite the opposite is true. In a very enlightening article he proposes that after
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50 years of revolutionary reform, the political institutions of China remain essentially Leninist.
'The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to enjoy monopolistic power, independent
media, autonomous trade unions and other manifestation of civil society are almost wholly
absent' (1999: 580).
'Since 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has maintained itself in power through its
control over leadership selection in all strategic groups, and control not only government
agencies but the legislature, judiciary, the military, strategic economic enterprises, the media
and mass organisations such as the All China Federation of Trade Unions' (1999: 582).
2.2.1 Economic Policy Regime of Mao Zedong (1952-1975)
Oernberger (1999) describes the political regimes and economic reforms since 1949: Shortly
after Mao came to power in 1952, he went to Russia where he studied the Soviet
communism model for three months. Upon his return he implemented the communism model
in China.
Farmers who for more that 40 centuries worked their own land and sold their own produce
suddenly found themselves as part of as a production team within a commune, losing title to
their land and working in work groups for work points. Their markets were replaced by
planned allocation of resources. Banks, domestic- and foreign trade and enterprises were
nationalised. Central planners set targets for production and prescribed how it should be
produced and who the consumers will be. Prices and transactions became merely book
entries with no cash values.
Mao did however implement modifications to the soviet communistic model by 1957. The
modifications include a degree of decentralisation where central directives were seen as
guidelines for the lower level cadres to interpret and implement. Lower-level conferences
among suppliers and users work out delivery, contracts and schedules. And extreme
emphasis was placed on self-dependent economic development on national, regional,
provincial and enterprise basis.
Dernoerqer (1999) stress that the central planned economy had delivered some fruit such as
an average annually growth rate of 6.7% in gross domestic product (GOP). However, growth
was obtained through forced savings into relatively high rate of investment in fixed capital,
which led to inefficiencies that grew over time.
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2.2.2 Economic Reforms under Deng Xiaopeng (1978 -1995)
The death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the band of four, his radical followers, provided
an opportunity for a change in leadership and economic policy. During the third plenum of the
11th CCP Central Committee in November 1978, Deng emerged as supreme leader.
Deng had to focus on the most serious problems he inherited from Mao. Kapp (1998)
describes Deng's basic economic policy as enlivening the economy and opening to the
outside world. Kapp (1998) also refer to Deng's four modernisations - agriculture, industry,
national defence and science and technology.
On the agricultural front, peasants were allowed to abandon communes and revert to
subsistence farming. They were also allowed to sell their produce relatively freely on local
markets. The State, however, still claims residual ownership rights and a right to interfere in
the markets. (Dernberger: 1999)
Deng opened the economy to foreign trade and investment and joined global economic
institutions. In 1979 China and the US established full diplomatic relations, and in the spring
of that year new laws were passed allowing foreign investors to set up representative offices
as well as sino-foreign joint ventures. Import! export licences were granted and foreign
exchange controls implemented. Special economic zones were authorised and foreign direct
investment started to flow in. (Kapp: 1999)
State owned enterprises (SOE) were forced to go to markets and had to buy inputs and sell
outputs. Domestic and foreign enterprises could be created to compete with SOE's. It soon
became clear that reform of the monetary and fiscal sectors were required. The State
remained responsible for infrastructure projects, but most investment activities were now
financed through the People's Bank of China as the central bank. Other banks became the
commercial banks that offered normal services to their customers. To preserve revenues the
tax systems needed to be reviewed and higher direct taxes on individuals were imposed.
(Dernberger: 1999)
At his death in 1995 the reforms of Deng were far from complete, but impressive results were
showinq. An average of 9.8% economic growth was achieved. The structure of the economy
was adjusted so that the service industry regained its rightful share of the economy, 30.7%.
By 1995 China became the 7th largest participant in world trade, with foreign direct
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investment in 233 564 enterprises of which 40% of the US$639 billion came from foreign
participants. (Dernberger: 1999)
2.2.3 Economic Reforms under Ziang Zemin and Zhu Rongji (1996 -1999)
Ziang and Zhu also inherited economic problems from Deng. The economic growth declined
from 14% in early 1990's to only 7% in 1999. The previous sources of economic growth
started to slow down. Rapid growth of agriculture and town and village's enterprises (TVE's)
slowed down. Fortunately between 1985 - 1997 FDI was sustained and exports grew 27.7%
annually. However since 1996 FDI decreased to below 10% growth per year. (Dernberger:
1999)
Ziang and Zhu were increasingly faced with the difficulty of obtaining increases in efficiency
in SOE's, and were losing millions of Yuan annually due to SOE losses. Bad loans to state
enterprises created the problem of insolvency in the banking system. Not only did the bank
suffer, the government developed its own budget problems. State revenue declined to
10.7% of the GDP in 1995. Despite tax reform, revenues increased only with 1 % by 1997.
An increase in corruption and a worsening of regional and class-distribution of incomes
further added to the load. (Dernberger: 1999)
2.3 Reform of State-Owned Enterprises
An understanding of the state-owned sector with its limitations and recent reforms creates
more options for foreign investors in dealing with the government and obtaining business
rights. Jiagui (1998) describes four phases of enterprise reform between 1978 - 1996:
2.3.1 Phase 1: 1978 -1984
The government conducted pilot schemes where decision making was decentralised to the
SOE's. SOE's were also allowed to retain profits for allocation at their own discretion.
2.3.2 Phase 2: October 1984 - December 1986
Diverse management forms were introduced with the main focus on the contract system.
Further decentralisation of decision-making power was endorsed, as well as the separation
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of government functions from enterprise management. Trials were conducted with the
shareholding system in few enterprises.
2.3.3 Phase 3: 1987 -1993
Management mechanisms were further transformed with the main focus of improving the
contract system. The government formulated provisions on the contract system. It also
defined fourteen categories of decision-making, and relaxed the state planning and price
control of SOE's.
2.3.4 Phase 4: 1994 -1996
At the third plenary session of 14th party central committee gathering, the government
committed itself to modernise SOE's in line with demands of a market economy. In doing so
it defined property rights, demarcated power, and further separated the function of
government and enterprise management. It adopted scientific management principles and
encouraged large and medium SOE's to group into limited liability companies.
2.3.5 Phase 5: 1997 - 1998
Smith (1998) describes the recent developments in the institutional reform of state-owned
enterprises. 'At the Chinese Communist Party's 15th congress held in September 1997, the
central committee endorsed both the corporatisation of large state-owned enterprises and
the restructuring of small SOE's and decided to step up the speed of reforms. The central
component of the government's reform program is "zhuada, fangxiao" - grasping the big,
enlivening the small' (1998: 102).
In dealing with the deteriorating financial position of the state sector the most important
decision was to restructure China's large and medium sized (LME's). The focus is on the
largest 1000 SOE's. These top 1000 comprise only 2.8% of all SOE's, but represent 63% of
the total assets, 69% of output value and 74% of revenues. Strategies to reform these
SOE's include the following:
Firstly, to convert large and medium sized (LME's) into joint stock companies or limited
liability Companies in which each shareholders liability is proportionate to the investment.
Better performing LME's will be listed on the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong or New York
stock exchange, where shares are divided in different kinds. A-shares which are reserved for
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domestic investors and denominated in renminbi and B-shares which are restricted to
foreigners and denominated in U.S dollar. This new kind of joint stock limited companies
created opportunities for foreign investors to be involved by means of equity investment.
A second strategy is to create additional large enterprise groups in strategic pillar industries.
Jiang Zemin hopes to create these industries to be able to have several enterprises in the
Fortune 500 by the year 2010. China, when forced to open its domestic markets in
becoming part of the World Trade Organisation, wants to have a strategic stance in these
pillar industries against foreign competitors. Large enterprise groups are especially focused
in the petrochemical and automotive industries.
A third strategy focussing on the small scale SOE's is to allow bankruptcies of SOE's. Since
1990-1996 bankruptcies increased from 32 - 6332 p.a. In some cases, bankrupt enterprises
were allowed to be taken over by other firms or enterprise groups.
Fourthly, small scale SOE's were allowed to become shareholding co-operatives. In a
shareholding co-operative system, management and workers are sold shares equivalent to
the net assets of the enterprise. In some cases loss-making enterprises have been given to
workers for next to nothing.
The Government is also willing to auction off, lease, or even sell off SOE's as a fifth
alternative. But where a purchaser cannot be found or the sale is politically sensitive the
SOE'::; have been leased to the private sector. Some SOE's have sold leasehold land rights
to commercial occupants. Often SOE's occupy prime locations in the middle of the city
where real estate is the most valuable. The World Bank estimates the total value of state
owned land in China as 15 trillion yuan. This means that there is an enormous scope to sell
land-use rights to raise capital to facilitate restructuring. Willingness to sell off SOE's creates
a further opportunity for foreign investors to obtain valuable land, assets and personnel for a
quick start by means of these acquisitions.
The government also encourages profit sharing arrangements with managers. For example
in the Xinfang Enterprise Development company, six managers contributed 100 000 yuan to
receive proprietary interest in the firm. They should earn profits of 200 000 yuan within the
first year.
Finally since 1992 some SOE's have entered into joint ventures with foreign investors,
referred to as 'grafting'. Two main approaches exist: (1) SOE's convert their assets
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(buildings, equipment, land-use rights) into shares in the joint venture, while the foreign
partner provides capital. (2) SOE's convert into shareholding companies or joint stock co-
operatives and transfer part of their shares to foreign investors. SOE's also enter into joint
ventures with non-state sector.
2.3.6 Phase 6: 1999 - 2002
The Beijing Review (October 11, 1999) published the 'Decision of the Central committee of
the CCP of China on major issues concerning the reform and development of SOE's',
adopted at the fourth plenum of the 15th CPC Central Committee on September 22, 1999 ..
The document describes the remaining problem of SOE's as the following: 'redundant
construction, inflexible operations, weak in technical innovation, heavily in debt and social
burdens, surplus workers, and dropping economic returns' (1999: 19).
Among a list of 11 initiatives the government also continues to 'push forward strategic
restructuring of SOE's', 'improve the balance of SOE debts and assets and reducing SOE
social burdens' and 'speed up technological progress and industrial upgrading of SOE'S'
(1999: 19).
Debt/Asset swaps is an additional important programme of the government in order to relieve
the over-burdened state banks of SOE debt. First the government created so-called asset
management companies (AMC). Asset management companies payoff the debt from
qualified SOE's in return for equity in the company. The AMC will then agree upon actions
with the SOE to streamline the company's operations, and to bring it in a profitable position.
One of the measures may be to re-capitalise the enterprise by selling it to private or foreign
investors.
2.4 Implications of Economic- and State Owned Enterprise Reform for
Foreign Investment in China
A number of opportunities arise for the foreign investor, due to the economic- and SOE
reform in China:
First, continued economic reform opens the scope for foreign investment in a number of
ways: Additional investment vehicle alternatives, added investment locations, and more
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industries are open to investment. The entry mode alternatives and location decisions
become more relevant to the foreign investor.
Second, the privatisation of SOE's and especially the dept/equity swap program create
opportunities for investors to acquire existing enterprises in part or completely. The question
whether to enter China by means of de novo vs acquisitive entry becomes more relevant.
Thirdly, joint stock limited companies (JSLC) also give foreign investors the opportunity to
invest more flexibly, by means of the stock exchanges in China.
2.4 Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1979- 1999
The United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD(c): 1999) define
foreign direct investment as an investment from an entity in one economy to another country
that involves management control. In view of the increased opportunities for foreign direct
investment and the resulting entry mode decisions, characteristics and trends of FDI in China
will shortly be reviewed.
2.4.1 Current Levels of Foreign Direct Investment in China
2.4.1.1 Actual Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1979 -1999.
A steady increase in actual utilisation of FDI took place between 1979 - 1990 in China (see
Figure 5). Between 1991 and 1998 FDI levels increased tenfold from US$ 4.36 Billion to
US$ 45.58 Billion. However from 1998 a negative growth in FDI resulted in FDI levels lower
than realised in 1996, US$ 40.4 Billion.
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Figtire 5: Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1979 -1999
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2.4.1.2 Annual Growth in Actual Utilisation of Foreign Direct Investment in China,
1979 -1999.
Figure 6 highlights growth patterns of actual utilised FDI in China since 1979. The two lowest
points of growth have been in 1988 and 1998. The first can be explained by the worsening
economic climate and the political instability during the time of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre. The latter may still be the result of the Asian crises of 1998. A slow recovery of
2.7% growth in actual utilised FDI was realised in the first six months of 2000. Growth rates
• in excess of 150% were achieved between 1991-1993. But since 1993, growth declined
strongly up to an all time low in FDI growth rate of -11.36%.
2.4.2 Phases in the Development of Foreign Direct Investment to China
Sun (1998) offers a brief overview of the phases of FDI, which will explain the patterns of FDI
as highlighted in 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2
2.4.2.1 Phase 1: 1979-85
Foreign direct investment in China started in 1979 with the promulgation of the joint venture
law and the establishment of four special economic zones in Guangdong and Fujian. In
1984 another 14 coastal cities were opened for foreign investment, leading to the first boom
of foreign investment in 1984-85. High inflation and a lack of legal clarity, however, led to a
slump in growth. During this period investment was concentrated in small-sized assembling
for export.
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Figure 6: Annual Growth in Foreign Direct Investment in China, 1979-1999
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2.4.2.2 Phase 2: 1986-89
In response to the slump in growth the government promulgated in 1986 'Provisions for the
encouragement of foreign investment', followed by set of central, provincial and municipal
regulation for implementation. The government also clarified the legal framework for foreign
investment and increased the number of economic and technological development zones in
coastal areas. These actions lead to another growth period. Growth however slowed down
again towards 1990 due to a worsening economic and political environment. Seventy
percent of the investment projects were focused on manufacturing during this phase.
2.4.2.3 Phase 3: 1990-1997
Amendments to the joint venture law in April 1990, and the standardisation of the income tax
law for enterprises with foreign capital and foreign enterprises (1991) were made in response
to the worsening economic climate. In 1992 the government adopted the socialist market
strategy and stepped up market reforms. A host of commercial law's were passed, including
the Companies Act (1994) and the Regulations on the Establishment of Foreign Funded
Joint Stock Limited Companies. All these laws and regulations provided a legal framework
for foreign investors. FDI surged from only US$ 3.4 Billion in 1990 to US$ 45,5 Billion in
1997.
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2.5 General Characteristics of FDI to China
Luo & O'Connor (1998) suggests that the contextual environment and corporate investment
strategy has dramatically changed during the past two decades in China. Changes in the
structure of FDI in terms of entry mode, industry selection, project location, investment size
and operational features are taking place. Foreign businesses follow an evolutionary
approach in gradually" increasing their investment commitment to the local market and
operation, while incrementally heightening their pro-activeness and risk-taking.
Foreign investors increase their resource commitment as they gain experience, learn and
adapt their strategies in a foreign market. Multi-national corporations (MNC's) in China
purposefully incrementally increased their commitment and investment in local operations.
They are not only entering the market to take advantage of labour costs, but are there for the
long haul. They have through accumulated knowledge learned to build profits and sustain
them.
Three phases of investment were identified. First the opportunistic experimenter phase. The
investor will only set up a representative office or some small operation as an experiment or
base to learn the local conditions and opportunities. As knowledge and learning increase,
the foreign investor will become a strategic investor. During this phase key investments will
be made to establish the investor in the local market until it becomes a dominant local player.
In the final phase the foreign investor will continue building the enterprise to maintain its
majority position and to keep competition out.
2.5.1 Structural Changes to Market Entry Modes
Foreign investors initially entered China by means of CJV's. As they gained more
experience in the local market, other options like EJV's became more popular (Luo &
O'Connor: 1998). Figure 6 shows the value of contracted foreign direct Investment between
1985 - 1996 for the CJV, EJV and the WFOE.
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Figure 7: Market Entry Modes utilised in the PRe, 1985 -1996.
Market Entry Modes utilised in the PRe, 1985 -1996 (US$ Million)
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The EJV were the preferred entry mode since 1988, but its use sharply declined from 1993 to
1996. The promulgation of the company law of 1994 gave rise to a rapid increase in the use
of WFOE's. In 1995 the growth trend of WFOE's indicated that it will become the preferred
mode of entry into China. However, with the decline in FDI to China both the utilisation of
WFOE's and EJV's declined. The CJV lost it power as a main entry mode for foreign
investors. CJV's are reserved for shorter-term infrastructure and exploration projects.
The utilisation of WFOE's as opposed to EJV's still increased between 1996 and 1999, with
the actual utilisation of WFOE's at US$ 15.55 billion, while EJV are only marginally higher
with US$ 15,83 billion (see Figure 8). Moreover the utilisation of EJV's were reduced
consistently in the past three years.
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Figure 8: Utilised FDI per Entry Mode, 1996 -1999
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2.5.2 Structural Changes in Investment Size
Figure 9 indicates that only a marginal difference between contracted FOI and actual utilised
FDI between 1979-1989. Since 1990 however, contracted FOI rose from US$6.5 billion to an
amazing US$ 114,4 billion. An increase of more than 1700% in contracted FDI. Since
contracted FOI indicates the growth in actual FOI, the high levels of contracted FDI can
explain the steady growth of actual FDI in the following years.
In a similar dramatic way, contracted FDI decreased to a low of US$ 52.1 Billion. The
negative growth in contracted FOI explains the continued downward trend in actual FOI. The
current low levels of contracted FDI indicate that no dramatic increases in actual FDI can be
expected in the short term.
Figure 10 portrays the contracted vs. the actual utilised number of FDI projects. The growth
curve of the contracted vs actual utilised number of FDI projects, shows a similar pattern to
Figure 9. A dramatic number of 83347 contracted projects has been approved in 1993. The
numbers of contracted projects gradually decrease to 19 749 in 1998. The number of actual
utilised projects steadily increased from 27 in 1998 to 644 in 1997, and then decreased to
585 projects in 1998.
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Figure 9: Contracted vs Utilised FDI in China, 1979 -1998
Contracted vs Utilised FDI in China (US$ Million)
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Figure 10: Contracted vs Actual Utilised FDI - Number of Projects, 19979 - 1998
Contracted FDI vs Actual Utilised Number FDI - Number of Projects
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Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network (1999)
Figure 11 shows the average value of actual utilised FDI increased since 1986 from US$
25.82 million to US$ 77.64 million in 1998, after declining slightly from 1995. The increase in
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average value may be explained by a stronger commitment to the Chinese market by foreign
investors as they gained experience in the Chinese market place (Luo & O'Connor: 1998).
Figure 11: Average FDI value per Project
Average FDI Value per Project (US$ Million)
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2.5.3 Structural Changes in Industry Participation of FDI in China.
The evolutionary approach suggests that industrial participation will develop as knowledge
and experience in the market develops. In the initial phases of investment, foreign
companies operate in less capital and technology-intensive industries such as food, toys,
and textiles. As experience increases foreign companies extend their investments to high-
tech and capital intensive industries such as telecommunications and infrastructure projects.
(Luo & O'Connor: 1998) Table 1 indicates the sector distribution of FDI to China.
The manufacturing sector is by far the biggest receiver of FDI in China. US$ 25,58 million,
56% of the total realised FDI. This sector however shows a decline of 9% in receiving FDI
between 1997 - 98. Real estate management also proves to be an important sector by
attracting US$ 6,4 million or 14% of the FDI. The more than 40% growth in FDI in sectors 3,
4and 5 (Electric Power, Gas and Water Production and Supply; Construction) confirms Luo &
O'Connor's (1998) statement that with increased experience foreign firms will invest in more
capital intensive industries.
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2.5.4 Structural Changes in Project Location of FDI in China
A major characteristic of FDI to China, as illustrated in Figure 12, is the unequal distribution
of FDI to the various provinces. The trend can be related to the history of systematic
opening up to the outside world, first to the special economic zones and then to the opening
of the coastal cities.
Table 1: Sector Distribution of FDI to China, 1998 (US$ 10 000)
Unit: US$ 10000 Value of Projects
Nr. National Total 4,867,049 4,797,627 -1.4 100
1 Manufacturing 2,811,983 2,558,238 -9.0 56.3
2 Real Estate Management 516,901 641,006 24.0 14.1
3 Electric Power, Gas and Water Production and 207,191 310,279 49.8 6.8
Supply
4 Social Services 198,802 296,315 49.1 6.5
5 Construction 143,782 206,423 43.6 4.5
6 Transportation, Storage, Postal and 165,513 164,513 -0.6 3.6
Telecommunications Services
7 Wholesale & Retail Trade and Catering 140,187 118,149 -15.7 2.6
Services
8 Other Sectors 157,611 114,614 -27.3 2.5
9 Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and 62,763 62,375 -0.6 1.4
Fishery
10 Mining and Quarrying 94,033 57,809 -38.5 1.3
11 Health Care, Sports and Social Welfare 19,535 9,724 -50.2 0.2
12 Education, Culture and Arts, Radio, Film and 7,403 6,830 -7.7 0.2
Television
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network (1999)
The Guangdong province in 1998 realised a FDI level of US$ 12,01 billion or 26 % of the
total FDI to China. Similarly the Jiangsu Province realised US$ 6,63 billion or 15 % of the
total FDI to China. All of the top 10 FDI receiving provinces are part of the coastal area. The
other 21 of 31 provinces received only 16% of the FDI to China. These trends clearly
confirm a very uneven distribution of FDI among the provinces.
Despite the uneven distribution, structural changes in project location are also taking place.
As experience and learning increased, companies invested in all parts of China. In 1990
only 333 foreign invested enterprises (FIE's) invested in the interior. By 1995, 44 875 FIE's
were found in the interior of China (Luo & O'Connor: 1998).
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Figure 12: Top 10 FDI Receiving Provinces in China
Top 10 FDIReceiving Provinces in China (US$1()()()())
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network (1999)
Fiqure 13: Top 10 FDI Receiving Provinces in China, 1998 (%)
:Top 10 FDI Receiving Provinces, 1998 (%)
Other
16%
Guangdong
26%
Jiangsu
15%
Shanghai Fujian
8% 9%
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network (1999)
2.5.5 Regional Distribution of FDI to China
As illustrated in Table 2 and Figure 14, Asian countries were responsible for US$ 31.33
billion FDI to China, 68.92% of all the FDI to China in 1998. Followed by Latin- and North
American countries and Europe.
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Table 2: Regional Distribution of World-wide FDI to China, 1998
1998
443,899
North America
Europe
Oceanic and Pacific Islands 58,619
430,933
20,405 23
266,528
8,237 15,876
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network (1999)
Figure 14: Regional Distribution of Worldwide FDI to China, 1998
Regional Distribution of Worldwide FDI to China, 1998 (%)
Ocean ic and Pacific
Islands Others
6% 1%
Africa
0%
Europe
9%
Latin America
10%
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network (1999)
2.6.6 Country Distribution of FDI to China
Although most of the world's FDI to China come from other Asian countries, who is the major
FDI contributor? Based on FDI levels of 1998, Figure 15 indicates the major role players in
order of importance. First, with a FDI level of US$ 20.6 billion, is Hong Kong. A surprising
second place belongs to the Virgin Islands, who channelled US$ 403.13 million FDI to China
in 1998. Thirdly, the United States invested US$ 389.84 million in China. The high level of
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FDI from the Virgin Islands may be contributed to the fact that the foreign investors invest via
the Virgin Islands, as is the case with Hong Kong.
Figure 15: Top Contributing FOt Countries, 1997-1998
Top 10 Contribution FDI Countries in 1997-98 (US$10 000)
500000
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network
The importance of key Asian FDI role players is also confirmed. Especially those of Hong
Kong, Singapore, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. To further explore the importance of the 65 %
of FDI to China refer Table 3 and Figure 16.
Hong Kong's contribution to the US$ 31.3 billion actual FDI to China amounts to 59 %.
Sinqapore and Japan only managed 10.85 % and 10.86 % respectively. The question that
should be asked what is does the FDI from Hong Kong consists of? What percentage of the
Hong Kong FDI is actually from investors within China who 'round-trip' their investment to
benefit from incentives given to foreign investors? This question however is beyond the
scope of this thesis.
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Table 3: Top 10 Asian FDI Countries between 1997-1998
r. Asia 3427589 3133102
1 Hong Kong, China 2063200 1850836 59.07
2 Singapore 260641 340397 10.86
3 Japan 432647 340036
4 Taiwan 328939 291521
5 Republic of Korea 214238 180320
6 Macao 39455 42157
7 Malaysia 38183
8 Thailand 19400 20538
9 Philippines 17927
10 Indonesia 6897
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network
Figure 16: Distribution of Asian Actual FDI to China in 1998
Distribution of Asian FDI to China (%) in 1998
Hong Kong,
China
59%
- --- ---------------------
Source: China Statistical Handbook 1999, China Statistical Information Network
2.6 Impact of Foreign Direct Investment on the Chinese Economy
Foreign direct investment can affect a host country on both macro- and micro levels. On a
micro level, areas that can be affected include transfer of technology, knowledge and best
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management practices. Host countries can also gain access to world markets by allowing
foreign invested enterprises.
On a Macro Level, real macro-economic variables like domestic investment, economic
growth, employment, imports and exports may be affected. Financial variables such as
interest rates, foreign exchange rates, inflation levels and balance of payments can be
affected. (Sun: 1998)
2.7 Summary
Through the market reforms of Deng Xiaopeng and Zhu Rongji, China has been gradually
opened to the foreign investor since 1978. A phased approach for the opening of the market
was employed by first only allowing investment in the special economic zone while only the
CJV could be utilised as an entry vehicle for foreign investors. Reforms in state enterprise
created opportunities for foreign investors to exploit opportunities in the state sectors. In
addition the development of a legal framework and policies for attracting foreign investment
resulted an explosion of foreign direct investment since 1991.
FDI to China over the past ten years was characterised by structural changes in the size-,
location-, and sectors of FDI to China. Most notable is the changes in entry modes utilised to
enter China. Although EJV's reigned as the supreme entry vehicle, since 1994 the WFOE
became a major entry vehicle, and by 1999 the WFOE was just as an important entry vehicle
as the EJV. The CJV lagged behind in the third place, while the JSLC only emergence as a
fourth alternative. The importance of each of these entry vehicles will be discussed in the
next chapter.
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3 Market Entry Mode Alternatives for Foreign Direct Investment in
China
3.1 Introduction
While chapter 2 provided a foundational overview of the history, trends and reforms of
foreign direct investment in China, chapter 3 will need to answer one of the most critical
questions for the foreign investors (see Figure 17). Which entry modes or -vehicles are
available for the foreign investor in China? What are the advantages, disadvantages or
problems of each entry mode? And which of these is the better performing entry mode in
China?
Figure 17: Market Entry Mode Decision Building Block Two
An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
(Chapter 6)
Four broad categories of market entry modes available to the foreign investor can be
identified in Figure 18: exporting, foreign indirect investment, foreign contractual investment,
and foreign portfolio investment. As indicated with the grey scale in the figure, the focus of
this thesis will be on evaluating foreign direct investment entry modes (Czinkot & Ronkainen:
1998; Kotabe & Helsen: 1998; Chee & Harris: 1998; Mead: 1998)
--
Market Entry Mode
Alternatives for Foreign
Direct Investment in
China Cha ter 3
Determinants of
Ownership Level in a
FIE (Chapter 5)
Theoretical Foundation's
of Entry Mode Choice
(Chapter 4)
Overview of the
Investment Environment
in China (Chapter 2)
3.2 Overview of Market Entry Modes
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3.2.1 Exporting
Exporting can be subdivided into indirect- and direct exporting. Indirect exporting may
include the utilising of export houses, export merchants, confirming houses, export agencies,
export management companies, international trading companies, joint marketing or
piggyback exporting and overseas buying offices (Chee & Harris: 1998; Kotabe & Helsen:
1998). Direct exporting instruments comprise the use of agents, distributors and the creation
of overseas sales branch offices. A main feature of exporting is that the actual production of
the product is still generated in the home country.
3.2.2 Foreign Contractual Investment
Although foreign contractual investment incorporates various forms of licensing, franchising,
contract manufacturing and contractual joint ventures, here follows just a brief reference to
licensing and joint ventures.
Figure 18: Market Entry Modes Alternatives for China
Foreign Foreign Direct Foreign
Exporting Indirect Investment Portfolio
Investment Investment
/~
Indirect Direct Contractual Fore.ign
Exporting Exporting Investment Production! Operation
,
/ <, -Agent / / '\ / '\-ExportHouses -Contract -Representative Office
-Export -Distributor Manufacturing -.Eqi.ïity ..Joi ntVentur'es -Joint Stock
Management -Licensing -Whoiïy Foreign Owned Limited
Company -Franchising Subsidlaïy Companies
-International -Contractual -Joint Stoëk Limited
TradingCompanies Joint Ventures Companies -Bonds &
-Piggybacking -Strategic Securities
Alliance
-, /
Source: Compiled from Czinkot & Ronkainen (1998), Kotabe & Helsen (1998), and Chee &
Harris (1998)
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3.2.2.1 Licensing
Licensing is a contractual transaction where the licensor offers some proprietary assets to a
foreign company - the licensee - in exchange for royalty fees. The main advantage of
licensing is the relatively easy way in which to enter a foreign market with scant resources,
and allows the investor to navigate around import barriers in the host country. It is well
suited for smaller companies. Licensing however can be less profitable than joint ventures
and WFOE's. Lack of commitment to the product from the licensee may result in weak
performance. After absorbing the technology, the licensee may mature into a competitor
(Kotabe & Helsen: 1998). Two specialised types of licensing include contract manufacturing
and franchising.
3.2.2.2 Contractual Joint Venture
Business-China (1999) describes a Sino-foreign contractual joint venture (CJV): 'A CJV is
formed by signing a contract through consultation of concerned parties from China and other
countries or regions. The contract shall define clearly the rights, obligations and interest
distribution to each party. The different contributions of each party of a co-operative venture
do not have to be in the form of equities, and the share of profits, losses and risks are all
stipulated in the contract. It is a contractual co-operative enterprise' (http://www.business-
china.com/investlguide.htm#form.htm).
The 1978 Sino-Foreign Co-operative Contractual Joint Venture Law governs CJV's. Since
the law lacks detailed implementation regulations, CJV's have wide discretion to organise
and manage its operations. No minimum contribution or limits on the term or scope of
contract is provided. No prohibitions for withdrawal from the contract are stipulated. CJV is
quick to establish and quick to terminate, and therefore especially attractive and suitable for
shorter-term projects like property development. However due to the deficiency of
regulations, CJV's are often at the mercy of local authorities' interpretation of an acceptable
scope of business. Since this investment vehicle is perceived by the authorities to be short
term in nature it is difficult to procure materials, obtain financing or qualify for tax benefits
(Brecher: 1995).
3.2.3 Foreign Portfolio Investment
Foreign Portfolio Investment involves the purchasing of stocks and bonds internationally. It is
primarily a concern to the international financial community (Czinkot & Ronkainen: 1998:
439). The joint stock limited company in China can be used either for portfolio investment or
direct investment, depending whether the investment is of long term nature or not.
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3.2.4 Foreign Direct Investment
Chapter 2 pointed out foreign direct investment involves a long-term relationship reflecting
investors' lasting interest in a foreign entity (UNCTAD(c): 1999). The focus of this thesis will
be on reviewing market entry mode decisions in the context of foreign direct investment
market entry vehicles. The residue of chapter 3 will review the following direct investment
entry modes: representative office; equity joint venture; wholly foreign-owned enterprise and
joint stock limited company.
3.3 Representative Office
3.3.1 Description
The representative office is by far the most common foreign business form in China (Melvin:
1997). Rothstein (1996) suggests that a representative office is one of the easiest and most
efficient ways of establishing a presence in China. Zhu (2000) propounds that foreign
investors frequently use representative offices, especially in the early stages of investment.
Todd (1998) advises companies analysing the market entry decision to consider establishing
a representative office in China without spending much money.
Before a foreign entity attempts to buy or sell products in China, it should establish a RO to
foster business contacts, investigate JV partners, and perform market research (Hatter &
Sullivan: 1997). The Puget Sound Business Journal (1996) defines a RO as an office that
engages in activities that are not direct business operations. An office limited to consultation,
market research, contacting prospective customers, negotiations on behalf of the head office
and contract administration. It is not permitted to make profit. The Business-China (1999)
quoting state regulations confirms, 'activities of established institutions (RO's) can only be
within the range of business connection, products introduction, marketing, technology
exchange and consulting services' (http://www.business-
china.com/invest/guide.htm#form.htm). Todd (1998) explains, to establish a RO, the RO
enters into a service agreement with parent company to provide defined services in China.
For example co-ordination, liaison, promotion, market surveys and other services on behalf
of the parent company.
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The RO is required by law to open a bank account, employ locals and promote the company
name or establish basic operations (Hafter & Sullivan: 1997). A RO also enables a foreign
entity to install telecom lines, buy equipment or obtain visas for visitors (Puget Sound
Business Journal: 1996).
A RO is not a separate legal entity, but part of the foreign corporation. The chief
representative is the designated agent for the foreign entity (Puget Sound Business Journal:
1996).
3.3.2 Advantages of Representative Offices
A representative office is a simple and flexible vehicle with a relatively low set-up- and
operating cost. Whereas many restrictions exist in industries where WFOE's and EJV's may
operate, no such restriction exists for representative offices (Rothstein: 1996). A RO can be
set-up in less than six months (Puget Sound Business Journal: 1996). In most cases it is
easy to attract personnel. Young Chinese graduates are very willing to work for
representative offices since it gives them exposure to the multinational environment
(Rothstein: 1996). By setting up a RO it gives an all important first impression to prospective
partners and customers qualifying the establishment, maintenance of long term relationships
and soliciting of sales on behalf of head office (Puget Sound Business Journal: 1996).
3.3.3 Disadvantages of Representative Offices
Rothstein (1996) highlights the prohibition of direct profit making activities and the fact that
the representative office is taxed, as the handicap of representative offices. If a RO goes
beyond its permissible activities, it will be taxed at the 33% company tax, and a 5% business
tax on its gross receipts. The law also requires a taxable RO to earn an arms-length profit
based on the functions it perform (Todd: 1998). A further obstacle is that RO's must recruit
their personnel through state management companies (Rothstein: 1996).
3.3.4 Procedure for Setting up an Representative Office
Figure 19 shows a simplified process of setting up a representative office. First the applicant
must find a sponsor for the application. The sponsor may vary depending on the industry.
Often it can be the Bank of China or the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation (MOFTEC). The applicant will then submit the required documentation to the
sponsor who in turn presents it to the authorities for approval. 'Within 30 days of receiving
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the letter of approval, the applicant must present the local bureau of the State Administration
of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) with 600 yuan ($73) and six documents: the approval
letter issued by the approval authority, the company's certificate of in-corporation from the
home country, an application letter signed by the company chairman, a capital credibility
certificate, a brief resume of each of the representatives, and a SAIC application form
completed in Chinese and English. If all the documentation is in order" SAIC will issue an
office registration certificate and a representative office certificate, both of which are valid for
one year. The applicant must also register with the Public Security Bureau, PRC Customs,
and the State Administration of Taxation, each of which has its own documentation
requirements' (Rothstein: 1996: 31).
Figure 19: Set-up Procedures of a Representative Office in China
Find Sponsor ·Documentation to Submit:
Organisation- RO
·Application
·Certificate of Authorisation from parent
, ·Certificate of legal operation-: ·Bank Reference~, ·Resume of RepresentativesSubmit Required ·Identification of Representatives
Documents - Sponsor ·Letter of Entrustment
~,
Register with SAIC -
·Procedures to Complete:RO
·Open Bank Account
·Customs procedure for import of
equipment
~, ·Registration for Taxation
~ ·Procedures for employment of Chinese
Complete Other Personnel
Procedures - RO ·Procedures for permanent residence
Source: Compiled from Business-China (2000), Sheila (1997), Rothstein (1996) and Puget
Sound Business Journal (1996)
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3.3.5 Suggestions
Rothstein (1996) concludes that many big companies have utilised RO's as a means of low
risk entering. Some have spent years courting government officials through the presence of
a representative office before it plunged into a joint venture or WFOE. Some continue to
utilise a RO as the head office.
3.4 Equity Joint Venture
3.4.1 Description
'An equity joint venture is a venture in which each party's contribution is decided through
consultation and clearly defined in the contract. The venture shall be jointly invested, jointly
managed, and the parties shall share its risks, profits and losses. Generally, the ratio of
foreign investment to total registered capital shall not be less than 25 %. Each party's
investment can be in cash or in the form of premises, factory building, equipment, machinery
or other materials, industrial property, patented technology and right to land use. A Chinese-
foreign joint venture is a limited enterprise of share ownership with the status of legal
person.' (http://www.business-china.com/invest/guide.htm#form.htm ).
EJV's are governed by the 1979 law of China on joint ventures using Chinese and foreign
investment and the July 1979 implementing regulations issued in September 1983 (Brecher:
1995). Brecher (1995) explains that if an EJV is dissolved its profits, losses and assets are
distributed according to each partner's holding in the registered capital. A foreign company
must own at least 25% stake in an EJV.
3.4.2 Forms of Equity Joint Ventures
Equity joint ventures can be differentiated by the amount of equity that the foreign partner
holds: Majority equity stake, 50-50 or minority equity stake (Kotabe & Helsen: 1998). Chee &
Harris (1998) suggests that joint ventures can also be classified in the following way:
Spider's web strategy: Establishing a joint venture with a large competitor and avoiding
absorption through joint ventures with others in network.
Go-together then split strategy: Co-operate over an extended period of time and then
separate. Suitable for construction type projects.
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Successive integration strategy: Starts with a weak inter-firm linkage, and gradually
moves towards interdependence and finally towards a merger or acquisition.
3.4.3 Advantages of Equity Joint Ventures
Although joint ventures are often seen as a forced entry strategy due to government
regulations, a number of good reasons exist for entering into a joint venture (Czinkot &
Ronkainen: 1998; Kotabe & Helsen: 1998; Chee & Harris: 1998; Mead: 1998). Joint
ventures yield higher control and returns than a licensing strategy. A major reason why
foreign investors opt for a JV entry is to gain strategic access to markets through the JV
Partner. If a credible partner is found it can provide valuable market experience and
knowledge. In addition to market knowledge, partners, if chosen correctly, might bring about
contacts with government, suppliers and customers critical to success. The pooling of
resources reduces risks and the cost of doing business in a foreign country. If well matched,
the combination of skills, technology and know-how can create synergy between the
partners. As with licensing, joint ventures can overcome export restrictions to the host
country. Joint ventures often receive special incentives and tax breaks from the government.
Governments fear the loss of control of the economy and seek the transfer of technology and
managerial skills from the foreign investor. In return the government might grant preferential
treatment. Chee & Harris (1998) suggest that joint ventures are very useful in oligopolistic
market where it will be too expensive to directly oppose the few strong incumbents.
3.4.4 Disadvantages of Equity Joint Ventures
The i.Jiggest drawback of EJV's from the foreign investor's perspective is the lack of full
control (Czinkot & Ronkainen: 1998; Kotabe & Helsen: 1998; Chee & Harris: 1998; Mead:
1998).
3.4.4.1 Non-Performing Partners
Wong & Maher, et. al. (1999) suggest that in China partner-related problems are most
significant. Chinese partners want to dominate foreign partners. The partner often has a
political agenda. Often the partner's contributions dwindle over the years, both in resources
commitment and actual management involvement. In addition JV partners have not lived up
to expectations: the partner did not provide the expected market knowledge and had limited
connections, or did not have the correct connections.
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3.4.4.2 Divergent Motivations
Kotabe & Helsen (1998) points to the conflicting objectives between Chinese and foreign
joint venture partners from Martinson & Tsong (1995) in Table 4.
Conflicts may arise from matters such as strategy, allocation of resources, technology, brand
names and often taking of profits (Kotabe & Helsen: 1998). Chinese partners also seek
profits on a shorter time horizon, and different opinions on profit taking are the source of
many conflicts between foreign and Chinese partners (Vanhonacker: 1997).
Table 4: Conflicting Objectives in Chinese Joint Ventures
Foreign Partner Chinese Partner
Planning Retain business flexibility Maintain congruency between the
ventures an the state economic plan
Contracts Unambiguous, detailed and enforceable Ambiguous, brief and adaptable
Negotiations Sequential, issue by issue Holistic and heuristic
Staffing Maximise productivity; fewest people per given Employ maximum number of local people
output level
Technology Match technical sophistication to the Gain access to the most advanced
organisation and its environment technology as quickly as possible
Profits Maximise in the long term; repatriate over time Reinvest for future modernisation;
maintain foreign exchange reserves
Inputs Minimise unpredictability and poor quality of Promote domestic souring
supplies
Process Stress high quality Stress high quantity
Outputs Access and develop domestic market Export to generate foreign currency
Control Reduce political and economic controls on Accept technology and capital but
decision-making preclude foreign authority infringement on
sovereignty and ideology
Source: Martinson & Tsong (1995: 5)
3.4.4.3 Technology Leakage or Slipover
A major concern especially in China with its very weak intellectual property protection is the
problem of technology leakage to the joint venture partner. Vanhonacker (1997) warns that
most Chinese companies lack experience to keep up with technological innovation. Such
partners also lust for the technology of foreign partners and foreign parties should therefore
be on their guard against copying of their technology or technology spill over. Many cases
exist where partners have divulged trade secrets and technology to suppliers, customers or
even competitors (Potter & Oksenberg: 1999; Gelb: 2000).
3.4.4.4 Employee Problems
Government policies of assigning and rotating managers give rise to the obvious problems of
short-term view and lack of skills. As soon as a manager is properly trained, he or she must
make room for the new assignee. Adding to the cost of joint ventures, is the tendency of
overstaffing JV's with poorly educated workers. Employee loyalty as a rule, is not highly
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valued. Former SOE workers fear mistakes and penalties and seldom take initiative.
Workers lack hands on experience with machinery and have no intrinsic value for machine
maintenance (Wong & Maher, et. al.:1999).
3.4.5 Procedures for Establishing Enterprises with Foreign Investment
To establish an EJV the simplified procedure as illustrated in Figure 20 can be followed.
After preliminary talks the partners/ investors will sign a letter of intent and draw up a project
proposal that will be submitted by the Chinese partner to the appropriate government organ.
Depending on the value of the investment, it will be submitted either to the State Council,
State Planning Commission or the Local Planning Commission. The pertinent departments
will review and approve/ reject the proposal. Upon approving the proposal the investors may
apply for registration of the enterprise's name at the appropriate Administration of Industry
and Commerce. A possibility (feasibility) study report will be prepared and submitted to the
appropriate body for approval. The articles of association and the contract of the EJV and
the CJV will be reviewed and approved/ rejected by MOFERT at every government level.
Upon approval of the articles and contract the investors may apply for an approval certificate
to establish an enterprise with foreign investment. Upon receiving the certificate the
investors may continue with the rest of the registration procedures as highlighted in Figure
20.
3.4.6 Recommendations for Foreign Joint Venture Managers in China
Wong & Maher, et. al., (1999) recommend that foreign investors should calculate the costs
of doing business in China. It will take an average 10 years to realise profits. Undue
attention from authorities should be avoided. If possible locate in a smaller municipality and
make smaller investments. Acquire 50-75 % ownership and for similar reasons obtain
majority membership on the board of directors. Establish individual sales and distribution
system. Use older technology to avoid technology leakage and keep suppliers close to head
office; suppliers need to be monitored. Apply western human resource strategies: for
example arrange people in work teams, draw up job profiles, base remuneration on merit,
institute a five day work, sliding holidays. Wong & Maher, et. al., (1999) further suggest that
younger people should be recruited since the bad state worker mentality has not yet been
reformed. Scholarship is a powerful motivator for the younger Chinese employees.
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Figure 20: Set-up Procedure for Foreign Invested Enterprise
Sign Intention of Co-
operation (If EJV)
~,
Compile and Submit Examination and
Project Proposal to Approval of Project
Government Organ Proposal -
SPC/MOFERT/MOFTEC
I
+
Apply for Registration of Review application for
Name Enterprise with _... Name Registration -...
AIC AIC
I
~
Prepare a Feasibility Examination and.. Approval of FeasibilityReport and Subm it to ..
Report -relevant Organ
SPC/MOFERT/MOFTEC
J
+
Apply for Approval Issue Approval
Certificate for _ .. Certificate for Enterprise...
Enterprises -Relevant Organ
I
+
Complete Registration Procedures:
·Registration with SAIC
·Procedure for Land use Rights
·Registration with Administration for Foreign Exchange
Control
·Open Bank Account
·Registration for Taxation
·Registration for Customs
·Registration with Finance Administration
Source: Compiled from Business-China (2000),LAB (1990), MOFERT (1990)
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Kotabe & Helsen (1998) suggest that to be successful in a joint venture, the first step would
be to pick the right partner, and establish clear objectives from the beginning. A 'china man'
(someone who knows both cultures and languages) to bridge cultural gaps will be useful.
Commitment from top management is argued to be essential for success, while an
incremental approach to implementation is advocated.
3.5 Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
3.5.1 Description
A Chinese wholly foreign-owned enterprise refers 'to enterprises in China established by
foreign companies, enterprises, economic organisations or individuals with funds entirely of
their own. They are also called enterprises exclusively run with foreign funds. All the profits
made by a foreign enterprise goes to the foreign investors'. (http://www.business-
china.com/invesUguide.htm#form.htm)
The 1986 Law of the PRe Concerning Enterprises with Sole Foreign Investment, and
detailed implementing regulations issued in 1990, governs the WFOE. A WFOE is solely
owned and operated by the foreign investor, it mayor may not have legal person, and it may
or may not be organised as a limited liability company. Furthermore it receives all the profit
and bears all the risks. The advantage of a WFOE is a greater control over the enterprise by
the foreign investor and the fact that it can make unilateral decisions without the regards of a
Chinese partner. A WFOE is protected against constraints of redundant labour and
excessive demands for technology transfer from a Chinese partner (Brecher: 1995).
3.5.2 Advantages of Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Vanhonacker (1997) advocates that WFOE's should be considered as a preferred alternative
to EJV's. He explains that WFOE's and EJV's are essentially the same in terms of taxation
and corporate liability, while the only real difference is that WFOE's take less time to
establish than EJV's, a board of directors are not required, and WFOE's are more restricted
that EJV's in certain sectors.
Vanhonacker (1997) advances that WFOE's are on the increase because FIE's have
become frustrated with inferior performance and limitations of EJV's. In addition companies
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have met little opposition from government in establishing WFOE's. Some of the major
advantages of WFOE's above that of EJV's are the following:
Flexibility and managerial control: companies can control their own internal operations
and procedures. They are not limited by lengthy decisions making processes of involving the
Chinese partners.
Faster to establish: local authorities are required to respond within 30 days for a WFOE's
apphcation. An EJV may take years to negotiate.
Efficiency and effectiveness: WFOE's are in control of their own operations. It can deliver
efficiency and effectiveness equal to their home countries, and are not limited by the
economic structure of the Chinese partner.
3.5.3 Disadvantages of Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Although greater control can be obtained through more ownership, it comes with a higher risk
and cost. WFOE's do not have the benefit of a Chinese partner's experience and access to
the market, and therefore risk making expensive mistakes.
As can be seen in the gradual adoption of WFOE's over years, it seems that foreign
investors should consider WFOE's only when they are already experienced role players.
They should be confident that sufficient financial and knowledge capital is available to utilise
such a high control/ resources commitment entry vehicle.
3.5.4 Set-up Procedures of Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise
Set-up procedures of WFOE's are very similar to that of joint ventures (See Figure 20). The
only difference being that no local partner is involved in the process.
3.6 Joint Stock Limited Companies
Capener (1998) in his article 'A New Investment Vehicle', refers to the adoption of the joint
stock limited company by the 15th Party Congress of the PRC. The congress decided that
joint stock limited companies, as the preferred state asset vehicle should replace all SOE's.
Joint stock limited companies are governed by the 1994 company law as well as the
provisional regulations on several issues concerning the establishment of joint stock limited
companies with foreign investment in January 1995. These provisions created a new vehicle
for Sino-foreign investment. A company can be established by 'sponsorship' or 'share offer'.
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It is possible to establish a foreign invested joint stock limited company as the acquiring
entity. One of the first examples of a Sino-foreign JSLC is Eastman Kodak, which formed a
JSLC with two other SOE's in the photographic industry.
Smyth (1998) describes reforms of SOE's. Large and medium sized enterprises (LMEs) are
converted into joint stock companies or limited liability companies in which each
shareholders liability is proportionate to the investment. Better performing LMEs are listed
on the Shanghai, Shenzhen, Hong Kong or New York stock exchange, where shares are
divided in different classes. A-shares are reserved for domestic investors and denominated
in renminbi and B-shares are restricted to foreigners and denominated in U.S dollars (see
chapter 2).
Sinopec, China's petrochemical giant provides an example of how foreign investors can
strategically utilise the JSLC vehicle. Sinopec was due for listing on the Hong Kong and New
York Stock exchanges in a multi-billion initial public offering. 95% of the shares were
purchased by strategic investors in the petrochemical industry, namely Exxon Mobil, BP
Amoco and Royal Dutch Shell (Euroweek: 2000).
3.7 Laws Governing Foreign Investment in China
The 1979 Law of the PRC on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment was the
first law promulgated in China allowing foreign investment. Table 5 indicates the
development of the legal framework that governs foreign Investment in China. Increasing
foreign investment levels and greater experience with foreign investors gave rise to the
steady development of a legal framework, guiding and governing foreign investment in
China.
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Table 5: Law's Governing Foreign Investment in China
Law Date Promulgated Drafting Agency
Law of the PRC on Joint ventures using July 1979 implementing State Council
Chinese and Foreign Investment amended in regulations issued in
April 1990 SeQ_tember 1983
Requlations of the PRC on Labour Management July 1980 implementing
in Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign regulations issued in Ministry of Labour
Investment January 1984
Provisional Regulations for Exchange Control of December 1980 State Council
the PRC
Rules for the Implementation of Exchange August 1983 State Administration of
Control Regulations Relating to Enterprises with Exchange Control (SAEC)
Overseas Chinese Capital Enterprises with
Foreign Capital and Sino-Foreign Joint ventures
Provisions of the State Council on the Question January 1986 State Council
of the Balancing of Foreign Exchange Receipts
and Expenditures of Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures
Provisions of the State Council for the October 1986 implementing State Council
Encouragement of Foreign Investment regulations issued in 1986-
("The 22 Articles") 87
Law of the PRC Concerning Enterprises with April 1986 implementing MOFTEC
Sole Foreign Investment (WFOEs) regulations issued in
December 1990
Provisional Regulations of the State March 1987 State Administration of
Administration for Industry and Commerce on the Industry and Commerce
Ratio of Registered Capital to Total Investment of (SAIC)
Sino-Foreign Joint ventures
Certain Provisions on Capital Contributions by January 1988 Ministry of Foreign Trade
Parties to Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures and Economic Co-
operation (MOFTEC) and
SAIC
Sino-Foreign Co-operative Contractual Joint April 1988 MOFTEC
Venture Law
Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign April 1991 implementing Ministry of Finance (MOF)
Enterprise Unified Income Tax Law regulations issued in June
1991
Opinion of Standards for Companies Limited by May 1992 State Economic
Shares Commission implementing
agency is the State
Commission for
Restructuring the
Economy
Value-added Tax Consumption Tax and November 1993 MOF
Business Tax Regulations
Company Law December 1993 SAIC
Provisional Regulations on The January 1995 MOFTEC
Establishment of Foreign Funded Joint Stock
Companies Limited
Source: Compiled from Brecher (1995: 10-18), MOFTEC: 1995)
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3.8 Joint Venture vs. WFOE Performance in China
Although much can be speculated about the advantages and disadvantages of CJV's, EJV's
and WFOE's in China, the foreign investor are concerned about the impact of entry mode on
the profitability and market share of its venture.
Pan, Li & Tse (1999) sampled 14466 foreign entrants in 610 product-classification in China.
The impact of order and mode of market entry on profitability and market share were studied.
The tilree modes of entry that have been evaluated were the CJV, EJV and WFOE in China.
Although the main focus of this thesis relates to the mode of entry, for the purpose of this
discussion order and lead-time of entry has a significant effect on profitability, and as a result
entry mode's impact cannot be seen in isolation.
3.8.1 Order and Lead-Time of Market Entry
Pan, Li & Tse (1999: 84) found that 'foreign firms that are early entrants in a given product
sector in a host country have higher market shares and profitability than those entering at a
later time'. Figure 21 depicts the impact of early entry on profitability and market share in
China. The average market share per entrant was 0.453% and the average return on assets
(ROA) was 0.573%. Early entrants' market share had an average market share of 1.960,
which is much higher than the average for all foreign firms. The average of 2.952% ROA is
also much higher than the average of all the companies.
Figure 21 also illustrates that the 'the amount of lead-time for early entrants is positively
related to market shares and profitability' (1999:84). Market share and profitability decreases
the later foreign companies entered China.
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Figure 21: Impact of Early Entry on Profitability and Market Share in China
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3.8.2 Impact of Market Entry Mode on Profitability and Market Share in China
With regards to the impact of market entry mode on profitability and market share in China
Pan, Li & Tse (1999) hypothesised and confirmed that WFOE's and EJV's have higher
profitability and market share than CJV's (see Figure 22). EJV's and WFOE's perform better
than CJV in terms of market share, however with regards to profitability EJV performs much
better than WFOE's. The reason for this might be that EJV's are usually found in pillar
industries where profitability is higher. In addition the WFOE's take a long-term view and
reinvest profits in order to obtain a long-term dominant market position.
Verifying earlier results Pan & Chi (1999: 359-374) studied 1 066 MNC's from Hong Kong,
Taiwan, USA, Japan and Europe to establish the impact of entry mode on the profitability of
foreign firms in China. They found that WFOE's do not have a higher return on sales than
EJV's or CJV's, but EJV has higher return on sales than both WFOE's and CJV's.
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Figcre 22: Impact of Early Entry on Profitability and Market Share in China
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Pan & Chi (1999) stress that entry mode choice matters. Foreign entrants need to take
caution for the down side of entering China alone. Valuable advantages of an EJV like
favourable government policy, easier procurement of supplies, concessions and market
access can be lost when entering alone.
3.8.3 Interaction between Order and Mode of Market Entry
Pan, I_j & Tse (1999) also reviewed the interaction between entry mode and -timing' impact
and found that 'WFOE's and EJV's that entered early have higher market shares than those
who enter late' (1999:87). While the profitability of WFOE's and EJV's that entered early was
not found to be more profitable than later entrants are.
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3.9 Summary
Chapter 3 reviewed the market entry modes available to foreign investors in China. Each
entry mode involves a number of advantages and disadvantages. Moreover each entry
mode provides the foreign investor with different levels of levels of control over the operation
on the one hand. On the other hand obtaining control over an operation requires resource
commitment and risk. Figure 23 illustrates that a WFOE rewards the foreign investor with
high control, while the risk and resource commitment is equally high.
Figure 23: Control vs Risk Trade-off between Market Entry Modes
High-s:::Q>
E
:i2 ~
II) E
ii: E- 00 o
Q> Q>
Q> CJ"- "-C) ::l
Q> 0C II)
Q>
0:::
Low
• WFOE
JSLC
Equity Joint Venture
Licensing
Direct Exporting
Representative Office
Indirect Exporting
Level of Control Over Operation High
Source: Compiled from Czinkot & Ronkainen (1998); Kotabe & Helsen (1998);
Chee & Harris (1998) and Mead (1998)
In view of Figure 23 the question of which entry mode to utilise while entering China can be
reduced to what level of ownership, resource commitment or control should a foreign entrant
adopt while entering China. The residue of the thesis will focus on the determinants of the
level of resource commitment or ownership that a foreign entrant adopt.
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4 Theoretical Foundations for Entry Mode Choice
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 and 3 provided the first pillar for entry mode choice in China. It established an
overview of the investment environment, and in that context described the entry mode
options available to the foreign investor in China (see Figure 24). However to review the
entry mode decisions from an empirical research perspective, it is necessary to return to the
theoretical foundations of entry mode choice as found in literature.
Figure 24: Market Entry Mode Decision Building Block Three
An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
(Chapter 6)
Market Entry Mode
Alternatives for Foreign
Direct Investment in
China Cha ter 3
Determinants of
Ownership Level in a
FIE (Chapter 5)
Overview of the
Investment Environment
in China (Chapter 2)
Most of the entry mode research is performed from a single or a few theoretical perspectives.
Bell (1996: 13) identifies the following basic theories that should be used as a starting point
and a conceptual framework for dealing with the entry mode question:
• Hymer's Market Imperfections Theory of FDI (Hymer: 1960, 1976)
• Transaction Cost Economies (Williamson: 1975, 1985)
• Internalisation Theory (Buckley and Cassson:· 1976, 1996, 1998; Buckley: 1998;
Buckley, Burton & Mirza: 1998)
• Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm (Dunning: 1981, 1988, 1993)
• Strategic Behaviour Approach (Kogut: 1988, Harrigan: 1985, Porter: 1991.)
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• Resource-Based Theory (Penrose: 1959; Wernerfelt: 1984, 1995; Mahoney and
Pandian: 1992)
• Eclectic Theory of the Foreign entry mode choice (Hill, Hwang, and Kim: 1990)
Although the Evolutionary (Kogut & Zander: 1993; Luo & O'Connor: 1998; Cui: 1997) and
Institutional (Davis: 2000) theories of the firm can be included in the list, it will not be
reviewed at this point. The majority of entry mode determinant research built on the listed
theories and the chapter will aim to provide an understanding of the theories underlying
extant entry mode research.
4.2 Hymer's Market Imperfections Theory of Foreign Direct Investment
Calvet (1981 :43-51) abridges theories of foreign direct investment. He advances that
Kindelberger was the first to submit a theory for foreign direct investment based on the neo-
classical perfect competition model. In a world of perfect competition FDI cannot exist. In a
perfect market no external economies exist. Information is obtained without cost and no
barriers to trade or competition exist. Trade only is possible. Thus Hymer propound a
market imperfection theory to FDI. In contrast to perfect markets, local firms possess better
information about their economic environment. Two conditions exist for FDI to take place.
First a firm must have an advantage above other firms, which will make the cost of an
investment viable, and secondly the market for this advantage must be imperfect. The
following classifications of the market imperfection theory exist:
Market Dis-equilibrium Hypotheses: The assumption can be made that in a perfect
economy, subject to perfect competition, adjusted prices everywhere will bring in equilibrium
supply and demand factors. However in segmented markets the rates of return may not be
the same everywhere. Under such circumstances given the level of risk, the rates of return
are not equal in every country. FDI will flow to higher ROR countries as the market is again
in equilibrium. Upon equilibrium FDI will cease to exist. This hypothesis can also be applied
to labour and technology markets.
Government Imposed Distortions: Among others, government policy may be responsible
for the dis-equilibrium explained above. Direct distortions include fixed exchange rates,
wage policies, regulations, tariff and trade barriers. However no equilibrating forces exist to
correct distortions created by the government. In other words every government must have
the same policies in order for FDI to cease to exist.
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Market Structure Imperfections: Above illustrations are consistent with competitive market
structure. On the other hand 'market structure imperfections are brought about by the
existence of monopolistic and oligopolistic market characteristics' (1981: 46). Two
characteristics of monopolistic or oligopolistic markets should be highlighted. Firstly,
decisions of firms are maximised if such markets are interdependent. For example the few
competitors closely monitor each other's moves and adjust their strategies and tactics
accordingly. Secondly, barriers to market entry is a requirement to prevent a surge of
competitors.
Market Failure Imperfections: 'Market failure imperfections are characteristics in
production techniques and commodity properties, which prevent a market mechanism from
allocating resources efficiently' (1981: 47). Three types of imperfections exist that lead to
market failure: external effects, public goods, and economies of scales.
4.3 Transaction Cost Economies
Nooteboom (1996: 16 - 24) drawing on a number of authors syncopate the transaction cost
economy. Two perspectives exist in the transaction cost analysis (TCA). Firstly a long-term
objective that aims to identify the survival of the fittest governance forms. Or differently
stated, to select a governance structure which will provide for long term success. Secondly,
the transaction cost economy facilitates short-term managerial choices, which explains why
managers in divergent situations select varying make-or-buy decisions.
Nooteboom defines a transaction as 'the moment at which agreement is established and
ownership rights are transferred' (1996: 17). The transaction consists of three divergent
phases: contact, contract and control. Each of the three stages represents costs of the
transaction. The contact phase will incur cost for marketing services, searching a partner or
researching. Costs of preparing and concluding the contract are costs during the contract
phase, whereas costs of monitoring the implementation of the contract are to be calculated
during the control phase.
The cost of contract and control increases principally when the buyer and supplier make
specific investments, which are worthless outside the transaction. For example a mould that
can only be used for the customer's product. In such instances the parties become
dependent on one another and switching costs are too high to change partners. Drawing on
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Williamson (1975), Nooteboom (1996) points to three types of specific investments: site
specificity, physical assets specificity and human asset specificity. Transaction costs
incurred due to specific investment will provide incentives to integrate activities into one firm.
Erarnilli and Rao (1993) confirms the above argument by referring to Williamson (1985)
asserting that a given task can either be performed internally or it can be contracted to
external agents. Whether to perform the task internally or not will depend on the
comparative transaction costs of running a system (including ex ante cost of negotiating a
contract and ex post cost of monitoring the performance and enforcing the behaviour of the
parties to the contract). When markets operate under perfect conditions it would not be
necessary to monitor partners since they would be easily replaceable. But if the market fails
these costs of monitoring will increase. Cost of monitoring must be compared by the cost of
integration (of establishing an integrated operation).
The TCA predicts that firms integrate when assets specificity is high, because the higher cost
of vertical integration is comfortably offset by the benefits flowing from such an arrangement.
When specificity is low, firms refrain from integration because the benefits of control, falls
short of the cost to attain it (Erramilli and Rao: 1993).
In short the TCA view the entry mode decision from a cost perspective. Whether to perform
a given task by itself or with a partner will depend on which is the most cost effective.
Nooteboom (1996) criticises the transaction cost theory in that it merely provides
comparative static of governance structures, and does not allow for a dynamic view of the
multi-national enterprise (MNE). It also omits a resource-based view of the firm.
4.4 Internalisation Theory
Buckley and Casson (1976) introduced and explained the theory of internalisation. Costs and
benefits of internalising markets govern the growth of the multinational firm. Giving a
background to the theory he explains that during the period up the Second World War the
force behind MNE growth was the need to regulate raw materials internationally. After the
Second World War MNE growth was driven by the need to diffuse technical and marketing
know-how in a way that best maintained the intellectual property of the innovating firm.
Underlying the internalisation theory lie the assumptions of the orthodox theory of production:
profit maximisation and perfect competition. Internalisation is still dependent on the
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assumption of profit maximisation, but recognises and relaxes the perfect competition
assumption to accommodate monopolistic and oligopolistic reaction. It also allows for
general forms of market imperfections, which are derived from imperfect intermediate
product markets.
4.4.1 Description of the Internalisation Theory
Buckley and Casson (1976: 33) advance by stating the main assumptions of the theory.
First, firms maximise profits in a world of imperfect markets. Second, when markets in
'intermediate products are imperfect the incentive exists to bypass them by creating internal
markets under common ownership and control activities'. Third, the internalisation of
markets across borders creates MNC's. Internalisation will be undertaken to the point where
the benefits are overtaken by the costs.
Intermediate products refer to any semi-processed material, which are used as input in the
process. However it also includes knowledge and expertise as embedded in patents and
human capital.
Rugman (1981: 27) asserts that the 'essence of the internalisation theory is the recognition of
market imperfections, which prevent the efficient operation of international trade and
investment'. Rugman further simplifies internalisation by stating 'internalisation is the
process of making a market within the firm' (1981: 28).
Four main sets of factors come into play with internalisation as suggested by Buckley and
Casson (1976: 34):
Industry Specific Factors: the nature of the products and the structure of the market.
Regi.)n Specific Factors: geographic and social characteristics of the region.
Nation Specific Factors: political and fiscal relations of the nation.
Firm Specific Factors: the ability of the management to organise internal markets.
4.4.2 Benefits of Internalisation
The benefits of internalisation are argued to rest in the avoidance of market imperfections.
Five types of market imperfections were identified which leads to benefits for internalisation
(Buckley and Casson 1976: 37):
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Time Lags: inter-dependant activities in markets may lead to significant time lags between
initiation and completion of activities.
Discriminatory Pricing: exploitation of market power may be done through discriminatory
pricii-:g which is only feasible through internalisation.
Unstable bargaining situation: a situation exists, where a party's bi-Iateral power leads to
uncertainty in pricing and unstable barging, the uncertain situation may provide an incentive
for internalisation.
Buyer Uncertainty: in a situation where a difference in knowledge of the product between
the buyer and seller exists and the seller is unable to convince the buyer that the product is
sold at a reasonable value, the buyer might want to shoulder itself against the risk and
internalise.
Government Interventions: the moment government impose restrictions, for example tariffs
on imports or exports or other non-tariff barriers on trade, the MNE will have an incentive to
internalise its production in the host country.
4.4.3 Costs of Internalisation
The benefits of internalisation should be offset against the cost of internalisation. A risk of
internalisation may be that the firm does not operate at a level of economies of scale. This
can however be corrected by using a system of selling excess production on the open
market or alternatively to buy intermediate products where internalised production is not
sufficient. The main cost items to be considered under internalisation are the resources cost
due to fragmentation of markets, higher communication cost internally and the risk of political
discrlrnination from the host country government. However the net benefit of internalisation
will depend on the ability of management to co-ordinate internal markets. (Buckley and
Casson: 1976)
4.5 Dunning's Eclectic Paradigm
Dunning (1981: 9-31) submits that the propensity of an enterprise to engage international
business has three determinants. First, the extent it possesses (or acquires) assets which
the competitors do not possess. Secondly, its desire to sell or lease these assets to other
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firms vs. to make use of them internally and thirdly, how profitable is it to exploit these assets
in conjunction with indigenous resources of foreign countries, rather than home country.
Dunning (1981) propounds the Ownership, Location & Internalisation (OLl) paradigm for
international production (See Table 6). The more ownership specific advantages possessed
by the firm, the greater the inducement to internalise, and the wider the attraction of foreign
rather than home based manufacturing. However for a company to produce successfully
alongside indigenous firms it must possess additional ownership advantages sufficient to
outweigh the cost of servicing an unfamiliar or distant environment. The function of the
enterprise is to transform inputs into more valuable outputs. Two kinds of inputs are
identified: First those available on same terms to all firms, regardless size-, or nationality of
the firm, but which are specific in their origin to particular location and have to be used in that
location. Second, inputs that an enterprise may create for itself based on technology,
organisational skills, or buy from other institutions. These inputs normally include proprietary
right of use. Although the origin of the second type of inputs may be linked to location-
specific endowments, their use is not so confined.
'The possession of ownership advantages determines which firms will supply a particular
foreign market, whereas the pattern of location endowments (assets) explains whether the
firm will supply that market by exports or by local production' (Dunning 1981: 10). The
internalisation strand of the theory deals with the question why does a firm choose to use
ownership advantages itself? Why does it internalise its capital, technology, and
management skills to produce goods rather than externalise their use by engaging in
portfolio investment, licensing, management contracts and so on? The theory offers that
basic incentives to avoid disadvantages, or capitalise on the imperfections of one or the other
of the external mechanisms of resources allocations - the market or prices system and the
public authority fiat (Dunning: 1981). Table 7 provides insight into the determinants and
indicators relevant in the OLi framework.
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Table 6: aLi - Determinants of International Production
Import Substituting
Manufacturing
Capital, Technology,
Management and
Organisational skills,
Surplus R&D capacity,
Economies of Scale,
Trad
Material & Labour Costs,
Markets, Government
police -barriers to
imports and investment
incentives
Manufacturing
Trade & Distribution
Ancillary Services
Miscellaneous
electronics,
textiles and clothing,
cameras, etc.
As above but also
access to markets
Low r costs.
Incentives to local
production by host
vertical integration
Various kinds
a)Portfolio Investment
b)Where spatial linkages
essential (airlines &
Need to Need to ensure sales
outlets & protect
company's name
A variety of goods -
particularly those
requiring close
consumer contact
Markets As per 2 and 4 Insurance, banking
consulting services
Variety - but include Markets
geographical
diversification (airlines &
hotels
Source: Dunning (1981:13)
Dunning (1988) restates and extends the eclectic paradigm in Figure 25. Dunning is
convinced that a holistic theory of production should be drawn from the 'new classical theory
of factor endowments (assets), extended to embrace intermediate products, and to allow for
the possibility that some endowments are mobile across national boundaries' (1988: 11).
The more even distribution of factor endowments is among nations, the more likely
international production is to take place. Dunning advances that the second strand is the
theory of market failure, which also explains the division of activity between multi-national
and local firms. 'Cetris paribus, the higher the transaction costs of using the market as a
transactional model, and the greater the efficiency of MNE's as co-ordinators of
geographically disperse activities, the more international production is likely to take place'
(1988: 11).
ownership transaction advantages in his model.
Thus Dunning distinguishes between 'Oa' - ownership assets and 'Ot' -
54
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 7: OLI - Ownership and Location Advantages
Wages per man hour
R&D as % of Sales" Energy costs (eg. Electricity)
I-=E-c-o-no-m--:-ie-s-o7f=S-c-a:-le-:----------------1 Materials Costs
Size of Firm" Tax Rates"
Relative size of Enterprise Average Number of Countries MNE operates in
Non-Production/All Workers" r Costs:
Capital/Labour Ratio Transport Costs
Opportunities for Investment Tariffs
Size of Local Market Non-Tariff Barriers
Size of Local Market + Exports
Diversification Indices
Average Number of Countries Operates in·
% of foreign/total production of home firms
Number of product group of parent"
% of shipments from multi-plant enterprise to total
shipments (in home country)"
General:
Political Risks
arket Concentration:
% output of industry accounted for by largest firms
Efficiency:
Wage Costs (per man hour) of production workers
Resource Availability:
% of main materials imported"
% of main materials used in production process
Product Differentiation:
Advertising/ Sales Ratio
Net output or sales per man
Growth:
Increase in Sales
Production Cost per man
Net output or sales per man
Profitability:
Profits/Assets or Sales
Proif!ability:
Profits/assets
Increase in sales
Source: Dunning (1981: 17)
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Figure 25: The Endowment! Market Failure Paradigm of International Production
Factor Endowments
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-Government
Intervention
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-Transport Cost
-Production Cost
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-Psychic Distance
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Source: Dunning (1988: 12)
56
Firm:
-Size
-Age
-Strategy
-Leader! Follower
-Innovator! Followe
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Itaki (1991) however criticises the eclectic paradigm. Firstly, Itaki suggests that the
ownership advantage has become redundant in that it originates from internalisation and
integration, while the cost of acquiring ownership advantages is neglected. 'After paying for
the contribution of all the factor inputs, super normal profit that remain in the firm's results
simply from the firm's organisational power of internalisation and integration' (1991 :447).
Secondly, ownership advantages are argued to be inseparable from location advantages.
When looked at from an economic and not an engineering perspective, the ownership
advantage is tied to, and is influenced by the location and should be considered
simultaneously.
Dunning (1995) re-appraised the eclectic paradigm in an age of alliance capitalism. First,
Dunr.inq suggests that the concept of competitive advantages (of ownership) 'should be
extended to take explicit account of the cost and benefits derived from inter-firm relationships
and transactions (both at home and abroad) and particularly those that arise from strategic
alliance and networks.' In considering location advantages, extended attention should be
awarded to the following factors. 'The territorial embedded ness of interdependent immobile
assets, in particular changing economic activities. Conditions under which inter-firm
competitive enhancing alliances may flourish; and the role of national and regional authorities
in influencing the extent and structure of localised centres of excellence'. Thirdly, the
concept that firms internalise intermediate markets, primarily to reduce the transaction- and
co-ordination cost of markets, needs to be widened to include dynamic and competitive
enhancing goals of the firm (1995: 473).
4.6 Strategic Behaviour Approach
Kogut (1988: 322) submits, 'whereas transaction cost theory posits that firms transact by the
mode which minimises the sum of the production and transaction costs, the strategic
behaviour approach posits that firms transact by the mode which maximises profits through
improving a firm's competitive position vis-a-vis rivals' (1988:322). Kogut advances how a
firm's asset value is influenced through the strategic behaviour of competitive positioning. A
firm may be motivated to enter in a JV to deter entry or erode competitor positions.
Hoskisson, Hit,et al. (1999) describes the development of the strategic management field in
the past two decades as dramatic. Referring to the earlier works on strategy he suggests it
focussed on the fit between strategy and structure. Porter (1985) however extended these
views to competitive strategy and competitive advantage.
57
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.6.1 Porter's Dynamic Theory of Strategy
Porter (1991: 95-117) proposes a dynamic theory of strategy. The 'reason why firms succeed
or fail' is the fundamental question of strategy (1991: 95). To explain why firms succeed or
fail, a theory is needed to link the environmental circumstances and firm behaviour to market
outcomes. Porter explores the question of success by suggesting a chain of causality in
Figure 26.
Figure 26: Porter's Determinants of Success in Business
Activities/
Value
System
Firm Success
Attractive Attractive
Relative .... ... Industry.... ...
Position Structure
Sustainable
Com petitive
Advantage
Managerial .. .. Initial
Choices ..... ... Conditions
Source: Porter (1991: 100)
A firm's success is a function of both the industry's attractiveness and the firm's relative
position in that industry (industry effect and positioning effect). The industry's attractiveness
or profitability will be dependent on the five competitive forces, as pictured in Figure 27.
Since the five forces model is so well known, it will not be further explained.
58
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 27: Porter's Five Forces Model
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The question is however what determines the relative position in the industry. Porter
advocates that a sustainable competitive advantage or advantages will result in a competitive
position. The generic low cost- and differentiation strategies are suggested as basic
strategies for developing a competitive advantage. Competitive advantage is also developed
in the context of competitive scope, namely which products to offer, buyer segments to
serve, locations to enter or what level of vertical integration to adopt. The choice of scope is
central to strategy.
Still the question remains why some firms realise a cost or differentiation advantage.
Underlying competitive advantage, are the activities (value chain) of a firm. A firm is a
collection of activities as illustrated in Figure 28. Through the economics of performing a
value chain, a firm can attain a cost advantage, or create more customer value.
Porter drives the why questions still deeper by identifying drivers or structural determinants of
differences among competitors. Why are some firms able to produce at lower cost or
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differentiate from others? A number of determinants are suggested, including: economies of
scale, cumulative learning curves, linkages between value activities, the ability to share
activities between divisions, capacity utilisation, activity location, investment timing, level of
vertical integration, and institutional factors.
Figure 28: Porter's Value Chain and Value System
Firm Infrastructure
Human Resource Management
Technology Development
Procurement
Inbound
Operation
Outbound Marketing
ServiceLogistics Logistics & Sales
L- F_i_rm__'s__V_a_lu_e_c_h_a_in ~
Supplier Firms Channel Channel
Value Value Value Value
Chain Chain Chain Chain
Value System
~
Source: Porter (1991 :103)
Porter identifies managerial choices and initial conditions at the root (see Figure 26).
Numerous examples exist where companies succeeded entirely based on managerial
innovations (e.g. Apple, Wal-Mart). Initial conditions, on the other hand, may include pre-
existing skills, a reputation, or in-place activities. However initial conditions can be explained
by a history of managerial choice.
From a firm perspective it can then be argued that a competitive advantage depends on a
firm's ability to make good strategy choices and implement them. However, a dynamic
theory needs to simultaneously deal with firm, industry and broader environment variables.
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A competitive advantage originates both from within and outside the firm. The 'starting point
for the theory is that environmental change is relentless and firms, through innovations, have
considerable latitude in both influencing their environment and responding to it. Firms create
and sustain competitive advantage because of the capacity to continuously improve,
innovate, and upgrade their competitive advantages over time. Upgrading is the process of
shifting advantages through out the value chain to more sophisticated types, and employing
higher levels of skill and technology. Successful firms are those that improve and innovate in
ways that are valued not only at home but also elsewhere. Competitive success is enhanced
by moving early in each product or process generation, provided that movement is along a
path that reflects evolving technology and buyer needs, and that early movers subsequently
upgrade their position rather than rest on them. In this view, firms have considerable
discretion in relaxing external and internal constraints' (1991: 111).
In Figure 29 Porter suggests that factor, demand and supporting industry conditions, needs
to be considered as part of a dynamic process of strategy formulations.
Figure 29: Environmental Determinants of Innovation and Upgrading
Firm Strategy,
Structure,
Rival
Related and
Supporting
Industries
Factor
Conditions
Demand
Conditions
In summary, relating the strategic behaviour approach back to entry mode choice, a foreign
entrant will need to consider which entry mode is the most appropriate to implement its
strategy and to best facilitate the development and protection of an competitive advantage.
Source: Porter (1991: 111)
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4.7 The Resource-Based Theory
Hoskisson & Hit et al. (1999) argue that the resource-based view of the firm only became a
dominant framework in the 1980's and 1990's, despite having its roots in the 1950's. A
number of researchers have applied the resource-based view of the firm to the areas of
strategie management and international business recently (Wernerfeit: 1984/1995; Peteraf:
1993; Sharma: 1995; Fay: 1996; Tsang: 1997; Jones: 2000; Das, T.K. 2000).
4.7.1 Penrose's Theory of the Growth of Firms
Kor & Mahoney (2000: 109) advocate the importance of Edith Tilton Penrose's (1959)
classic: Theory of the Growth of Firms. Penrose's resource approach to the growth of the
firm laid the foundation for the resource-based view of the firm. Kor & Mahoney (2000: 114-
119) abstract Penrose's work into ten ideas as is illustrated by Figure 30 and Table 8.
Table 8: Penrose's Ten Idea's of the Resource Growth Process
Idea 1: Firm growth can be usefully studied as a dynamic process of management interacting with
resources.
Idea 2: Firms are institutions created by people to serve the purposes of people.
Idea 3: Services of resources are drivers of firm heterogeneity
Idea 4: Service that material resources will yield depends upon the knowledge possessed by
human resources. The two together create a subjective productive opportunity that is unique for
each firm.
Idea 5: Firm growth is a function of firm-specific experiences in teams.
Idea 6: Managerial capability is the binding constraint that limits the growth rate of the firm - the
so-called 'Penrose effect'
Idea 7: Excess capacity of productive services of resources is drivers of firm growth.
Idea 8:Unused productive service of resources can be a source of innovation.
Idea 9: Firm diversification is often based on firm's competencies that can lead to a sustainable
advantage.
• Idea 10: An important component of competitive process is experimentation.
•
•
•
•
•
Source: Compiled from Kor & Mahoney (2000: 114-119)
Central to Penrose's theory is the concept that firms develop resources, which must be the
basis for diversification strategies and creating a sustainable advantage.
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4.7.2 Wernerfelt 's Resource-Based View of the Firm
Wernerfelt (1984) add to Penrose (1959) by seeing a firm as an extensive set of resources.
He suggests that firms should be viewed from the resource side rather than from product
side, and introduces the concepts of resource position barriers. The resource-based view
addresses key issues for strategy formulation, namely: On which resource to build a
diversification strategy, which resources to develop through diversification, in what sequence
and to what market to diversify, and finally what types of firms to acquire.
Wernerfelt utilises Caves' (1980) definition of a resource as tangible and intangible assets,
tied semi-permanently to the firms. Such assets may include brand names, in-house
knowledge of technology, employment of skilled personnel and trade contacts. Resources
yield different returns under different circumstances. Drawing on Porter's five forces model
(1991) it is suggested that when resources are controlled by a monopolistic group, or sold on
monopolistic market or substitute resources are available, the yields on the resource will
dissipate.
Higher yield can be realised where a firm holds a first mover advantage. The reality of the
first mover firms holding the valued resources (e.g., valuable government contacts), affects
the cost and revenues of later entrants. A resource position barrier protects such a first
mover. A resource position barrier can be compared to an entry barrier, although an entry
barrier only deals with barriers to the new entrants. Resource position barriers implies
advantages over both new entrants and incumbents. Firms should strive to develop both,
entry barriers and resource position barriers.
Classes of resources are effective in identifying the specific resource position barriers to be
built up. Examples of resources in which resource position barriers can be build up, include
machine capacity, customer loyalty, production experience and technological leads. Holders
of resource barriers should strive for a position where resources become self-reproducing
and making it directly or indirectly more difficult for later entrants to catch up.
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Figure 30: Penrose's Model of the Resource Growth Process
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Merger and acquisitions are viewed as an opportunity to buy otherwise non-tradable bundles
of resources. Two resource-based criteria are suggested for evaluating an acquisition target:
Whether resources are related supplementary (more of existing resources) or related
complementary (if acquiring resources combine effectively with existing resources).
Wernerfelt promotes the use of a resource-product matrix to evaluate diversification strategy
(See Table 9). Although the most common diversification strategy for companies is to utilise
a single resource and enter all markets with that resource, it is suggested that resources
should be developed sequentially. By employing a current resource in the local market, (e.g.
domestic contacts) a further resource (e.g. production skills) can be developed (still in the
home market). Upon being developed, the production skills can be leveraged to enter the
international market, giving rise to another resource to be developed (e.g. international
contacts)
Table 9: Resource-Product Matrix
International
x---+---. XTurnkey
Source: Wernerfelt (1984: 179)
An important component of the resource-based view is to balance the exploitation and
development of resources. Diversified firms can be viewed in terms of a portfolio of
resources rather than products, in which a balance should be optioned between developing
and exploiting resources. A final caveat from Wernerfelt is seeing the development of
resources as stepping-stones. The Japanese first developed capabilities in chip
manufacturing before it entering the computer industry as a natural next step (Wernerfeit:
1995: 171-180).
4.7.3 Cornerstones of Competitive Advantage - A Resource-Based View
Peterat (1993) extends the concept of competitive advantage by supplying the cornerstones
of a sustainable competitive advantage (see Figure 31). For a competitive advantage to be
sustainable and to earn above normal rent, the following requirements need to be met:
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The first requirement is resource heterogeneity from which Ricardian or monopoly rents can
be earned. Resources differ in efficiency and superior resources will be able to gain higher
rents. Secondly, ex post limits to competition, prevent advantages from being competed
away. Being limits imposed on competition before they gain a dominant position. Imperfect
imitatability and imperfect substitutability is suggested as such limits. Isolating mechanism
(e.g. property rights) are suggested as an ex post limit. Thirdly, imperfect factor mobility
ensures that valuable resources remain in the firm. Factors are imperfect mobile if the item
cannot be traded. Such assets will be firm specific or co-specialised. Fourthly, ex ante limits
to competition prevent cost from offsetting the rents. For example, if new entrants compete
for a valuable location, the cost of the location will increase, leading to a reduction in rents to
be earned.
Figure 31: The Corner Stones of Competitive Advantage
Ex Post Lim its to
Com petitionHeterogeneity
Rents: Monopoly
or Ricardian
Rents Sustained
Rents Sustained
within the Firm
Rents not
offset by costs
Imperfect
Mobility
Ex Ante Lim its to
Com petition
Source: Peteraf (1993: 186)
4.7.4 A Resource-based View of Strategic Alliances
Das t2000) applies the resource-based view to create a resource-based theory of strategic
alliance. He views strategic alliances and merger/acquisition, as a means of gaining
strategic access to valuable resources (e.g. market contacts and -knowledge). The
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resource-based view also specifies the conditions under which firms will favour alliance over
M&A's. Obtaining resources and retaining resources are the two motivations for alliances
(Kogut (1988). Firms might wish to access international markets by M&A or alliances to
access resources.
4.7.4.1 Types of Resources
Das (2000: 31-61) distinguishes resources based on it characteristics (imperfect mobility,
imperfect imitatability and imperfect substitutability) and whether it is a property based
resource or a knowledge-based resource. See Table 10 for examples.
Table 10: Typical Resources Based on Resource Characteristics and Resource Types
Resources
Imperfect Imitatability Patents, Contracts, Copyrights, Technological and Managerial
Trademarks and Registered Resources
Technological and Managerial
Resources
Imperfect Substitutability
Source: Das (2000: 31-61)
Consequently, Das (2000) proposes that the more a firm's resources are characterised by
imperfect mobility, imperfect imitatability and imperfect substitutability, the more likely the firm
will become involved in strategic alliances.
4.7.4.2 Impact of Resource Type on Ownership Structure
Table 11 identifies the structural preference under specific circumstances. A unilateral
contract based alliance will be preferred when both partners' resources are mainly property-
based. Examples of unilateral alliances include licensing, subcontracting and distribution
agreements. It involves chiefly the exchange of capital, plants, and distribution channels.
Table 11: Resource Types and Firms Structural Preferences
Unilateral Contract Based
Alliance
Minority Equity Alliance Bilateral Contract-Based
Alliances
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Partner firm A who owns primarily property based resources will prefer a unilateral contract
based alliance with partner a property based firm B, while it will prefer a EJV with a
knowledge based firm B. Partner firm A, who primarily owns knowledge-based resources,
will seek a minority EJV with a property based partner A, while a bilateral contract based
alliance will be adopted with a knowledge-based partner B.
In conclusion, the resource-based perspective requires foreign entrants to ask the question
how will the selected entry mode impact the exploitation of existing firm resources. Which
entry mode will be best suited to develop and protect of firm resources?
4.8 Eclectic Theory of the Choice of International Entry Mode
Hill et al. (1990: 117-128) submits the eclectic theory of international entry mode. Although
Anderson and Gatignon's (1986) framework for the entry mode choice holds promise, it is
criticised as being too one sided in that it only takes a transaction cost perspective to entry
mode choice. Hill et al. (1990) suggests that a united framework should incorporate
strategic-, environmental- and transaction variables.
4.8.1 Foundations for an Eclectic Framework of Choice
Entry mode options can be reduced to licensing, joint ventures and wholly owned
subsidiaries. Each mode has different implications for the degree of control, level of
resource commitment, and the risk of dissemination proprietary know-how (as discussed in
chapter 3).
With level of control is meant the level of authority over strategic and operational decision-
making. Resource commitment implies dedicated assets that cannot be re-deployed without
cost (loss of value). As resource commitment increases, the sunk cost (irrational exit
barriers) to exit the market increases. Dissemination risk refers to the risk of dissemination
of firm specific knowledge that will be appropriated by the licensing or joint venture partner
Table 12 highlights the impact of each entry mode on the level of control, resource
commitment and dissemination risk. Licensing provides a low level of control over the
operation, a low requirement of resources, but a high risk of dissemination of proprietary
know-how.
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Table 12: Characteristics of Different Entry Modes.
Low
Low Low High
Medium
Wholly Owned Subsidiary High High
Medium
Licensing
joint Venturing Medium
Source: Hili et al. (1990: 123)
4.8.2 Hill et at's Entry Mode Decision Framework
Hill et al. (1990) maintains that three groups of variables are relevant to this theory. Each of
the groups of variables is connected to one or more of the following: level of control, resource
commitment or dissemination risk. Strategic variables influence the entry choice through
control requirement it entails. Environmental variables influence entry modes through their
impact on resource commitment. And transaction cost variables influence both the
dissemination risk and the level of control requirements.
The eclectic framework of the international entry mode decision is depicted in Figure 32. The
following propositions are made (1990: 120- 125):
4.8.2.1 Strategic Variables
Firms have to choose between a global or multi-domestic strategy, as was expounded in 4.6.
It is proposed that firms that pursue a multi-domestic strategy will favour low-control entry
modes, while firms pursuing a global strategy prefer high control entry modes. Firms that
have a strong need for global strategic co-ordination, (for example in global and oligopolistic
industries) will favour high-control entry modes.
4.8.2.2 Environmental Variables
Whbr. the perceived distance in location familiarity is great, MNC's will favour entry modes
that involve relatively low resource commitments. If demand conditions are uncertain, (as in
embryonic or declining host markets) MNC's will favour entry modes that involve low
resource commitments. The greater the volatility of competitive conditions in the host
market, the more MNC's will favour entry modes that require low resource commitments.
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Figure 32: Eclectic Framework of the International Entry Mode Decision
Strategic Variables:
1. Extent of National
Differences
2. Extent of Scale
Economics
3. Global
Concentration
Environmental Variables:
1. Country Risk
2. Location Familiarity
3. Demand Conditions
4. Volatility of Competition
Entry Mode
Decision
Transactional Variables:
1. Value of Firm Specific
Know-how
2. Tacit Nature of Know-
how
Source: Hili et al. (1990:120)
4.8.2.3 Transaction Cost Variables.
The greater the quasi-rent stream generated by a MNC's proprietary know-how, the greater
the probability that the MNC will favour an entry mode that minimises dissemination risk.
And the greater the tacit component of firm-specific know-how, the more an MNC will favour
high control entry modes
Hill et al. (1990) tenders that in practise the various groups of variables will indicate different
directions for the entry mode choice. A possible solution might be to determine weights for
each of the groups of variables. However companies with a high component of proprietary
knowledge will consider the protection against dissemination of their knowledge to be of
utmost importance. They maintain that the overall value of the corporation will weigh more
than the individual subsidiary. High control will generally be preferred in homogeneous- and
scale economics industries. Oligopolistic industries will place a high premium on the level of
control.
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4.9 Summary
Choosing an appropriate entry mode when entering into a foreign market proves to be a
complex decision. The starting point is to grasp the theoretical foundations from which to
consider the entry mode choice. Figure 33 depicts a logical sequence for considering an
entry decision based on the reviewed theories.
Strategic- and resource-based view's suggest a firm should evaluate which entry mode will
enable the entrant to effectively implement its strategies, develop a competitive advantage,
exploit existing resources and protect intellectual property. Dunning's eclectic theory
requires a firm to consider which entry mode is most appropriate given the firm's ownership
and locations advantages. The transaction cost analysis cautions the entrant to consider the
costs involved to adopt various governing structures, while internalisation seek to answer the
profit maximisation question.
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Figure 33: Summary of Foundational Theories' Impact on Entry Mode Choice
Resource-Based View
What entry mode be most
effective to exploit, develop
and protect company
resources and advantages?
Strategic Behavior Approach
What entry mode will best be
suited to implement company
strategy and develop a
competitive advantage?
Eclectic Theory
What entry mode will be most
effective to exploit ownership
and location advantages?
Source: Compiled Chapter 4: Foundational Theories of Market Entry Mode Choice
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Institutional Theory
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(To be discussed in Chap. 5)
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5 Determinants of Ownership level in a Foreign Invested
Enterprise
5.1 Introduction
The fourth building block to advance a market entry mode decision framework for foreign
investors in China (MEMOFFIC) is to determine what the determinants of ownership level in
a foreign invested enterprise are. As depicted in Figure 34, the review of entry mode
determinants will build on its theoretical foundations as described in chapter 4.
Figure 34: Market Entry Mode Decision Building Block Four
An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
(Chapter 6)
Market Entry Mode
Alternatives for Foreign
Direct Investment in China
h
Determinants of
Ownership Level in a
FIE (Chapter 5)
Theoretical Foundation's
of Entry Mode Choice
(Chapter 4)
Overview of the
Investment Environment
in China (Chapter 2)
Not only will it be required to identify relevant entry mode determinants, but rather to assess
the impact that each determinant has on the ownership level in a foreign invested enterprise.
5.2 Existing Models of Entry Mode Choice
Owing to the limited scope of the thesis, it is not necessary to carry out a detailed review of
the entry mode research. However, a few selected studies provide an overview of the status
of the entry mode determinant research. The transaction cost framework of Anderson &
Gatignon (1986), the eclectic framework of Bell (1996), and the resource-based view of
Tsang (1997) are the most important to mention. In this section only the conceptual
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framework of the model will be deliberated while the determinants identified in the
frameworks will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
5.2.1 Anderson & Gatignon's Transaction Cost Framework for Analysing Efficiency
of Entry Modes
Anderson & Gatignon (1986: 1-23) submit a transaction cost analysis of entry mode choice.
Four determinants of entry mode from a transaction cost perspective are offered in Figure
35. To analyse the most efficient entry mode, a foreign entrant must first consider its level of
transaction specific assets. Secondly, the external and internal uncertainty of an
environment needs to be assessed while lastly, the potential for free riding (intellectual
property abuses) must be appraised. Upon considering all these factors, an entrant will be
able to decide on the degree of entry mode control that will yield long term efficiency.
Figure 35: A Transaction Cost Framework for Analysing Efficiency of Entry Modes
Transaction Specific
Assets:
P1: Level of Proprietary
Content
P2: Level of Customisation
P3: Product -Unstructured
P4: Level of Product Maturity
External Uncertainty:
P5: Level of Country Risk
Degree of Entry
Mode Control
Long-Term
Efficiency
+
Internal Uncertainty:
P6: International Experience
P7: Socio-Cultural Difference
PB: Host Country Market
Size +
Free Riding Potential:
P9:Level of Brand Image
Source: Anderson & Gatignon (1986: 1-23)
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5.2.2 Bell's Comprehensive Eclectic Framework for Entry Mode Choice
Bell (1996) offers a comprehensive review of the entry mode literature and proposes a
framework for entry mode choice by integrating strategic behaviour-, resource-based-,
internalisation- and transaction cost theories (see Figure 36).
Figure 36: Comprehensive Eclectic Framework for Entry mode Choice
Strategic Behavior Approach
Strategic Variables: ...c
~
-Global Strategy 0
L- -Level of Competition CO
0 0
ID -Industry Growth L-a....c Ownership a.I- Variables: Transactional «"0 -International ..
ID Experience Foreign Market Variables:
CJ)
CJ) 0
CO -Host Country Entry Mode -Asset 0CO Experience Choice Specificity cI
ID -Product -Reputation 0
0 ..
L- Experience 0
::J -Relative Size Location Variables: CO0 CJ)
CJ) -Cultural Differences cID CO0::: -Host Country Risk I....
-Host Government Policy I-
-Level of Welfare
Internalisation Theory
Source: Bell (1996: 42)
Bell (1996) tests the results from a mail survey of Dutch firms by means of a confirmatory
factor analysis, a binomial logit analysis, a multinomial logit analysis and an ordered logit
analysis). The tables (see Table 13 and Table 14) highlights determinants as hypothesised,
and offers a review of previous studies related to the impact of entry mode determinants on
ownership level in a FIE. The results and findings of the study will be discussed in the
subsequent sections where required.
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Table 13: Impact of Strategic-, Transactional-, Location- and Ownership Variables on
Ownership Level in a FIE
either small or
Source: Compiled from Bell (1996)
5.2.3 Tsang's Resource-Based View of Entry Mode Choice
Tsang (1997: 151-168) submits a resource-based view to construct a model for explaining a
firm's selection of international technology transfer mode. Technology transfer is the
transmission of knowledge which enables the recipient firm to manufacture a certain product
or provide a particular service' (1997: 155). Figure 37 explains the elements of the model. In
dealing with an international technology transfer, a firm needs to review its resource
constraints, consider the resource requirements of the host country or transferee, and
determine how to protect its valuable resources while transferring it. These factors will limit
the range of transfer modes but the firm's strategy will determine which transfer mode to
utilise. Owing to strategic considerations, firms may opt for higher control options to gain for
example first mover advantages or experience, even when it is not profitable. However,
smaller firms will not have the capability to utilise strategies that will drain its resources over
the long haul. Tsang does not offer any proposition regarding strategy, but suggest that
'strategy is a more important moderating factor for smaller firms than larger firms' (1997:
162). In addition, a firm needs to consider how to develop its resources as part of the
transfer strategy.
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Table 14: Determinants of Ownership Level and Resource Commitment of Foreign
Market Entry
(il :0- 0
or Nót N N nl ~0> 0> n::0; 0; 0> 0> (ij M ~ CJ)
CJ) CJ) "0 CJ) CJ) CJ)c:: êil CJ) CJ)nl
Source: Adapted from Bell (1996: 32-33)
5.2.4 Criticism of Current Entry Mode Decision Models.
Although useful, the models offered to guide entry mode choice can be criticised mainly on
two fronts. The first point of critique is that most of the models are viewed only from one or a
few theoretical frameworks. The transaction cost framework and resource-based view only
view the entry mode decision within the parameters of its narrow theoretical departure points.
The transaction cost framework are limited to the cost of the transaction. The resource-
based view neglects costs, strategic- and institutional determinants.
The second point of criticism relates to the work of Bell (1996). Bell (1996) provided the
most comprehensive entry mode framework by integrating the transaction cost-,
internalisation-, strategic behaviour- and resource-based views into a framework for entry
choice. However, firstly, the empirical work of Bell was limited to Dutch companies, thus
limiting the ability to generalise the results. Secondly, Bell's (1996) classifications of
resource-based variables. Although experience can be seen from a resource-based
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perspective, Bell neglects the heart of ownership advantages, namely the level of intellectual
property transferred by the firm. Thirdly, and more importantly Bell did not include
institutional and evolutionary variables in his model. Lastly, the work of Dunning (1981,
1988, 1989, 1995) relating ownership advantages (Ot & Oa) can be extended to include Oe
or ownership experience determinants. Oe variables can be regarded as evolutionary
variables.
Figure 37: A Model of International Technology Transfer Mode Choice
Experience Effect
•Resource Constraints
-Firrn Size of Transferor
-Tacitness of Technology
Strategy
r
Resource Reguirements Transfer Mode-Technical absorptive
f--+ Scope of Strategic r-4 Decision f--+ Resourcecapacity of transferee Choice (Resource Development-Indiqenous technical Commitment
capability of host country
~
Resource Protection
-Protection of Intellectual
Property
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Source: Tsang (1997:157)
5.2_5 An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decisions Framework for Foreign Investors
From the literature review up to this point, it is clear that authors use entry mode
determinants inconsistently, resulting in uncertainty where exactly each determinant fits in. It
is helpful to understand that the determinants of entry mode choice can be classified either
by the unit of analysis or per its theoretical foundation as illustrated in Table 15. Moreover, it
is important to note that each unit of analysis can be analysed from different theoretical
perspectives. For instance the firm can be analysed from strategic-, resource-based or
internalisation perspectives.
In order to logically analyse the entry mode decision the unit of analysis should be
considered from the macro to the micro. As proposed in Figure 38 , the foreign entrant
considering the entry mode choice should first perform an external analysis in which it
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considers the home-, host- and industry factors from a location- and institutional perspective.
Secondly, the entrant should consider the firms internal environment from a strategic-,
resource-based- and an ownership experience (evolutionary) perspective. Lastly the
potential partner, project and the transaction should be analysed from a resource-based- and
transaction cost perspective. Upon considering each of these determinants, depending on
its relative weight the entrant will be in a good position to choose the level of ownership to
adopt in the FIE.
Baser! on the framework in Figure 38 the impact of each determinant on the level of
ownership in a FIE will be reviewed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
Table 15: A Logical Analysis of Entry Mode Choice
External Host Country • Location Advantage
Analysis • Institutional
Home Country • Location Advantage
• Institutional
Industry • Strategic Behaviour View
• Resource-based View
• Transaction Cost
Internal Firm • Strategic Behaviour View
Analysis • Resource-based View
• Ownershi Ad
Transaction Partner • Resource-based View
Analysis • Transaction Cost
Project •
•
5.3 Location Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
Depicted in Figure 38 are the location determinants that need consideration as part of the
external analysis. The determinants are host country risk, market potential of the host
country, level of welfare in the host country, indigenous absorptive capacity of the host
country and the social cultural distance between the home and the host country.
5.3.1 Host Country Risk
Drawing on a number of writers, Anderson & Gatignon (1986) include as host country risk
political instability, economic fluctuation and currency changes. They offer that one response
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to country risk is to exert more control over an operation, but caution that from a transaction
cost perspective such an attempt might lock an entrant into a relationship that will result in
obsolete technology. A second response to a high country risk is to utilise lower control
modes. However, when asset specificity is high, a magnifying effect takes place due to the
specificity of an investment. High asset-specificity companies will find it too venturesome to
be at the mercy of partners (in a volatile external situation) and prefer higher control
mechanisms. Consequently 'the greater the combination of country risk (political instability,
economic fluctuations) and transaction-specificity of assets, the higher the appropriate
degree of control will be exerted' (Anderson & Gatignon 1986: 15).
Figure 38: An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for Foreign Investors
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Sources: Bell (1996), Tsang (1997), Anderson & Gatignon (1986), Delios & Beamish
(1999)
Bell (1996) on the other hand established that country risk alone, negatively affects
ownership level (increase likelihood of JV's). Table 14 evinces that the studies of Gatignon &
Anderson (1988) and Shane (1993) supported findings of Bell, while those of Agarwal and
Ramaswami (1992b) and Brothers et al. (1993) contradict the current study. Bell (1996)
maintains that firms will seek to reduce ownership levels in a high-risk country since it offer
firms more flexibility and at least losses will be shared.
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Proposition 1: Host Country Risk (a)
All things being equal, increased host country risk will amplify a MNC's desire for flexibility of
movement and hence reduce the levels of ownership in a FIE.
Proposition 2: Host Country Risk (b)
All things being equal, increased host country risk will enlarge the desire to control an
investment, especially when asset specificity is high. Subsequently greater ownership levels
will be sought in a FIE.
5.3.2 Market Potential
No study was discovered that specifically researched the impact of market potential. Firms
entering high market-potential countries can be expected to be more willing to invest greater
amounts in view of the potentially larger return. In addition, higher potential markets will
attract more foreign investors.
Proposition 3: Market Potential
All things being equal, host countries with relatively larger market potential will provide
foreign investors with the incentive to commit more resources and consequently take higher
ownership levels in a FIE.
5.3.3 level of Welfare
8ell (1996) studied how the level of welfare in the host country affects the level of ownership.
He found that an increase in the level of welfare will have a negative impact on the level of
ownership adopted in a FIE. The findings of Bell (1996) are supported by the findings of
Gomes-Casseres (1989,1990), Shane (1993) and Argwal (1994). Larimo (1993) in contrast
found the opposite (see Table 14). Bell (1996) justifies that firms are much more willing to
enter developed countries than developing countries since the local firm have much more to
offer in terms of expertise and local market knowledge.
Proposition 4: level of Host Country Welfare
All things being equal, MNC's entering host countries with a relatively high welfare will be
more likely to utilise joint ventures than entering host countries with a lower level of welfare.
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5.3.4 Indigenous Technical Capability (ITC)
lndiqenous technical capability refers to the ability of the country to assimilate technology.
R&D expenditures, investment in national education, and the number of technical personnel
per capita provide indications of the ITC. Tsang (1997) highlights the finding of Contractor
(1980) that in developing countries with a higher lTC, a higher proportion of licensing as
means of technology transfer exist. Consequently, 'when the indigenous technical capability
of the host country is low, firms will prefer transfer modes that require high resource
commitment' (Tsang 1997: 160).
Proposition 5: Indigenous Technical Capability
All things being equal, when the indigenous technical capability of the host country is low, the
foreign investor will more likely prefer higher ownership levels. Whereas an increased ITC
will reduce the need for high ownership levels in a FIE.
5.3.5 Cultural Distance
According to Anderson & Gatignon (1986) when the socio-cultural distance between a home-
and host country increases, internal uncertainty forms within the firm. The writers propound
that at high levels of socio-cultural distance, low control levels are more efficient than
intermediate levels and high-control levels are more efficient than intermediate levels. 'High-
control levels are more efficient only when there is a substantial advantage to doing business
in the entrants way' (1986:18).
Bell (1996) denotes that studies regarding the impact of cultural distance on the likelihood of
JV's/ WFOE's are contradictory. Table 14 reveals that a group of studies found that cultural
difference negatively influences the level of ownership of foreign entrants (Gatignon and
Anderson: 1988; Erramilli: 1991; Agarwal and Ramaswami: 1992b; Erramilli and Rao: 1993,
Argwal: 1994). On the other hand, Madhok (1994) and Padmanabhan (1994) observed that
cultural difference enhances the likelihood of full ownership modes being used by entrants.
The study of Bell (1996) is the first to clarify this apparent contradiction by observing both a
positive and negative effect on ownership as depicted in Figure 39.
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Figure 39: Impact of Cultural Distance on Ownership Level
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At very low and very high levels of cultural difference, firms will prefer lower ownership
modes. The likelihood of JV's during these levels of cultural distance will be high. This trend
may indicate that firms select joint ventures for different reasons, and it may be in culturally
similar or -diverse host countries. At very high levels of cultural difference, companies will
associate in joint ventures, as a means of getting acquainted with host cultures. Joint
research, learning or sharing of costs are motives for joint ventures in lower cultural distance
companies (Bell: 1996).
Proposition 6: Cultural Distance
All things being equal, at very low and very high levels of cultural distance MNC's espouse
lower levels of ownership, whereas at moderate levels of cultural distance MNC's will favour
greater levels of ownership in a FIE.
5.4 Institutional Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
5.4.1 Internal Institutional Policy
Davis (2000: 239-259) offers an isomorphism perspective on entry mode choice within a
institutional framework. He criticises the transaction cost and resource-based framework as
being inconsistent and contradictory in findings.
Institutional theory comprises both external and internal institutions in its definition. External
institutions include regulatory structures, agencies, laws, courts and professions. Internal
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institutions may include institutional pressures within the parent firm. Subsidiaries or
strategic business units need to conform to the parent's organisational norms. Subsequently
two sources of isomorphic pressure need consideration when dealing with entry mode: host
country institutional environment and internal (parent) institutional environment. To achieve
legitimacy with other organisations, such as host country government or the parent firm, a
strategic business unit must conform to institutional pressures whether internal or external.
The focal point to gain legitimacy can be either internal or external. The relative dominance
of internal vs. external institutional pressure will determine organisational behaviour.
Parent organisations maintain similarity across subsidiaries through organisational
structures, processes and routines. As a parent increases control in a subsidiary, the
pressure to maintain internal isomorphism may override pressure for external isomorphism.
Alternatively, when a subsidiary enjoys a high level strategic autonomy, the pressure to
conferm to internal isomorphism may reduce.
A higher degree of interdependence or resource sharing between a subsidiary and a parent
will increase the need for control and co-ordination and consequently the greater the need for
internal isomorphism (similarity). As illustrated in Figure 40, Davis (2000) found that
business units utilising WFOE's have experienced a higher degree of parent isomorphism
than other business forms. When the level of interdependence between parent and
subsidiary is high, and the strategic autonomy is low, the likelihood of utilising a WFOE is
greater.
Figure 40: An Isomorphic Perspective on Entry mode Choice
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Source: Compiled from Davis (2000: 239-259)
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Local market adaptation exists when the external institutional pressures are higher than the
internal institutional pressure. In other words, the subsidiary will rather conform to and gain
legitimacy from host country institutions. Lower resource commitment modes are utilised
under local adaptation, for example exporting or licensing.
Proposition 7: Internal Isomorphic Pressure
All things being equal, MNC's with a high level of internal isomorphic pressure will be more
likely to opt for full-control entry modes.
Proposition 8: Local Adaptation
All things being equal MNC's with a high level of local adaptation will be more likely to utilise
share-control entry modes.
5.4.2 Host Government Policy I -Restrictiveness
Host country restrictiveness refers to restrictions that a host government imposes on foreign
entrants. Especially restrictions related to the ownership levels allowed in a FIE. Bell (1996)
found a non-significant effect of host government policy contrary to all the previous studies of
Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Gomes-Casseres (1989), Gomes-Casseres (1990), Shane
(1993), and Padmanabhan (1994) (See Table 14). He expostulates that much earlier data
sets (between 1965 and 1986) were utilised. In addition, he submits that Padmanabhan and
Cho's (1994) study contrasted two data sets, entries before 1986 and entries after 1986.
Host government restrictions influenced ownership level much more before 1986 than in the
second period (Bell 1996: 108). On the other hand, Delios & Beamish (1999) observed that
host country restrictions have a significant negative impact on the ownership structure of
foreign entrants. They also found a strong correlation between host country risk and host
country restrictiveness.
Proposition 9: Host Government Restrictions
All things being equal, MNC's entering a host country with restrictive government policies on
ownership level will deter from utilising full-control entry modes
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5.5 Industry Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
5.5.1 Industry Growth
Bell (1996) found that high industry growth would encourage the formation of joint ventures.
This finding is consistent with Erramilli (1991). A JV may be perceived as a better vehicle to
capture opportunities of fast growing industries since a JV can be faster operational than a
Greenfield WFOE.
Proposition 10: Industry Growth
All things being equal, MNC's entering fast growing industries will tend to utilise lower
ownership structures like joint ventures to exploit fast dawning opportunities.
5.5.2 Service Inseparability
Erramilli & Rao (1993) drawing on a number of writers distinguish separable services-from
inseparable services. Separable services' production and consumption can be de-coupled.
For instance an engineer can perform his design work in a home country and send the
design to the host country. However, for inseparable services such as the hotel service or
hospitals, the service is consumed as it is produced. In inseparable service, the foreign
entrant will need to take much care to ensure that the service is rendered according to
standard. It will therefore require attention that is more personal. Consequently, inseparable
services require higher levels of control over the operation.
Proposition 11: Service Inseparability
All thinqs being equal, MNC's entering an industry characterised by inseparability of service,
will be more likely to employ higher ownership levels in the FIE.
5.5.3 Resource/Capital Intensity
Erramilli & D'Souza (1993: 29-42) contrasts the foreign market entry behaviour of small firms
with that of large firms. Drawing on a number of studies, they suggest that small. firms be
characterised by resource constraints and cautious investments. Larger companies on the
other hand tend to choose high-resource, high-risk entry modes. Full-control entry modes
become less likely as the scale of foreign operation increases.
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Employing a mail survey of US service companies, Erramilli & D'Souza (1993) studied the
impact of capital intensity on the entry mode choice of small and large service firms. Figure
41 depicts at low levels of capital intensity, that both small and larger service firms will adopt
high levels of ownership. At a higher capital intensity, small service firms yield more control
than larger service firms do. Small service firms lack the ability to commit resources and
perceive greater risk than larger firms do. The capital intensity of the industry, to which it
belongs, conditions the relationship between firm size and foreign market entry behaviour of
the firms.
Figure 41: The Impact of Capital Intensity on ownership levels in FIE's
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Proposition 12: Resource/Capitallntensity
All things being equal, MNC's entering into a high resource or capital intense industry, will be
more likely to utilise lower ownership levels in the FIE.
Proposition 13: Capital Intensity and Service Firms
All things being equal, small service firms entering a high capital intense industry, yield more
control than large service firms will.
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5.6 Strategic Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
5.6.1 Global Integration vs. a Multi-Domestic Strategy
Hill et al. (1990) proposes that one of the crucial choices a firm needs to make in the context
of strategy, is whether to adopt a global or multi-domestic strategy. A multi-domestic
strategy is adopted in the belief that markets differ in 'consumer tastes, competitive
conditions, operating conditions, political-, legal- and social conditions' (1990: 120). To
maximise value (differentiate) companies must be responsive to local demand.
Responsiveness will imply the development of an own marketing function, autonomous
manufacturing, differing product attributes and differing competitive strategies in each host
country.
A global strategy capitalises on the belief that a convergence of tastes or needs in the global
markets exist, leading to homogeneous global markets. Global markets can be exploited
through economies of scale, centralised production and -marketing (cost advantage). In a
global strategy, the value chain will be configured to manufacture a component or part at the
best possible location. Then the final product is assembled locally to make small
adjustments if so required. To follow a global strategy, requires a high degree of control in
order to attain co-ordination in the global production system.
Bell (1996) confirms that when a firm follows a global strategy it will decrease the likelihood
of a JV (and increase the likelihood of a WFOE). Although the findings of Bell show a
positive relationship with level of ownership, it was not significant. No previous studies
tested the impact of global strategy on level of ownership. Further research of the role of a
global strategy is required.
Proposition 14: Global Strategy vs. Multi-Domestic Strategy
All things being equal, MNC's that follow a global strategy will adopt higher ownership levels
in a FIE than those who follow a multi-domestic strategy.
5.6.2 Oligopolistic Nature of Market
Hill et al. (1990) also observes with an increasing number of industries that are oligopolistic
in nature, companies have objectives that go beyond normal calculus of choosing the most
efficient entry mode for the market. It may well enter a host country with the aim of deterring
an international competitor from attacking its home market. Especially in global oligopolies,
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the need for global co-ordination is high and it will utilise full-control entry modes even when
it does not make economic sense on stand-alone basis.
Proposition 15: Oligopolistic Nature of Market
All things being equal, MNC's entering in an oligopolistic market will adopt a higher level of
ownership in a FIE than those who do not enter an oligopolistic market.
5.6.3 Differentiation Strategy
Argwal et al. (1992) found that firms following a differentiation strategy (or have a higher
ability to differentiate products) are averse to contractual risk and prefer investment entry
modes. In other words, firms that follow a differentiation strategy have a higher level of
intellectual property and react in the same way as firms with a high intellectual property level.
See 5.7.2 for a discussion on the impact of intellectual property level of entry mode choice.
Proposition 16: Differentiation Strategy
All thing being equal, MNC's that follow a differentiation strategy will adopt higher ownership
levels in a FIE than MNC's who follow a low cost strategy.
5.6.4 Local vs. Export Market Focus
Foreign entrants exploiting a host country as an export base, can be expected to be less
concerned with local market adaptation or knowledge and access to the local market.
However, entrants with a local market focus will require local market knowledge and local
markets access - gained through partnership. Consequently firms with a local market focus
will ba more likely to collaborate with local firms, thus reducing the ownership level adopted
in the FIE (Pan & Chi: 1999).
Proposition 17: Local vs. Export Market Focus
All things being equal, MNC's with a primary focus on the host country market will likely
favour a joint venture with a local partner, than a MNC who employs an export strategy.
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5.6.5 level of Competition
A high level of competitive intensity may reduce the attractiveness of a particular market and
therefore reduce the incentive to employ high-resource commitment entry modes in a foreign
market. However, Bell (1996) found, contrary to the proposition that strong competition will
increase the likelihood of a JV (decrease the likelihood of a WFOE), that stronger
competition decreased the likelihood of JV's. The finding implies that MNC's require more
control over a FIE to handle the competitive situation more effectively. Previously only Kogut
& Singh (1988) detected the non-significant impact of competition.
Proposition 18: level of Competition
All things being equal, MNC's entering a market with a high competitive intensity, will require
a greater level of ownership to manage the FIE.
5.7 Resource-Based Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
5.7.1 Firm Size of the Transferor
Tsanq (1997) suggests that resource constraints include both quantity and quality of
resources. The size of the transferor relates to quantity of resources. For instance, the
number of employees limits how fast a transfer can be done. Even if new employees are
appointed, time is necessary to become part of the organisation and to learn organisational
processes. Another constraint is financial resources or a lack of capitalisation, which limits
the options for greater control. Therefore 'when compared with large firms, small firms will
favour transfer modes that require low resource commitments' (1997: 159).
Proposition 19: Firm Size of Transferor
All things being equal, large MNC's, with high resource availability, are more likely to utilise
full-control entry modes, than small firms with less resources.
5.7.2 level of Intellectual Property
Regarding the quality of resources, Tsang (1997) suggests that the tacitness of the
knowledge will determine the level of intimate human contact required for the transfer.
Drawing on a number of authors, Tsang (1997) states 'the newer the technology, the more a
firm will favour transfer modes that require high resource commitments' (1997: 159). Also
90
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
drawing on a number of studies, Tsang (1997) proposes that 'the more complex technology,
the more a firm will favour transfer modes that require high resource commitments'
(1997:159).
Proposition 20: Intellectual Property Level (a)
All things being equal, MNC's transferring high levels of intellectual property will be more
likely to pursue full-control entry modes as opposed to a firm transferring lower levels of
intellectual property.
5.7.3 Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Consistent with Das (2000), Tsang (1997) suggests that firm resources are imperfectly
imitable. However, when technology is substantially coded, imitation by a competitor can be
a real danger. It is critical that a firm protects itself against leakage of its expertise. The risk
of patent infringement will provide an incentive for firms to seek higher control or complete
internalisation. Hence, 'when the protection of intellectual property rights is poor in the host
country, firms will favour transfer modes that require high resource commitments' (Tsang
1997: 161).
Similarly, Anderson & Gatignon (1986) caution against free riding. Free riding refers to
agents that receive benefits without paying the costs. McDonalds for example experienced
problems with some of its franchises that attracting customers based on its name. The free
riders however did not uphold the stringent rules that accompany the franchise. In other
words, free riding is the danger of a brand name utilised inappropriately, inconsistently or
wrongly positioning it. The more valuable the brand name, the higher control over the
operation will be required. Therefore 'entry modes offering higher degrees of control are
more efficient the higher the value of brand name' (Anderson & Gatignon (1986: 20).
Delios & Beamish (1999) discovered that protection of intellectual property would instigate a
negative relationship with ownership structure. Consequently, when intellectual property
protection is weak, firms will aim to protect itself against the leakage of information by
acquiring a higher ownership level of the new subsidiary.
Proposition 21: Intellectual Property Rights Protection
All things being equal, MNC's entering a host country with weak intellectual property
protection, will be compelled to obtain high levels of ownership in a FIE.
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5.7.4 Importance of Technology
The role that technology plays in the transferor's business will determine what level of
protection will be required. Drawing on a number of authors, Tsang (1997) suggests that a
higher R&D investment level and closeness of technology to the core business (or
competitive advantage) will increase the need for protection. Accordingly 'the more
important the technology is to a firms business, the more the firm will favour transfer modes
that require high resource commitments' (1997: 161).
Proposition 22: Importance of Technology Transferred
All things being equal, the greater the importance of the technology transferred to the
transferor, the higher the level of ownership that a MNC will adopt in a FIE.
5.8 Evolutionary Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
5.8.1 International Experience
Anderson & Gatignon (1986: 17) propose that the 'degree of control in a foreign business
entity should be positively related to the firms cumulative international experience'.
Inexperienced international entrants fear the unknown, overstate risks, and understate
opportunities. These firms also choose culturally similar countries to invest. As experience
increases competence, confidence and understanding increases and investments flow to
countries that are culturally more distant. An increase in experience leads to greater control.
Erramilli (1991: 479-502) examines the effect of international experience on service firms'
selection of entry modes and points to the apparent contradiction in research on the impact
of experience on the mode choice. Erramilli (1991) suggests ethnocentric and polycentric
explanations for the impact of international experience on entry mode choice. The
ethnocentric explanation holds that parent companies insist that their own employees will
manage the new subsidiary since the host country workers cannot be trusted. An
ethnocentric view requires full ownership of the new venture. Secondly, the polycentric view
proposes that as experience in the host country increase, companies realise that local
employees can profitably be utilised and control can be relaxed.
Illustrated in Figure 42 he proposes that a U-shaped relationship between experience and
desire for control exist. Between low to moderate levels of international experience, the
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desire for control will decline, whereas between moderate to high levels, it will increase.
Companies with much experience will reason that they do not need partners anymore since
they know the market and are able to exploit opportunities themselves.
Figure 42: Impact of International Experience
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Employing a mail survey of US service firms engaged in international operations,
international experience is measured both in length (number of years engaged in
international operations), as well as scope (geographical location) of business activities. The
findings confirmed that the probability of service firms choosing full-control modes is high at
low levels of experience, low at moderate levels and again high at high levels of experience.
However, contrary to market selection results, the length and not scope of experience
seemed to be important in determining entry mode choice.
Bell (1996) observes a positive impact of international experience on level of ownership.
Earlier studies of Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992a) and
Madhok (1994) support the observation (See Table 14). As companies gain international
experience, they become more comfortable with entering cultural diverse situations and
desire greater control of their operations.
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Proposition 23: International Experience (a)
All things being equal, at lower levels of international experience, MNC's desire high levels of
ownership, however the desire for control will gradually decrease as they gain experience.
Proposition 24: International Experience (b)
All things being equal, at higher levels of international experience, MNC's will desire and be
more equipped to take greater levels of control of their foreign operations.
5.8.2 Host Country Experience
Contrary to the proposition that higher host country experience decrease the likelihood of
JV's, Bell (1996) found that it 'significantly increases the probability of JV's as compared to
WFOE's' (1996: 104). His finding is in contrast with his own findings of international
experience as discussed in 5.8.1. Moreover, the studies of Gomes-Casseres (1989),
Gomes-Casseres (1990), Hennart (1991), and Padmanabhan (1994) found a positive impact
of international experience on entry mode. Bell (1996) suggests that different dynamics be at
work with host country experience as opposed to international experience. As host country
experience increase, firms learn that it can profitably to operate alongside local companies,
or they realise that they need local partners.
Delios & Beamish (1999) measure international experience by means of export intensity,
number of foreign investments and the years of host country experience. Both an increase in
export intensity (a proxy for international experience) and host country experience resulted in
higher levels of ownership, thus contrasting Bell's findings as illustrated in Figure 43.
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Figure 43: Impact of International Experience vs. Host Country Experience
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Erramilli (1991) did not separate host country experience from international experience when
he found a U-shaped relationship of international experience on ownership level. It is
possible then to suggest that the cumulative effect of both host country and international
experience render the U-shaped outcome. The work of Bell (1996) should be examined for a
possible U-shaped effect of host country and international experience.
Low
Ali things being equal, an increase in host country experience will reduce the fears for co-
operation in joint ventures and will increase the likelihood to exploit strategic opportunities by
means of shared ownership.
Low International Experience High
All things being equal, an increase in host country experience will lead to a greater desire for
control over the foreign subsidiary, resulting in an increased likelihood of adopting full-control
entry modes.
Source: Compiled from Bell (1996)
Preposition 25: Host Country Experience (a)
Proposition 26: Host Country Experience (b)
5.8.3 Mode Experience
Although Bell (1996) proposes that both JV experience and WFOE experience positively
affect the likelihood of the respective entry modes, his study encountered multi-collinearity
problems and omitted these two variables from the study. Madhok (1994) found a positive
relationship with mode experience. Tsang (1997) proposes that 'the efficiency of handling a
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transfer mode will be positively related to the number of times that the mode has been used'
(1997: 164).
More recently Padmanabhan & Cho (1999: 25-44) examined the impact of mode specific
experience on the ownership level of FIE's. Drawing on various authors, Padmanabhan &
Cho (1999) state that decision specific experience is gained though being part of a particular
decision setting which then becomes ingrained in the organisational memory. Decision
specific experience can be considered as important sources of ownership assets and
transaction advantages to the firm.
Their study of Japanese FDI confirmed their propositions (see Figure 44). Firms with a high
level of experience in a particular mode, will utilise that mode more frequently. For example,
firms with much JV experience will be more likely to enter new markets by utilising aJV.
Moreover, mode specific experience is more influential than international or host country
experience in determining the subsequent ownership structures of new market entries.
Proposition 27: Mode Experience (a)
All things being equal, MNC's with a higher level of share-control mode experience, will be
more likely to employ share-control entry modes.
Proposition 28: Mode Experience (b)
All things being equal, MNC's with a higher level of full-control entry mode experience, will be
more likely to employ full-control entry modes.
Proposition 29: Mode Experience (c)
All things being equal, a high level of mode experience will be more influential in determining
the entry mode choice than host country or international experience.
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Figure 44: Impact of Decision Specific Experience on Entry Mode Choice
High
Control
Q,)
"'CoC5:E
"'C ~o _
o s:::::=w
- Cl
Q,) s:::::
.:.:: .-
.- I/)...J ._
:;:::.
::>
Low
Control
Low
Control
Experience with
Entry Mode High
Control
Source: Compiled from Padmanabhan & Cho (1999: 25-44
5.8.4 Product Experience
Bell (1996) found that a company's experience with a product or service does not affect the
likelihood of JV significantly. The study does not support the proposition that sufficient
product experience decreases the likelihood of JV's. No previous studies measured product
experience.
5.8.5 Experience Effect
Tsang (1997) points to the surge in literature concerning the learning organisation over the
past decade. A learning organisation modifies, adapts and improves behaviour with the
gaining of experience. Referring to a number of studies, Tsang (1997) asserts that as firms
enter countries they gain experience that will result in lower cost of subsequent entries.
Moreover, firms learn more from utilising higher resource commitment modes than those
utilising lower resource commitment modes. Therefore, 'the cost of transferring a technology
will be negatively related to the number of prior transfers. The experience effect will be more
pronounced if the prior transfer modes require high resource commitments' (1997: 163).
With the transfer of technology, modifications of the technology are necessary. For example,
equipment that operates well in cold weather will not operate well in tropical weather.
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Modifications or innovations might spark brand new innovations. The probability of these
innovations will increase with an increase in the number of technology transfers (Tsang:
1997).
5.9 Transactional Cost Determinants of Entry mode Choice
5.9.1 Asset Specificity
Anderson & Gatignon (1986: 7) define transaction-specific assets as 'investments (physical
and human) that are specialised to one or a few users or uses'. The default hypothesis in
the transaction cost analysis (TCA) is that a low level of ownership should be utilised until
proven otherwise. The TCA further suggests that firms should not integrate when the
supplier market is competitive. Competition leads to effective market functioning. By not
integrating, companies avoid the cost of company divisions, -politics and inefficiencies.
However, when a transaction-specific advantage becomes valuable, the TCA suggests that it
is better to integrate (internalise) the operation or alternatively redesign the task in order that
general-purpose assets can service the operation. Four types of transaction-specific assets
are identified:
Firstly, proprietary products. 'Modes of entry offering greater control are more efficient for
highly proprietary products or processes' (Anderson & Gatignon 1986: 10). It is difficult to
transmit non-codified products or services across borders. Valuation of information becomes
a problem when the buyer or agent does not know what the value of information is without
the supplier revealing it, at which point the information loses its value. Thus, owners of
proprietary knowledge will exploit it by means of direct investment.
Secondly, unstructured products. 'Entry modes offering higher degrees of control are more
efficient for unstructured, poorly understood products and processes' (Anderson & Gatignon
1986: 11).
Thirdly, the custom made level of a product. 'Entry modes offering higher degrees of control
are more efficient for products customised to the user' (Anderson & Gatignon 1986: 11).
Customisation of products demands a high level of dependence on local knowledge. A
growing dependence on a contractor for such local knowledge implies high asset specificity,
and consequently a company will be locked in. A firm would therefore want to internalise the
function.
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Fourthly, the product maturity. 'The more mature the product class, the less control firms
should demand of a foreign business entity (Anderson & Gatignon 1986: 12)'. Immature
products are undefined and knowledge and expertise still embedded in the employees
worl<ing with the products. In an effort to avoid leakage of knowledge, firms will have a
desire to utilise a high level of control. However, when product knowledge diffuse and
become standard, the incentive to use low control low risk methods to reap income will
increase (Anderson & Gatignon: 1986).
Bell (1996) also finds that extraordinarily specific assets decrease the likelihood of JV's
(increase likelihood of WFOE's). Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Erramilli and Rao (1993)
and Padmanabhan (1994) as highlighted in Table 14 support his findings.
Proposition 30: Product Customisation
All things being equal, MNC's that enter a market with a high level of product customisation,
will bo required to take a high level of ownership in a FIE.
Proposition 31: Life Cycle Stage
All things being equal, MNC's with mature and defined technology can gain an 'extra mile'
through adopting low resource commitment entry modes.
Proposition 32: Asset Specificity
All things being equal, MNC's with high levels of transaction-specific assets, will obtain
higher ownership levels in a FIE due to the high cost of switching between partners
5.9.2 Asset Specificity in the Service Sector
Eramilli & Rao (1993: 19-38) study the choice of entry modes by contrasting patterns
between low and high asset specificity in US service firms. They argue that the application
of the TCA approach to service-firms proved some shortcomings. The basic assumption of
the TCA is that companies prefer low-control modes. Eramilli & Rao (1993) however protest
that the default choice would be a preference for higher control modes. In addition,
numerous non-TCA motives for integration of activities exist. For example, the existence of a
globa! strategy, co-operation requirements, larger profits, and avoiding disadvantages of
shared control. Integration costs are not always that high for service firms whom normally do
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not have the same expensive plants and equipment. Consequently, the modified transaction
cost approach (MTCA) assumes that a company's default preference is for a higher level of
control. The benefits of integration for high specificity are so high that they will shun away
from shared control in virtually all situations.
Asset specificity in the service industry relates to idiosyncratic services. Defined as services
which are characterised by high levels of professional skills, specialised knowledge and
customisation. Professional skills are acquired through many years of study and experience,
and require significant levels of assets and human investments. Specialised expertise refers
to knowledge that is specific to a very narrow range of applications and which is not of much
use elsewhere (e.g. management consulting in the health care industry). The level of
customisation to individuals contributes to the specificity of the investment. The marketing of
idiosyncratic services are characterised by high asset specificity and it will be difficult to
transfer the service to someone else to render.
The MTCA predicts that a firm's utility for shared-control modes diminishes with increasing
asset specificity. However capital intensity, inseparability of service, cultural distance and
host country risk may act as moderators to the effect of asset specificity. Utilising a mail
survey of US service firms, the inverse relationship of the following moderating factors were
studied (see Figure 45):
5.9.2.1 Capital Intensity
Figure 45, no. 1 shows that the 'inverse relationship between asset specificity and service
firm's utility for share-control modes will become stronger with increasing capital intensity'
(1993:24). However, it was only partially supported by the findings. At higher levels, rising
capital intensity weakens the relationship. At very high levels of capital intensity, high asset
specificity firms are more likely to adopt shared control modes than low asset specificity
firms
5.9.2.2 Inseparability
Figure 45, no. 2 denotes that the 'inverse relationship between asset specificity and service
firm's utility for share-control modes will be stronger for inseparable services than for
separable one' (1993:24). The findings confirmed the hypothesis.
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Figm e 45: Moderators of the Impact of Asset Specificity in the Service Industry
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5.9.2.3 Cultural Distance
The study did not support Figure 45, no. 3 that the 'inverse relationship between asset
specificity and service firm's utility for share-control modes will become stronger with
increasing cultural distance between the home and host countries' (1993:25). Cultural
distance does not raise costs for low asset specific firms in order to divest control. The effect
of cultural distance was found significant and positive.
5.9.2.4 Country Risk
Figure 45, no. 4 hypothesises that 'the inverse relationship between asset specificity and
service firm's utility for share-control modes will become stronger with increasing country risk'
(1993:25). The study only partially supported no. 4, since high asset specificity firms will
yield more control in higher risk situations than anticipated.
5.9.2.5 Firm Size
The impact of firm size as illustrated in Figure 45, no. 5 is supported by the findings. 'The
inverse relationship between asset specificity and service firm's utility for share-control
rnooss will become weaker with the increasing size of the firm' (1993:25). High asset
specificity firms will be virtually untouched by firm size, where low assets specificity firms will
increase their level of ownership as the size of the company increases.
Proposition 33: Asset Specificity in Service Firms
All things being equal, service firms will be more likely to favour share-control entry modes
when asset specificity is low. The tendency intensifies when services are inseparable, with
increased country risk or when a firm becomes smaller.
5.10 Project and Partner Specific Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
5.10.1 Relative Size Subsidiary of Subsidiary
Bell (1996) expected that due to limited resources a MNC would adopt lower ownership
levels when entering a foreign market with a relatively big subsidiary. However, it is found
that the relative size of investment has a positive correlation with the level of ownership,
contrary to expectation. Larger investments significantly increase the probability of WFOE's.
Bell (1996) resolves that MNC's might want to avoid the risk of unilateral dependence when a
large subsidiary is important to the overall strategy of the company. The only contrasting
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study is that of Kogut and Singh (1988b), while Hennart (1991) and Larimo (1993) obtained
non-significant findings (see Table 14).
Proposition 34: Relative Size Subsidiary
All thinqs being equal, as the size (importance) of the subsidiary increases relative to the
parent, it will be more important adopt a high level of control due to the strategic importance
of the subsidiary.
5.10.2 Technical Absorptive Capacity of Transferee
Resource requirements of a technology transfer can be defined as 'its demand upon the
transferor's input of resources' (Tsang 1997: 159). The greater the demand for inputs, the
greater the required control over the subsidiary. Technical absorptive capacity (TAC) of the
transferee refers 'to the ability to assimilate, adapt and integrate the technology into its
production system' (1997: 159). Pointing to a number of studies Tsang (1997) suggests that
TAC is a function of prior related knowledge and that manufacturing experience, firm size
and R&D intensity are determinants of TAC. Consequently 'when the technical absorptive
capacity of the transferee is low, firms will prefer transfer modes that require high resource
commitments' (1997: 160).
Proposition 35: Technical Absorptive Capacity
All things being equal, when the TAC of the potential partner is low, the firm will be required
to obtain higher levels of ownership of the foreign subsidiary.
5.11 Interrelations between determinants of Entry Mode Choice
Argwal et al. (1992: 1-27) examined the impact that interrelationships among ownership-,
location- and internalisation factors had on firms' choice of foreign market entry modes.
Building on the eclectic framework, Argwal et al. (1992) identified variables within the
framework. Firstly within ownership advantages, the ability to develop differentiated
products, firm size and international experience. Secondly, location advantages, including
marketing potential and investment risk. Thirdly, internalisation risks, of which only
contractual risk was identified. The U.S equipment leasing industry (service industry) was
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surveyed and analysed it by means of a factor analysis by means of multi-nomiallogistic
regression. Figure 46 illustrates the relationships have been studied:
Figure 46: Impact of Ownership, Location and Internalisation Factors on Entry mode
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5.11.1.1 Size/International Experience and Market Potential
Figure 46, H1 indicates that 'firms that are larger and that have higher multinational
experience are more likely to choose a sole venture for entry in relatively lower market
potential countries' (1992: 7). In the same token, Figure 46, H2 shows 'firms that are smaller
and that have lower multinational experience, are more likely to choose a joint venture for
entry in relatively higher market potential countries' (1992: 7. H1 & 2 were confirmed.
5.11.1.2 Ownership Advantage and Investment Risk
Argwal et al. (1992) wrongly hypothesised 'firms that have higher ability to develop
differentiated products are more likely to choose a sole venture mode in markets that have
higher investment risk'. Moreover, 'firms that are larger and have higher multinational
experience may have a lower probability of choosing a sole venture mode in such countries'
(1992: 8) (Figure 46, H3b). The study found that firms that have a greater ability to develop
differentiated products do not have a significant mode preference under an investment risk
situation.
5.11.1.3 Ownership Advantage and Contractual Risk
Confirming Figure 46, H4 the study found 'firms that have a higher ability to develop
differentiated products are likely to choose a sole venture mode in countries characterised by
high contractual risk. Firms that 'do not have this ability may choose a contractual mode
even when the risk are high' (1992: 9). The result emphasises that firms with differentiated
products place a premium on maintaining control.
5.11.1.4 Market Potential and Investment Risk
Partially supporting Figure 46, H5 in 'countries characterised by high market potential and
high investment risk, firms may show a higher preference for exporting' (1992: 10) and not
for joint ventures as was hypothesised.
In summary, small firms with limited international experience prefer to enter high potential
markets through shared entry modes. Firms with a higher ability to differentiate products are
averse to contractual-risk and prefer investment modes (WFOE's). While investment-risk
deters companies away from investment, for strategic considerations, bigger companies
continue to invest.
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5.12 Relative Importance of Determinants of Entry Mode Choice
One area lacking in the entry mode research is the relative importance or weight of each
determinant or group of determinants. Delios & Beamish (1999: 915-933) did however
empirically investigate the relative importance of transactional, institutional and experience
influences on the ownership strategies of Japanese investors in East and Southeast Asia.
The transactional variables embody contributed assets (asset specificity) and complementary
assets. Table 16 highlights the hypothesis and results of the study.
Table 16: Transactional, Institutional, and Experience Influences on Ownership
Structure
Total number of Japanese parents foreign
investments
H3c
Number of of operation experience
in the host
+
+
Dependant
EquityOwnership
Source: Compiled from Delios & Beamish (1999: 915-933)
+
Dellos & Beamish (1999: 930) found that experience and institutional factors are the most
important determinants of ownership strategy. Institutional variables affects ownership
structure at both regulatory and risk levels. Transactional factors are less important than
experience and institution factors. Firms operating in technologically and marketing intensive
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industries tended to take higher ownership positions when making foreign investment,
however the effect is relatively weaker than institutional- and experience related effects. One
strong effect of transaction cost factors is the strong positive relationship between proprietary
content of firm's assets and the level of ownership.
5.13 The Choice between Minority-, 50/50-, or Majority Joint Ventures
Bell (1996) submits that minority-, 50/50- and majority JV's are three distinct forms of
organisation. Each form has unique characteristics and features. A global strategy will
significantly increase the likelihood of a majority owned JV over a WFOE. Majority owned
and 50/50 JV's are used to enter rapidly growing industries. International experience will
influence MNC's to prefer WFOE's to majority JV and majority JV's to all types of JV's. The
50/50 JV's are preferred when the partner is highly experienced in the host country. Product
experience and asset specificity did not show any significant effect on the choice between
the level of JV's. Brand name companies prefer WFOE's to all types of JV's, especially
50/50- and minority JV's. The curvilinear effect of cultural distance holds for all three types of
JV's. That is for culturally similar and distant cultures JV's will be preferred to WFOE's. Host
country risk impels companies to opt for 50/50- and majority JV's. The analysis does not
support the perception that companies will opt for a minority share in high-risk situation.
Restrictive policies' effect on the preference for WFOE's to 50/50 JV's is significantly. MNC's
prefer 50/50- and majority JV's in developing countries.
Bell (1996: 129) summarises his findings: 'JV's are more likely to be established when a
high-growth industry is entered; the investing firms has much host country experience; the
cultural differences between the home and the host country are either very small or very
large; a risky host country is entered, and when the host country has a high level of welfare.
WFOE's are more likely to be established when the level of competition in the industry
entered is high; the investing firm has much international experience; the size of the foreign
subsidiary is relatively large; the assets transferred to the foreign affiliate are highly specific
and the investing firm has a good reputation.
Three variables appeared to have no significant effect on the choice between a JV and
WOS: Investing firm's strategy, its experience with products and the policy of the host
qove.nrnent,
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5.14 Summary
Upon gaining a understanding of the theoretical perspectives underlying entry mode choice
this chapter aimed to identify entry mode determinants as it relates to each theoretical
perspective. Current entry mode models do not provide an adequate framework for guiding
entry mode choice, since the models are too narrowly focussed on a single or a few
theoretical departure points. The model proposed integrates the dominant theories with its
relevant entry mode determinants into a logical framework that can guide a foreign entrant to
choose the most appropriate ownership level. In addition, the impact of each determinant on
the ownership level in a foreign invested enterprise was assessed.
Figure 47 summarise the proposed positive or negative relationship with ownership level with
a (+) or (-).
Figure 47: A General Market Entry Mode Decision Framework
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Sources: Bell (1996), Tsang (1997), Anderson & Gatignon (1986), Oelios & Beamish (1999)
Finally it is suggested although one study found institutional and experience variable to be
more influential than transaction cost variables, that the relative strength of the determinants
need to be further studied.
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6 An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 provides the final building block for advancing a market entry mode decision
framework for China (see Figure 48). In the first pillar, chapters 2 and 3 described the
general investment environment of China, and critically reviewed China-specific entry modes
available for the foreign direct investor. Each investment vehicle represents a different level
of resource commitment, control or ownership.
Figure 48: Market Entry Mode Decision Building Block Five
An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for
Foreign Investors in China
(Chapter 6)
Market Entry Mode
Alternatives for Foreign
Direct Investment in China
Determinants of
Ownership Level in a
FIE (Chapter 5)
Theoretical Foundation's
of Entry Mode Choice
(Chapter 4)
Overview of the
Investment Environment
in China (Chapter 2)
The second pillar, chapters 3 and 4, reviewed the theoretical foundations for entry mode
choice in order to draw from the theoretical foundations the general determinants of entry
mode choice. Entry mode determinants as researched have been reviewed and integrated
into a general market entry mode decision framework. Chapter 6 then, will need to integrate
the general entry mode framework with the China-specific environment.
T0 convert the general entry mode framework to a China-specific framework, two steps need
to be taken. Firstly, the China-specific entry mode literature must be reviewed in order to
identify any additional China-specific determinants of entry mode choice. Secondly, the
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framework must be applied to both China as a host country and South Africa as a home
country to be able to make proposition specifically for the Chinese situation.
6.2 Review of Entry Mode Research Applied to China
Only a few studies exist that apply entry mode determinants to the Chinese context or
identified China unique determinants. Firstly, Pan (1996) examined the determinants of
foreign equity ownership in joint ventures in China. Secondly, Pan & Tse (1997) proposed a
model for entry mode choice and formation of alliance in China. Thirdly, Cui (1997)
proposed an evolutionary approach to entry mode choice, while Sun (1999) studied the
impacts of intellectual property protection, host country risk and social distance in the
Chinese context.
6.2.1 Pan's Determinants of Ownership Level in EJV in China
Drawinq on the eclectic framework and the bargaining power literature, Pan (1996: 1-28)
examined the determinants of foreign equity ownership in EJV in China (see Table 17). In
addition to the general, Pan offers new variables of ownership level in China including the
level of state ownership of the Chinese partners, the alignment of local vs. foreign partners in
an EJV, the choice of EJV location in China and EJV contractual duration. The determinants
are categorised by ownership preferences (the level of ownership the foreign partner wants)
and ownership concessions (the level of ownership that the partner can get). Ownership
concessions are the outcome of the bargaining process with the host country partner or
government institution.
Pan (1996) identifies which of the determinants will have a significant influence on the
preference of a particular EJV type over another (see Table 18). Country risk of China,
foreign partner alignment, EJV duration and EJV investment amount will determine whether
a partner prefers equal equity ownership instead of a minority ownership. Whether a firm
prefers a majority ownership level instead of a minority ownership level, will be determined
by capital input, EJV investment amount, foreign partner alignment, advertising intensity and
competitive intensity. Country risk of China, foreign partner alignment and competitive
intensity will determine whether a 50% ownership will be preferred over a majority ownership.
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Table 17: Influences on Foreign Equity Ownership Level in Joint Ventures in China
."". :.;:,.::.
Advertising The foreign partner is more likely to own a 50% or a H1 +
Intensity majority share as the level of industry advertising
inten increases
Country Risk of The foreign partner is less likely to own a 50% or a H3 -Ps
China majority share as the level of risk in the host country
H2 + +
EJV Investment H4
Amount
increases
EJV Contractual Th ign partner is more likely to own a 50% or a H5 + +
Duration share as the contractual duration increases
Cultural Distance The foreign partner is less likely to own a 50% or a H6 +
majority share as the cultural distance between the
source eau and the host increases
Competitive The foreign partner is less likely to own a 50% or a H7 +
Intensity majority share as the level of industry competitive
inten increases
Local Partner The foreign partner is less likely to own a 50% or a H8
State Ownership majority share when the local partner is owned by
central of incial- level state entities
Local and The foreign partner is more likely to own a 50% or a Hg + +
Foreign Partner majority share as the number of foreign partners
Alignment involved in the venture increases. Similar effect
should hold true for the local
Location H10 + +
autonomous cities of
in.
Table 18: Significant determinants for EJV Type
• Country risk of China
• Foreign partner
alignment
• Competitive intensity
Country risk of China
Foreign partner
alignment
EJV duration and
• Capital input
• EJV investment amount
• Foreign partner
alignment
• EJV investment amount • Advertising intensity
• Com intens
•
•
•
Source: Compiled from Pan (1996: 1-28)
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6.2.2 Tse & Pan's Model of Entry Mode Selection and Alliance Formation
Tse & Pan (1997: 779-806) examined two dimensions of foreign market entry strategy,
namely mode of entry and formation of alliances. They suggest that formation of alliances as
entry strategy have not been studied adequately. Drawing on the transaction cost approach
of Anderson and Gatignon (1986) and eclectic framework, they propound that firms form
alliances to reduce risk, share technology, improve efficiency, enhance global mobility and
strengthen global competitiveness. In addition, firms form alliances to share risk, pool
resources, protect assets and to develop an ability to react quickly (Pan & Tse: 1996).
In Figure 49, Tse & Pan (1997) offer a conceptual model for entry mode selection and
formation of alliances in China. The model incorporates home country-, host country- and
industry factors. In addition, the model suggests operation location factors, as well as the
level of government negotiation factors. Seven sets of hypothesis are proposed and tested
utilising a longitudinal sample of 2998 foreign business activities in China for the period
between 1979 - 1993. The business activities include firms from the U.S, Europe, Japan and
other Asian Countries.
Figure 49: Model of Entry Mode Selection and Alliance Formation in the PRe
Host Country Factor:
-Experience in attracting FDI
-Length of Diplomatic Ties
Operations Location
-Special Economic Zones
-Openl Coastal Cities
-Other Place in China
Entry Mode:
-Licensing
-CN
-EN
-WFOE
Home Country Factor:
-Cultural Dimensions:
+Power Distance
+Uncertainty Avoidance Alliance with Non-:
-Home Country Partner
-International Partner
-Asian Partner
Level of Government
Interaction:
-State Government
-Provincial Government
-Municipal Government
Operations Related
Factors
Industry Factors:
-Scale of Operation
Entry Strategy
Source: Tse & Pan (1997: 779-806)
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Table 19 describes the hypothesis and findings of the study. The findings will be discussed
where required in the subsequent sections.
6.2.3 Cui's Evolutionary Approach to Market Entry in China
Cui (1997: 87-111) analyses MNC entry and expansion in China and proposes four stages of
development: entry preparation, market entry, market expansion, and experienced entrant.
Cui ( i997) suggests that a deterministic approach to market entry selection is not conclusive.
Rather an evolutionary approach provides a more holistic view of market entry. Market
development and convergence of MNC's in China offers an opportunity to test the
evolutionary approach. Cui (1997) criticises previous research for just focusing on specific
decisions rather than looking at internationalisation as a process of development from an
international-, to multi-national- to a global operation. Globalisation of a firm is a gradual
process of learning, reaction and adaptation. A firm's success and survival are tied to ability
to continuously learn and adapt in a changing environment.
Table 20 presents the stages of global market expansion in China. In the preparation stage
firms prepare to enter the Chinese market. The key concern during the preparation stage will
be to perform market research and assess the market demand, political risk and potential
feasibility of the operation. The relatively low risk, low cost representative office offers the
flexibility to perform research activities and to prepare the ground for later entry.
113
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 19: Model of Entry Mode Selection and Alliance Formation for China -
Hypothesis and Findings
With Own Country
Host Country
Factor
+ +
Host Country
Factor
+
Host Country
Factor
Operations
Be less likely to form alliance with non-PRC Firms when
enteri China
Source: Compiled from Tse & Pan (1997: 779-800)
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Table 20: Stages of Global Market Expansion and Business Strategy Implications
• Market research •
• Assessment of demand, • Offshore office
political risk and financial • Representative office with
feasibi small staff
Entry • Establish beachhead • Single local market
operation • Representative Office
• Transfer of capital and • The first joint Venture
management
• Smooth transition
Expansion • Sales growth • Expand to other regional
• Market share markets
• New product development • Establish national
• Product distribution headquarters
• Increase local ers
Experienced • Customer loyalty • Expand to marginal
• Competition markets
• Co-ordination •
• Rationalisation •
Source: Cui (1997: 87-111)
During the entry stages firms will test the market by entering into a single local market. The
representative office will be maintained to continue with liaison and research activities. A
firm with little international experience will enter into a joint venture to access local market
knowledge.
Upon gaining valuable market knowledge and experience, the entrant will enter the
expansion stage. More local markets will be entered, while utilising more local partners. The
representative offices might be extended to serve as the national head office.
After operating for a number of years in China, foreign entrants become experienced role
players. Experienced firms are more concerned with establishing a competitive position, co-
ordinating and rationalising various operations. Experienced firms, who find less reason to
work in local partnerships since adequate local knowledge has been accumulated, will utilise
WFOE's for subsequent entries. Experienced firms will also buyout partners or make
acquisitions.
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6.3 China-Specific Entry Mode Determinants
Figure 50 offers host country-, home country-, partner related- and project related entry
mode determinants that are China-specific. This section will review each of the determinants
and make propositions regarding its impact on ownership level in foreign invested
enterprises in China.
6.4 Host Country Determinants of Entry Mode Choice in China
6.4.1 Market Potentiall Welfare
The review of the Chinese investment environment in chapter 2 implies that general market
potential in China can be regarded as high. Simply appreciating the potential consumer
market of 1.2 billion people, a GOP of 8,203 billion yuan (+/- 1000 billion USO) and an annual
growth of over the 7 %, no doubt exists that China is potentially the world's biggest consumer
market (MOFTEC: 1999). The very high levels of FOI flowing to China since the early 1990
confirm this notion. As a result foreign investors prefer higher levels of ownership when
entering China.
Proposition 36: Market Potential in China
All things being equal, the relatively high market potential in China will result in foreign
investors taking higher ownership levels in FIE's than in countries with a lower market
potential.
6.4.2 Host Country Risk
Although the host country risk of China in the early 1980's had been high, the risk of doing
business in China decreased steadily over the years. One set back was the Tianianmen
Square massacre in 1989. Although the political situation since the incident has been
relatively stable, it would be a mistake to assume political stability in the long run. China
remains a one party Communist State. The example of the former Russia has shown the fall
of the ruling party is always possible. For fear of losing its status quo as ruling party, the
Communist Party of China encourages the market reforms and economic growth
(Oernberger: 1999). The political situation seems to be at least in the medium term to be
very stable and can therefore be rated as low to medium.
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Figure 50: China-Specific Entry Mode Determinants
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·Social Cultural Distance with the RSA
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/
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·Level of State Ownership
·Foreign Partner Alignment
·Complementary Assets
Source: Tse & Pan (1997), Pan (1996), Cui (1997), Sun (1999)
Pan (1996) found that a foreign partner is less likely to own high levels of equity, as the level
of risk in the host country increases. However the findings suggest that a favourable risk
situation does not bring a foreign partner to seek a majority share.
Proposition 37: Host Country Risk of China
,A.l1things being equal, the relatively medium levels of country risk in China will not result in
significantly higher ownership levels in FIE's in China.
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6.4.3 China's Experience in Attracting FOI
Chapter 2 describes the development of China's policies in attracting foreign direct
investment in China since 1979. China is the largest recipient of FDI among developing
countries and the fourth largest recipient of all countries (Gelb: 2000). In gaining experience
with attracting foreign investment, China learned how to create a stable investment
environment with incentives for foreign investors. A number of laws and regulations were
promulgated to reduce uncertainty for the investor (See Chapter 2 & 3). Tse & Pan (1997)
found that increased experience with foreign investment would lead to higher equity
investments.
Proposition 38: Host Country Risk of China
All things being equal, China's relatively high level of experience in attracting FDI will result in
higher ownership levels in FIE's in China.
6.4.4 Host Government Restrictions
The Chinese government has followed a phased approach in opening up the economy to the
outside world (Chapter 2). Both high levels of restrictions and incentives were employed to
direct FDI where the government deemed necessary. Restrictions imposed on foreign
investors were on three levels: the geographical location of investment, the sectors of
investment and lastly, the equity level of investment. Since the government was primarily
motivated to upgrade the technology base of its state enterprises, it restricted investment in
the initial phases to joint ventures and to the SEZ. In return for the restrictions, foreign
investors were granted special privileges such as big tax break.
An interesting policy change currently in China is the drive to eliminate the regional
inequalities. Incentives in the previously designated investment areas are being recalled.
This while government offers incentives for investing in the undeveloped west. In June 2000
MOFTEC issued a circular containing a list of preferred projects in the undeveloped central
and western areas of China (CIFIT: 2000). Table 21 serves as an example of projects that
will receive preferential treatment in the under-developed areas in China.
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Table 21: A Example of the List of Project in China's Central and Western Regions
with Preferential Policies for Foreign Investors
1. Storage, freshness keeping and processing of grains, vegetables, fruits and poultry an
livestock products
2. Forestation and introduction of good species of trees and plants.
3. Production of phosphorus-free detergent.
4. Technical reforms in cotton textile productions, printing and dyeing enterprises.
Manufacturing of new types of textile machines.
Construction and management of highways, independent bridges and tunnels.
Applied technique development in coal processing and production of coal products.
Deep processing of coal tar.
Exploration. development and usage of coal bed gas resources.
10. Construction and management of thermal power station with single generator capacity 0
300 000 kilowatt and above
11. Exploration and exploitation of copper resources (not for sole-foreign funded)
12. Development and manufacturing of high quality of neodymium, iron and boron material and
rare-earth mothers.
Source: CIFIT (2000)
Incentives include company tax exemption, exemption from tariff- and other import value
added taxes. However in the midst of granting incentives, restrictions apply to ownership
levels where the pillar industries are concerned (CIFIT: 2000).
Proposition 39: Host Country Restrictions
All things being equal, China's relatively high level of restrictions in especially the pillar
industries will result in lower ownership levels in FIE's.
Proposition 40: Host Country Incentives
All things being equal, the high level of incentives in China's under-developed western areas
and 'encouraged' industries will result in higher ownership levels in FIE's.
6.4.5 Intellectual Property Protection
One of the biggest areas of concern for foreign investors over the past few years was, and
still is, the status of intellectual property rights (IRP) protection in China. Simone (2000: 12)
states that 'billions of dollars worth of counterfeit products are made in China every year,
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from cosmetics, food, drugs, pesticides, and electrical appliances to more publicised
software, music and films'. In the software and film (VCD's) markets pirate copies constitute
80-100% of respective markets (Weldon & Vanhonacker: 1999).
Clark (2000) gives insight into the birth of the problem. In the mid-1980's virtually no
counterfeits existed in China. However since the early 1990's, the production, export and
domestic sale of counterfeit products increased dramatically. This trend can be attributed to
the following factors: Firstly, the liberalisation of the Chinese market. Previously government
controlled factories suddenly had the choice of what to manufacture and more freedom to
distribute their goods. Secondly, the establishment of Hong Kong and Taiwan counterfeit
producers in China. Thirdly, an increase in appreciation of brand-name products provided
incentives for counterfeit producers to profit from the trend. Lastly, due to cost cutting
strategies, foreign investors used simplified production techniques, which resulted in
products being copied more easily.
Since the early nineties, international trade partners demurred against the lack of legislation
to protect them against IPR abuses. Goldberg & Fedder (1991) criticised the new Chinese
copyright law and its implementing regulations of June 1, 1991, which violated the Bern
Convention for Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the Universal Copyright
Convention on several accounts. Criticism included that insufficient terms of protection were
awarded, inadequate enforcement provisions provided and overboard exceptions from
protection allowed. For example, users were allowed to make unspecified small amounts of
copies for educational or government use, which resulted in government institutions and
unive-sities compiling their own libraries of pirated software.
Fortunately, due to international pressure, China has agreed to a number of international
treaties on IPR. Their bid to joint the WTO will require China to conform to the Agreement on
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). TRIPS will demand China to
enforce copyright, trademarks, patents, and trade secrets within a year of ascension to the
WTO (Clark: 2000).
In view of TRIPS, China is currently reviewing the legal framework for intellectual property
protection. Nevertheless Clark (2000) cautions that the main problem of implementing the
TRIPS will not be the lack of a legal framework, since China's law is already essentially
compliant, but rather the weakness of its enforcement regime. Potter & Oksenber (1999)
assert that significant reforms in terms IPR have been made. Raids against pirate factories
have been done, IPR violators have been fined and some even imprisoned. Nevertheless
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problems of administration and enforcement exists. Firstly, despite the formation of an inter-
agency IPR administrative conference, which is presumed to co-ordinate IPR centrally,
administrative IPR bodies are still scattered and divided. These bodies include the
Trademark Office, the China Patent Office, the National Copyright Administration, the State
Intellectual Property Office, the Cultural Market Administration and the General
Administration of Customers. Secondly, even though the criminal apparatus such as the
Public Security Bureau increased, it is still inadequate.
Concerning the inadequacy of the criminal enforcement, Simone (1999) reports that China's
record of convicting and jailing counterfeiters has been woeful and only a handful of serious
offences resulted in convictions. With regards to 15'000 trademark offences in 1997, only 57
were handed over to the judicial authorities to be investigated. Inadequate fines are another
problem. A maximum fine of 50% of illegal revenues (which is almost impossible to
determine) is not nearly enough to deter offenders. Protectionism and corruption within the
enforcement bodies exist. Typical examples are the tip-offs to offenders before the raids.
Potter & Oksenber (1999) add to the list of dilemmas, the lack of resources employed to build
a cadre of IPR administration and enforcement.
In summary, China faces a huge IPR protection problem despite reforms. Clark (2000)
forewarns that China's entry into the WTO will result in more IPR abuses due to the greater
ease that IPR violators can import and export their products. Whenever the economy grows,
counterfeits will grow. But 3-5 years after WTO ascension IPR protection can be expected to
come under control. As a result, for the medium term, foreign investors will be expected to
seek higher ownership level in their new ventures as protection against IPR violators.
Proposition 41: Intellectual Property Protection
All things being equal, weak IPR protection in China will result in higher ownership levels in
FIE's in China.
6.5 South African Specific Home Country Determinants
6.5.1 Length of Diplomatic Ties with SA
Tse & Pan (1997) point to the example of Yugoslavia and North Korea who were the first
countries to have established diplomatic relations with China in 1949. Their study confirmed
that MNC's from countries with longer diplomatic ties will receive more favourable treatment
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than those with shorter diplomatic ties, resulting in higher ownership levels in FIE's. A history
of diplomatic relationships with China will also influence MNC's to invest in areas outside the
SEZ and coastal cities.
South Africa's relationship with the People's Republic of China was strained due to its good
relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) during the apartheid era. The PRC refuses
diplomatic relationships with countries that recognise Taiwan's sovereignty as a nation. As a
result China was very closed for South African business until the change of government in
South Africa (Breytenbach: 1999).
The then vice-president Mbeki recognised the importance of China as potentially the world's
biggest market, and in 1998 officially exchanged full diplomatic relations with Taiwan in
favour for relations with China (Van der Walt: 1997, 1998). However, in 2000 South Africa's
exports to China still lagged behind, with only 1.28% of its total export volume, as opposed to
the 2.27% to Taiwan or the 13.68% to the USA (Department of Trade and Industry: 2000).
Sun (1998) utilised trade between countries as a substitute for diplomatic relations between
two countries, and subsequently it can be derived that the diplomatic relations between
South Africa and China are still not favourable, although improving.
In comparison with the US, who exchanged relationships with Taiwan in 1979 (Breytenbach:
1999) for relations with China, South African companies will adopt less equity based entry
modes. Illustrating the benefit of longer diplomatic relationships with China, is the signing of
the US-China bilateral agreement in November 1999. The agreement will give US
companies access to previously restricted industries such as banking, insurance and
telecommunication (China Business Review: 2000). In addition, telephone companies will be
allowed to hold up to 49% of telecommunication ventures upon WTO entry and up to 50%
two years after WTO ascension (International Law Update: 1999).
Proposition 42: Length of Diplomatic Ties with South Africa
All things being equal, the relatively short diplomatic relationship between South Africa and
China will result in lower ownership levels in South African FIE's in China as opposed to
countries with longer diplomatic ties with China.
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6.5.2 Social Cultural Distance
Sun (1999) identified three social cultural groups relating to China:
Group 1: Hong Kong and Taiwan, who share the same language and culture with that of
China due to close proximity.
Group 2: Other Asian countries (including Japan, Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea),
that share cultural and historical links with China.
Group 3: Western countries (US and Europe) who have very different languages and
cultures from that of China.
Analysing annual FDI statistics from MOFTEC, Sun (1999) found that countries from the first
two groups have a lower inclination to set up EJV's. The observation suggests that for the
Chinese situation an increase in cultural distance between the home and the host country will
reduce the level of ownership the foreign entrants will pursue.
Contrary to expectation, Pan (1996) found that an increase in cultural distance increases the
likelihood for a foreign entrant to own a 50% or majority share in FIE. Pan's (1996) findings
suggest a foreign partner will aim for effective control over operations in higher cultural
distance situations. To further complicate the matter Bell (1996) found that both at very low
and very high levels of cultural distance that MNC's adopt lower levels of ownership (See
discussion in chapter 5).
Literature does not offer any further explanations for the contradictions. However we can
speculate that at low levels of cultural distance, firms will utilise both high and low levels of
ownership entry modes for different reasons. At medium levels of cultural distance MNC's
will prefer higher levels of ownership. High levels of cultural distance will on the one hand
increase the frequency of EJV's to learn from local partners, while at the same time firms
from high uncertainty avoidance cultures will prefer to maintain a high level of control.
Sun (1999) also found that group 1 & 2 countries employed CJV's more regularly since the
uncertainty and lack of legal framework will be more difficult to cope with for a western
company. Group 1& 2 companies will also be more likely to set up WFOE's due to a higher
level of knowledge of the local culture and language.
South Africa can be viewed as part of group 3 in terms of cultural distance. In other words,
the cultural distance between South Africa and China is high. Owing to the large cultural
distance, South African companies may react in two possible ways when entering into China.
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First, owing the lack of experience, a greater need for control over operations will lead to
higher equity levels. Secondly, owing to the lack of knowledge of the local market, South
African companies will seek local partners who can provide local market access and
knowledge.
Proposition 43: Cultural Distance between South Africa and China
All things being equal, the relatively high cultural distance between South Africa and China
will result in lower equity levels in South African FIE's. Instead companies with high levels of
uncertainty avoidance, will tend to maintain higher levels of ownership as a measure against
the high uncertainty of the distant cultural situation ..
6.6 Partner Related Determinants
6.6.1 Indigenous Technical Capability (ITC) and Technical Absorptive Capacity (TAC)
During the old era of Communism in China, the technical development of the Chinese work
force lagged behind. Isolation from the outside world and the lack of experience working on
advanced technology created a gap in technological experience and training. As a result the
TAC of the older workforce is relatively low, especially those employed in the SOE's.
However since the opening up of China in 1979, the Chinese government pursued the
upgrading of technology, and the development of technical and managerial skills of the
workforce (Frankenstein: 2000; Chapter 2). Enormous efforts are being made to turn the
situation around. In 1999 4.13 million students enrolled as under-graduate students at
universities, 3.06 million enrolled in adult higher education and 230 000 enrolled as post-
graduate students (an increase of 200 000 to 1998). 10.5 Million students studied at ordinary
secondary schools while 14.3 million enrolled in vocational or technical schools. Adult
technical training schools offered courses to 101 million people. In addition 2.71 million
professional people and technicians were engaged in technical or scientific activities, of
which 1.5 million were scientists or engineers. Expenditure on scientific or technical activities
was up 10.8 % to 128 billion yuan (USO 15 Billion) (MOFTEC: 1999).
These efforts indicate that a relatively large force of technically trained people is emerging in
China. The level of technical knowledge of the upcoming or younger workforce is relatively
high, including those from private companies.
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Proposition 44: Technical Absorptive Capability
All things being equal, the low levels of TAC among especially SOE workers in China will
result in higher ownership levels in FIE's in the medium term, while in the longer term the
upgrading of technical skills will relieve the necessity of taking higher ownership by FIE's.
6.6.2 Foreign Partner Alignment
Pan's (1996) proposed and confirmed (rather obviously) that when the number of foreign
partners increase in an EJV as opposed to the number of Chinese partners, it is more likely
to own a 50% or a majority share in the venture. A similar effect should hold true for the local
partners in the venture.
6.6.3 Level of Contractual Risk
In addition to the weak IPR protection in China, a culture of abusing IPR exists (Weldon &
Vanhonacker: 1999, Clark: 2000). In section 6.4.5 the problem of intellectual property rights
abuses were discussed sufficiently.
Proposition 45: Level of Contractual Risk
All things being equal, the high levels of opportunism of local partners in China will result in
foreign partners adopting high ownership levels in FIE's.
6.6.4 Complementary Assets
A local partner should have assets that are valuable to the foreign entrant. As referred to in
chapter 3 most foreign entrants lack market knowledge and experience. Their local partners
are then expected to provide the necessary market knowledge, experience as well as
connections with government, suppliers and customers to be successful. Chapter 3 also
pointed out that many partners in China fail on all these accounts.
Proposition 46: Complementary Assets
All things being equal, the relatively low levels of technical- and market knowledge, and
market access of Chinese partners will deter foreign investors from entering into joint
ventures.
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6.7 Project RelatedDeterminants
6.7.1 Level of Intellectual Property of Transferred Technology
Drawing on a number of writers, Sun (1999) states that the proprietary nature of a product is
highly correlated with ownership level. A high investment in research and development will
lead to higher ownership. However the more mature the product class, the less control firms
would demand of a foreign business entity. High-tech propriety products give more
bargaining power with the host government.
Applying this to the Chinese situation, Sun (1999) found that a large number of foreign
investment projects utilise standard technology while employing a large number of labourers.
Such investment projects normally employ an EJV with a local partner. However in the high
tech sectors, he found that between the period of 1979-1993 WFOE's accounted for 55.2%
of the entries. Thus a high level of technological content will also lead to higher ownership
levels in China.
Pan (1996) employs advertising intensity as a proxy for the level of intellectual property of the
product. He found that the foreign partner is more likely to own a 50% or a majority share as
the level of industry advertising intensity increases.
Proposition 47: Level of Intellectual Property of Transferred Technology
All things being equal, MNC's transferring technology with a high intellectual property content
to China will prefer greater ownership in the FIE's, while firms transferring technology with a
low level intellectual property or mature technology to China will yield ownership in the FIE's.
6.7.2 Level of Chinese Government Dealings
Tse & Pan (1997) propose that the level on which a foreign firm deals with the government
will have an impact on the level of ownership in the venture. Mainly three levels of
government in China exist. The state (central -), municipal- and local governments. The
nature, size and location of the project will determine the level on which a firm interacts with
the government. Each level of government represents a different level of risk for a foreign
firm. Higher levels of government have more authority to interpret regulations and approve
projects, whereas lower levels of government are more flexible and have fewer regulations to
conform to. Pan (1997) found that projects that deal with lower levels of government will
adopt higher levels of ownership in the FIE's.
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Proposition 48: Level of Chinese Government Dealings
All things being equal, FIE projects dealing with municipal and local government levels will
adopt higher ownership levels than those who deal with the central government of China.
6.7.3 Stage of Entry
As discussed in 6.2.3, Cui (1997) offers an evolutionary approach to market entry in China.
FIE's enter and expand into China in four stages of development: entry preparation, market
entry, market expansion, and experienced entrant. At later stages of market entry, FIE's will
adopt higher ownership levels than early stages.
Proposition 49: Stage of Entry
All things being equal, FIE's in later stages of market entry in China will adopt higher
ownership levels than those in earlier stages of entry.
6.7.4 Project Location
Pan (1996), Tse & Pan (1997) and Sun (1999) propose project locations as a very important
determlnant of entry mode choice. Sun (1999) points to the connection between the location
determinant and country risk. Special economic zones and coastal cities have attracted the
majority of foreign investment and consequently developed the necessary infra-structures
and services for a foreign entrant to be successful. Implementing a project successfully in
the under-developed western areas involves more uncertainty. Foreign entrants perceive
that the circumstances in economic zones involve lower risks and will as a result be more
likely to take a higher ownership position in these cities, as opposed to under-developed
western areas. Sun's (1999) regression analysis confirmed that in the south-east coastal
areas FIE's preferred majority JV's and WFOE's to minority JV's. Sun's (1999) finding is
consistent with Pan's (1996) observations that partners locating in the SEZ or coastal cities,
will be more likely to own a 50% or majority share when the EJV is located in South China or
one of the three autonomous cities of Beijing, Shanghai or Tianjin.
Proposition 50: Project Location
All things being equal, FIE's locating in SEZ's and open coastal cities will take higher
ownership positions than those locating in under-developed western areas of China.
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6.7.5 Investment Amount and -Duration
From a resource perspective it can be expected that FIE's will not be able to take high
ownership positions in very big investment projects. Pan (1996) found that as the total
investment in an EJV increases, the less likely the foreign partner would own a 50% or a
majority share.
Similarly it can be expected that projects of longer duration, will be more important to a
foreign investor. Pan (1996) found that as the investment duration increases, the foreign
partner is more likely to own a 50% or a majority share in a FIE.
Proposition 51: Investment Amount
All things being equal, the larger the investment amount required from the foreign investor,
the lower equity position will be taken up in a FIE in China.
Proposition 52: Investment Duration
All things being equal, the longer the investment duration of the EJV, the larger equity
position will be sought by the foreign investor a FIE in China.
6.8 An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for Foreign
Investors in China
By integrating the general entry mode determinants as discussed in chapter 5 with the
China-specific determinants as discussed in 6.3 - 6.7, Figure 49 offers a market entry
decision framework for China. The model proposes that a foreign entrant should first
consider the external environment's impact on the entry level of ownership. The external
environment consists of host country-, home country- and industry determinants. Secondly,
the internal environment of the enterprise should be assessed. The internal environment
consists of strategic-, ownership assets-, experience- and institutional factors. The outcome
of both the external and internal analysis will indicate to the foreign entrant both what the
desirability is for a high level of ownership, as well as its ability to enter by means of a WFOE
or EJV. Finally, an analysis of the potential partners and the proposed project will determine
whether the entrant can in fact enter by means of the desired ownership level. The shaded
sections of the model indicate the China-specific variables as discussed.
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Figure 51: An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for Foreign Investors
in China
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To further illustrate, a MNC entering China will first review the host country factors. A high
market potential, high experience with attracting FDI, host country incentives and weak
intellectual property rights protection will provide an incentive to adopt a high ownership
level. However a high level of indigenous technical capacity will reduce the need for a high
level of ownership, while a specific host country restriction can rule out for instance the
possibility of setting up aWFOE.
Depending on the relative strength of the entry mode determinants, a combined impact will
be either a low, medium, high or very high ownership preference/ requirement. In the same
way the internal determinants will be considered and depending on the relative weight
thereof, it can be decided whether it's desirable or required to partner with or not. Should it
be desirable or required to partner, each of the partner related determinants should be
considered. Project related factors would be the final influence whether to utilise a minority-,
50/50-, majority EJV or aWFOE.
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Table 22: Market Entry Mode Scorecard for China
Rating Scale:
1- Lowest Possible Ownership; 2- Minority Ownership;
3- Majority Ownership Desired; 4- Full Ownership
1. Market Potential/ Welfare (H +)
2. Host Country Risk 3 9 2 3 4
3. Experience in attracting FDI (H 2 3 4
4. Host Countries Incentives (H +) 1 2 3 4
5. Host Country Restrictions (H -) 1 2 3 4
6. Intellectual Property Protection (L +) 4 8 2 3 4
7. Indigenous Technical Capability (M- 3 12 1 2 3 4
B
8.
9.
11. Industry Type (Service/ Manufacturing) 1 2 3 4
12. Industry Growth 1 2 3 4
13. Service Inseparability 2 3 4
14. Resource/Capital Intensity 1 2 3 4
15. Competitive Intensity 1 2 3 .4
16. Oligopolistic Nature of Market 2 3 4
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35. 1 2 3 4
36. Relative Size of Operation 2 3 4
37. Level of Government Dealing 2 3 4
38. Project Location with SEZ or open city 2 3 4
39. Entry Stage 1 2 3 4
From a practical point of view Table 22 offers a score card for evaluating entry mode choice.
A rating scale from 1-4 is used. A score of 1 indicates the lowest ownership desired while 4
points indicate a desire or requirement for full ownership. The foreign entrant should first
determine the relative weight of each determinant before it can be scored. The score should
be multiplied by the relative weight for the applicable determinant and written in the point's
section. Once all the determinants are scored, the total points are calculated and a
percentage point calculated against the maximum possible points for the relevant
determinants. See the example in scoring in section A of Table 22.
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6.9 Summary
Chapter 6 offers the final building block in advancing a market entry mode decision
framework for China. Existing entry mode models for China were reviewed and integrated
into a holistic market entry mode decision framework for China. The framework suggests a
phased approach in analysing the market entry mode decision. Firstly, an external analysis
of the host-, home- and industry factors should be performed. Secondly, an internal analysis
of the firm strategy, - assets, -policy and -experience should be carried out, while a review of
partner and project factors should lastly be performed.
The impact of China-specific determinants in the framework was assessed. Figure 52
summarises the assessment and impact of each China-specific entry mode determinants.
China's relatively high market potential, experience in attracting FOI, and weak intellectual
property protection will provide a very high incentive for foreign investors to utilise full control
entry modes when entering into China. High levels of opportunism, low levels of technical
absorptive capacity and lack of performance from the Chinese partners will intensify foreign
investors' desire to take full control over their foreign operations in China. On the other hand,
government restrictions in certain sectors will prevent foreign entrants utilising WFOE's or
majority EJV's.
MNC's who follow a global strategy, with a relatively high international- and host country
experience, who transfer a high level of intellectual property, and have sufficient resources,
will be advised to utilise a WFOE entry mode when entering into China.
Lastly, South Africa's relatively short diplomatic relationship and high cultural distance with
China, coupled with a lack of host country experience will reduce South African firms'
motivation to utilise WFOE's in China. However the weak intellectual property protection and
the large potential market potential of China may still persuade South African firms to adopt a
WFOE rather than an EJV when entering China.
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Figure 52: Summary of the Impact of China-Specific Entry Mode Determinants
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7 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations
7.1 Summary
Foreign investment in China over the past 1° years has seen explosive growth. From a
meagre US$ 3.8 billion in 1990, FDI in China grew to US$ 45.5 billion in 1999. While its bid
to ascend to the WTO has renewed foreign investors' interest China's, problems and
frustrations with the CJV's and EJV's have increasingly resulted in foreign investors taking
control over its local operations in China through WFOE's.
Entry mode literature is contradictory and fragmented in its approach to offer guidance to the
foreign investors in selecting an appropriate foreign market entry mode. This study aimed to
advance a market entry mode decision framework for foreign investors in China
(MEMOFFIC). In doing so, it critically reviewed current market entry modes available for the
foreign investor in China, reviewed and formulated propositions regarding determinants of
entry mode choice in general, and integrated China-specific entry mode determinants into a
holistic framework of entry mode choice.
The study followed a two-pillar approach as depicted in Figure 53. First a basic literature
overview of China's investment environment was performed. In the context of the general
investment environment, the entry mode options available for foreign direct investors in
China were critically analysed.
The second pillar of the literature overview turned to the theoretical foundations of entry
mode choice on which most empirical research was built. From its theoretical departing
points the entry mode choice determinants were identified and surveyed. Propositions were
offered for each determinant of entry mode choice. The determinants of entry mode choice
were then integrated into an entry mode decision framework. Finally, the impact of China-
specific entry mode determinants on ownership level in FIE's was assessed and propositions
offered.
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Figure 53: Method and Structure of the Study
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Chapter 2 offered that China's economy and business environment over the past 21 years
was characterised by a phased or gradual opening to the outside world. Each phase opened
new opportunities for investors, and impacted especially the mode in which foreign entrants
do business in China.
Economic- and SOE reforms created opportunities for foreign investors in China: Firstly,
continued economic reform broadens the scope for foreign investment possibilities. A wider
choice of investment vehicles is available than in the past, especially with the introduction of
the JSLC (joint stock limited company). In terms of location, foreign investors are
encouraged to invest not only in the SEZ and open coastal cites but also in the under-
developed western areas of China. Previously restricted industries, especially in the service
sectors are gradually opening to the foreign investor. Secondly, the privatisation of SOE's
and especially the dept/equity swap program create opportunities for investors to acquire
existing enterprises in part or in full. And thirdly, JSLC also give foreign investors the
opportunity to invest more flexibly, by means of the stock exchanges in China.
An analysis of the trends in foreign direct investment confirmed that foreign investors
followed an evolutionary approach to entering the Chinese market. Structural changes in the
size, location, and sectors of FDI in China were identified. Gaining host country experience
increased the average size of investment; investment locations shifted from coastal areas to
also include inland areas, while initial investments in lighter industries made room for
investment in resource intensive industries. More importantly, host country experience led to
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an increased resource commitment in the entry modes utilised. Although EJV's reigned as
the preferred entry vehicle, since 1994 the WFOE became a major entry vehicle. By 1999
the WFOE was just as important entry vehicle as the EJV, while the CJV lagged behind in
the third place and the JSLC only emerged as a fourth alternative.
Chapter 3 analysed the Ra, CJV, EJV and WFOE as market entry vehicles in China. The
Ra is offered as a low risk, low cost first step entry vehicle. Ra's are restricted to market
research, liaison and marketing activities in China. It is easy and quick to set up. No
restrictions are imposed on which sectors may be entered with a Ra. Without first setting a
Ra, a foreign investor will have difficulty to find partners, suppliers and first customers. The
CJV is offered as quick to establish and a quick to terminate entry vehicle. It is ideally suited
for shorter-term projects like joint research, -exploration or -property development. A lack of
legal framework for the CJV often leaves CJV partners at the mercy of officials' interpretation
of the law. CJV's find it difficult to obtain approvals and procure materials due to a perceived
lack of commitment to China.
The EJV offers an equity-based investment where the foreign partner is normally required to
have an interest of at least 25%. EJV's can be leveraged to gain strategic access to
markets, as well to develop knowledge of the local market through the Chinese partner.
Partners have valuable contacts with local suppliers, customers and government officials -
without which it is difficult to operate successfully. On the other hand disappointing
performance, limited contacts, and a high level of opportunism of Chinese EJV partners can
harm the success of the venture. WFOE's are established exclusively with foreign funds. It
is much easier to establish than the EJV. WFOE's earn all the profit and take full control but
also bear the higher costs and carry the full risk. Flexibility and efficiency is easier to attain
since no accountability towards the Chinese partner is needed.
Pan & Chi (1999) research found that EJV's perform better in both market share and
profitability than WFOE's. They advise foreign investors to take caution for the down side of
entering China alone. Valuable advantages of an EJV like favourable government policy,
easier procurement of supplies, concessions and market access can be lost when entering
alone.
Moreover each entry mode provides the foreign investor with a different level of ownership or
control over the operation. Obtaining control over an operation requires more resource
commitment and involves more risk. Consequently, the entry mode decision can be
redefined in terms of the level of ownership adopted in the FIE.
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Chapter 4 propounds foundational theories to deal with the entry mode question. Hymer
posits that local firms possess better information about their environment than foreign firms
do. For FDI to take place, a foreign firm must have an advantage over the local firm. And
the market for the advantage must be imperfect. The TCA evaluate mode choice on the
basis of the competitive cost of the alternative governance forms. Cost of contact, contract
and monitor must be calculated before the optimal governance form. Transaction cost
analysis cautions the entrant to consider the cost involved to adopt various governing
structures. Internalisation theory suggests that firms should choose least cost locations and
internalise markets to the point where the benefits of internalisation outweigh the cost. The
ownership decision should be based on profit maximisation motive.
Dunning (1981, 1988) combines the market imperfection-, the transaction cost and
internalisation approaches in an eclectic framework. He offers that the propensity of a firm
engaging in international business will be determined by the following factors: First, the
extend it possesses (or acquires) assets which the competitors do not possess (ownership
advantage). Secondly, its desire to sell or lease these assets to other firms vs. to make use
of them internally (internalisation advantage) and thirdly, how profitable it is to exploit these
assets in conjunction with indigenous resources of foreign countries, rather than home
country (location advantage). Eclectic theory demands a firm to consider which entry mode
is most appropriate given the firms' ownership and location advantages.
Porter (1991) tenders that a firm's success depends on the relative attractiveness of an
industry and the firms' relative position in the industry. In order to attain such relative
position a firm should build a competitive advantage over its competitors. Building a
competitive advantage will require a firm to configure its value chain to differentiate it or
create a low cost advantage. Underlying the configuration of its value chain, lies the initial
conditions and managerial choice. One of these managerial choices is the entry mode
choice. In other words, the value chain can be configured through the level of ownership it
takes in subsidiaries. The strategic behaviour approach asks what level of ownership is the
most appropriate to implement the MNC's strategy and facilitate the development and
protection of a sustainable competitive advantage.
Penrose (1959) and Wernerfelt's (1984) resource-based view suggests that a firm should
grow through the utilisation of its resources and in the process develop additional assets.
Resource position barriers should be erected to distinguish the firms from its competitors.
Heterogeneity of assets, limits on competition, imperfect factor mobility and imperfect
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irnm'tabilty are footings for resource position barriers. The resource-based perspective
requires foreign entrants to ask the question of how the selected entry mode will impact the
exploitation of existing firm resources. Which entry mode will be best suited to the
development and protection of firm resources?
External organisations such as the host country government and internal organisations such
as the parent firm exert institutional pressure on an entrant. Organisational routines,
structures and processes influence subsidiaries to follow similar patterns to the parent.
Entrants that experience high levels of isomorphic pressure from the parent will tend to adopt
a WFOE. On the other hand, when the government institutional pressure is higher than the
internal pressure, firms will adapt to local market conditions.
Figure 54 integrates the foundational theories in a logical framework for analysing entry
mode choice. As part of the foreign entrants' external analysis, a firm should consider
institutional pressures. The relative impact of external- vs. internal institutional pressures
should be assessed. Secondly, an internal analysis of the firm should consider the strategic,
resource based-, eclectic- and internalisation perspectives. Thirdly, the project analysis
should incorporate transaction cost and evolutionary approaches in selecting the appropriate
entry mode level.
Chapter 5 identified entry mode determinants, which delineate each of the theoretical
perspectives underlying entry mode choice. Entry mode decision models found in literature
do not provide an adequate framework for guiding the foreign investors in selecting
appropriate ownership levels. The models are too narrowly focussed on a single or a few
theoretical departure points. The general entry mode decision framework proposed
integrated all the dominant theories as represented with its entry mode determinants. It can
guide a foreign entrant to choose the most appropriate ownership level.
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Figure 54: Impact of Foundational Theories on Entry Mode Choice
Institutional Theory
What relative impact will
internal and external
institutional pressure have on
entry mode choice?
Exter~~.~~~iiI~y~i~ .....H.. ••• •••••••••• • H •• • •••••••• H •••••••••• H ••••• H ••••••••••• H. .H.... H •• H.
Strategic Behavior Approach
What entry mode will best be
suited to implement company
strategy and develop a
competitive advantage?
Resource Based View
What entry mode be most
effective to exploit, develop
and protect company
resources and advantages?
I I
Eclectic Theory
What entry mode will be most
effective to exploit ownership
and location advantages?
,
Internalisation Theory
At what level of ownership
does the cost outweigh the
benefits?
Evolutionary Approach
What impact will experience,
learning and stage of entry
have on entry mode choice?
Transaction Cost Theory
What is the most cost
effective entry mode?
Source: Compiled from Chapter 4,5,6
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In addition, each determinant has been assessed in terms of its impact on the ownership
level in a foreign invested enterprise. Figure 55 summarises the proposed positive or
negative relationship with ownership level with a (+) or (-).
Figure 55: An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework
Eclectic -Locatlon
Advantages Strat!!Ql1 Bellavia .. iY!11!:03ch:
'Host Country Risk (-) Global Integration (+)
'Market Potential (+) 'Oigopolistic Nature of Market (+)
'Weaare Host Country (-) ·Differentiation Strategy (+)
'Indigenous Technical -Export vs Local Market Strategy
Capacity (-) l~(+) .~~'Cultural Distance (+/-) -Level of Competition (+)Reso..-ce Based View
ct 'Firm Size (+) «) 'Intellectual Property - Level (+)
Institutional Theorv CU -Product/Service Differentiation (+) CU'Institutional Policy(+)
j~
'Resource Availability (+) C
~
-Host Government Policy (+) 'Resource Obsolesce (-) ...
-Product Customisation (+) Q)
'Product Maturity (-) -C
Evolutiona!:]£ Th!lQQ!:
Indus!ri Factors -Experierce - Intennational (+/-)
'Industry Growth (-) -Experience - Mode (+/-)
'Service Inseparability (+) -Experience - Host Country (-1+)
·U.~itallntensity (-) 'Experience Effect
Transactional Factors
-Asset Specificity (+)
-Level of lP Protection (+) tA
'Free Riding (+)
tA
>.
CU
C«
C
Potential Partner 0
•Technical Absorptive ;:;
Capacity (-) 0
CU
tA
C
CU
Project Factors ...
I-
'Size of Entry (-)
'Relative Size of Subsidiary
(+)
Sources: Bell (1996), Tsang (1997), Anderson & Gatignon (1986), Delios & Beamish
(1999)
For instance from a strategic perspective, a high level of global integration, differentiation and
competition increase the desired level of ownership that an foreign entrant will seek in a FIE.
However from a resource perspective if the product is mature, the entrants desire for
ownership will be reduced. Depending on the relative strength of each determinant, the entry
mode decision can be taken.
7.2 Conclusions
Although tempted to provide simple right or wrong answers to the foreign investor in China,
this study has pointed out that no simple entry mode answers exist. Existing entry models or
frameworks were found inadequate to provide guidance for the foreign investors. These
frameworks are fragmented and too narrow focussed in terms of its theoretical departure
points. The entry mode choice depends on a host of factors from a number of theoretical
perspectives. The relative strength of these factors in the host country, industry and firm-
specific environment will determine what ownership level a foreign investor should adopt in
China.
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Chapter 6 reconciled the Chinese business environment with the general research on entry
mode choice. China-specific determinants were identified and incorporated into the entry
mode decision framework. The framework suggested a phased approach in analysing the
market entry mode decision. Firstly an external analysis of the host-, home- and industry
factors should be performed. Secondly, an internal analysis of the firm's strategy, assets,
policy and experience should be carried out, while a review of partner and project factors
should lastly be performed.
The impact of China-specific determinants on the foreign entrant's ownership was assessed.
The highlighted sections of Figure 56 summarise the assessment and impact of each China-
specific entry mode determinants.
Figure 56: An Integrated Market Entry Mode Decision Framework for Foreign Investors
in China (MEMDFFIC)
External Analysis Internal Analysis Project- & Partner
Analysis
Host Count!Y Factors !China}: Strategll Factors:
'Market Potential/ Welfare (H+) C. -Global lnteqration (+) >..-
'Experience in attracting FDI (H+) ..c • Differentiation Strategy (+) :!::::
'Host Countries Incentives (H+) til 'Local Market Focus (-) - Partner Factors:.-
'Host Country Restrictions (L-) .... 'Export Market Focus (+) .c 'Technical AbsorptiveCl)
-lntcllectuat Property r:: 'Level of Competition (+) <C Capacity (L -) Cl)
Protection (L+)
== 't:S
'Complementary Assets (L-) CJ
'Indigenous Technical 'Level of Opportunism (H+) .-
Capability (M -) 0 \ c 1\ 'Foreign Partner Alignment 0.... CU (+) .c.s Ownershil1 Assets: >. 'Local Partner State 0Home Count!]£ Factors: >. 'Firm Size :!:::: Ownership (H -) Cl)'Length of Diplomatic Ties ~ '(Resource Availability) (+) -.- 't:Swith SA (L-) - 'Intellectual Property Level (+) .c.- 0'Social Cultural Distance with SA ..c 'Product Life Cycle Stage (-) 1! Project Factors :lE(H +/-) CU
I II
'Investment Amount (-)
'Uncertainty Avoidance (-) .... .-.- en 'Contractual Duration (+)
~til Cl) 'Relative Size of Operation
Cl)
EXl1erience Factors: C (+) .....Indust!y Anaillsis C C
'Experience International (+/-) 'Level of Government
'Industry Type (Service/ - - W
Manufacturing) CU 'Experience Host Country (+/-) ns Dealing (-)r:: 'Experience Mode (+/-) C 'Location SEl and Coastal'Asset Specificity (+) .... a.. areas (+)
'Industry Growth (-) Cl) Cl) ·Stage of entry (+)
'Service Inseparability (+) - .....-Resource/Capital Intensity (-) >< C (+) Positive relationshipW Institutional Factors: -'Competitive Intensity (+)
'Internal Institutional Policy (-) Negative relationship-Oliqopolistic Nature of Market (+) with ownership level in a FIE
In order to provide even clearer guidance to the foreign investor in China, Table 23 provides
a list of typical conditions that need to be satisfied before a foreign entrant should adopt a
WFOE or an EJV. This list only represents the two ends of the control continuum, and the
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relative strength of each determinant will determine which ownership level the foreign
investor will adopt.
Table 23: Preferred Conditions for WFOE's vs. EJV's in China
Home Country
determinants
Ownership Assets
Experience Determinants
Later or experience stages of
en
andLocate in SEZ and open
coastal cities
rnment
en coastal cities
Earlier stages of entry
The external analysis of the Chinese host country factors suggested that its relatively high
market potential, experience in attracting FDI, and weak intellectual property protection will
provide a very high incentive for foreign investors to utilise full control entry modes when
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entering into China. Chinese partners' high level of opportunism, low levels of technical
absorptive capacity and lack of performance will intensify foreign investors desire to take full
control over their foreign operations in China. On the other hand, government restrictions in
certain sectors will prevent foreign entrants' utilising WFOE's or majority EJV's.
MNC's following a global strategy, who have relatively high levels of international and host
country experience and are transferring high level of intellectual property will be advised to
utilise a WFOE when entering into China, provided it has sufficient resources. On the other
hand, firms entering into fast growing industries that lack the required experience, market
access, government connections and are transferring lower levels of intellectual property,
should utilise an EJV.
South Africa's relatively short diplomatic relationship and high cultural distance from China,
coupled with lack of host country experience will reduce the motivation of South African firms'
to utilise WFOE's in China. However the weak intellectual property protection and the large
potential market potential of China may still persuade South African firms to adopt a WFOE
when entering China.
Finally, foreign entrants to China should take caution not to simply utilise a WFOE in China.
Firstly, the empirical work of Pan, Li & Tse (1999), and Pan & Chi (1999) have clearly shown
that EJV's performed better than both WFOE's and CJV's in terms of profitability and market
share. Secondly, this study suggested an evolutionary approach to entering the Chinese
market. A representative office should be used for the first phase of entry to do market
research, establish relationships with the government, customers and potential partners. If
an entrant lack international and host country experience, it will be fruitful to first transfer
mature technology on a limited scale in an EJV. Upon gaining the valuable market and host
country experience, subsequent transfers of high technology can be done through WFOE's.
7.3 Recommendations
This study added value in two ways. Firstly, it integrated all the dominant theories of entry
mode choice in a logical framework for considering entry mode decisions. Previous studies
were limited to only one or a few theoretical departure points. Secondly, it applied the
framework to the Chinese business situations and made propositions for the China-specific
situation.
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Two limitations of the study should be noted. Firstly, only a literature review was employed
and as a result the propositions were not empirically tested. Secondly, entry mode choice
was studied in isolation from other market entry strategy factors.
Recommendations are firstly, that the MEMDFFIC should be empirically tested on a
representative sample of MNC's in China. Secondly, the framework should be extended to
include other aspects of the market entry strategy. Figure 57 indicates the MEMDFFIC dealt
only with the entry mode decisions, while the diversification-, timing and location decisions
should be incorporated.
Figure 57: Market Entry Strategy Decision Framework for Foreign Investors in China.
Determinants?
MEMDFFIC
Entry Modes Decision?
• Representative.Office
• Contractual Joint Venture
• Equity JOintVenture
(Minority/50-5QIMajority)
• WFOE
• JSLC
~~ Performance?
Determinants?
Determinants?
Determinants?
Diversification Mode
Decision
• Merger
• Acquisition
• Greenfield Start-up
Timing Decision:
• Early Entrant
• Early Follower
• Late Entrant
Location Decision:
• Special Economic Zone
• Coastal Area's
• Less Developed West
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The diversification mode deals with the question of whether to enter the market by means of
an acquisition or to develop the new venture internally (Hennart & Reddy: 1997, Busija et al:
1997, Capener: 1998; UNCTAD: 1999, Zeira & Newburry: 1999; Milman: 1999, Mata &
Portugal: 2000; Hennart & Reddy: 2000; Chi: 2000, Brouthers & Brouther: 2000). Entry
timing deals with the question of whether to be an early entrant, early follower or late entrant
(Mascarenhas: 1992; Saggi: 1998, Luo, Y. 1998, Chen: 1999, Isobe et. al.:2000) while the
final decision will be a choice on where specifically to locate the new project (Erramilli &
Argwal et al.: 1996, Chen & Chen: 1998). Research on these three areas need to
incorporate both the determinant and performance dimensions.
Finally, the most important next step to enhance the MEMDFFIC will be to empirically
research the relative importance of each entry mode determinant or group of determinants.
Once the relative weight of each factor is determined, foreign entrants will be able to utilise
the framework very accurately as a predictor of ownership level in a foreign invested
enterprise in China.
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